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Abstract 
 
Thousands of rural households along the South African coast rely on fisheries 
resources, forest products and agricultural resources in order to support their 
livelihoods. These customary livelihoods have continued in many rural areas despite 
restrictive policies and laws during the colonial and apartheid administrations. More 
contemporary restrictions have emerged in the post-1994 democratic state due to an 
expansion of the conservation estate and increased efforts to improve compliance in 
existing protected areas. This conservation drive is due largely to environmental 
concerns as well as the country’s international and national commitments to enhance 
biodiversity protection. Statutory conservation governance in rural areas in South 
Africa often operates in parallel to traditional and customary systems of governance. 
This results in confusion and conflict emanating from the plurality of governance 
systems, actors and institutions whose powers, roles and approaches are informed by 
different norms, discourses, values, images and worldviews. This study seeks to 
enhance understanding about the conceptual linkages between livelihoods and plural 
governance systems, using the case study of Kosi Bay, a coastal region in northern 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. This was done using a case study methodology and 
empirical research to: a) describe livelihood strategies; b) identify and document 
statutory, traditional and customary governance structures linked to coastal resource 
governance; c) explore the norms, discourses, images, values and worldviews that 
have informed coastal resource governance in this area; d) review and analyse the 
influences of plural coastal governance systems on livelihood strategies; e) contribute 
towards conceptual frameworks that link livelihoods and governance and; f) make 
recommendations for improved livelihoods and governance in rural areas in the South 
African context and beyond. The study underscores the manner in which legal 
pluralism and historical context affect and influence governance processes, and 
demonstrates that the day-to-day livelihoods of rural people are diverse and dynamic, 
and can be profoundly affected by meta-level and institutional governance processes 
and practices. It concludes by highlighting the manner in which legal pluralism and 
historical context significantly affect and influence governance processes that shape 
rural livelihoods, and provides a set of recommendations for consideration. 
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Globally, rural people engage in webs of livelihood activities and combine a set or 
portfolio of activities and strategies to make a living (Scoones, 2009). In the African 
continent, communities have relied on a variety of sectors such as fisheries, tourism, 
agriculture, forestry and mining in order to devise livelihood strategies (Fabricius, 
2004; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004). Livelihood strategies can be understood as 
“the range and combination of activities and choices that people make and undertake 
in order to achieve their livelihood outcomes” (Baumann, 2002:17). Livelihood 
strategies tend to be complex and related to short- and long-term livelihood gains 
(Baumann, 2002). This is particularly true for rural contexts where people reside in 
environments that are rich in natural resources, such as coastal zones. 
 
Through highlighting capabilities, equity and sustainability, the sustainable 
livelihoods approach (Scoones, 1998; Allison and Horemans, 2006) has been 
instrumental in illuminating insights into how people in rural environments combine 
different types of livelihood resources in order to formulate livelihood strategies. The 
sustainable livelihoods body of work provides an avenue for the recognition of the 
complexities of the livelihood strategies of people whose lives are susceptible to 
stresses and shocks; whether environmental, social or policy driven (Allison, 2003). 
This is pertinent for rural coastal areas around the world where coastal resources have 
and continue to be a significant source of food and livelihood security for 
impoverished and marginalised people. 
 
The research described in the present study seeks to understand the relationship 
between governance and livelihoods by elucidating understanding about rural coastal 
livelihood strategies and highlighting the manner through which they are shaped, 
influenced and reproduced by natural resource governance systems. It draws on both 
livelihoods and governance bodies of literature in order to contribute towards building 
stronger linkages between livelihoods analyses and governance debates. Although 
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there is no universal definition of “governance”, Kooiman and Bavinck (2005:17) 
define it as “the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal 
problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application 
of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them”. 
Institutions can be defined as systems for enforcing established rules and norms that 
structure society, while organizations are structures (such as industries and 
companies) made up of different actors with common or conflicting objectives (North 
1994; Hodgson 2006). Policies, principles, regulations, rules and arrangements are 
institutional mechanisms used by organizations governing natural resource use and 
access. According to Umali (2009:5), formal and informal institutions exist as 
“distinct frameworks of rules for doing things”, implemented through organizations to 
produce, reproduce and reinforce social relations. 
 
In many developing countries, statutory and customary governance systems tend to 
operate in parallel with each other in rural contexts, and there is a strong prevalence 
of competing and overlapping resource-use systems coupled with competing modes 
of governance (Cousins, 2000; Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). In the Southern African 
context, governance, control and ownership of land and natural resources are 
considered inherently complex because of various factors, including: the 
interdependency of socio-ecological systems; the involvement of a plethora of actors 
with conflicting views and interests; the lack of democratic reform in property rights 
regimes currently employed in the management of the resources; the cross-boundary 
nature of the resources; as well as high-level contestations and tensions linked to 
access and use of the resources by different interest groups (Ramutsindela, 2008; 
Sowman and Wynberg, 2014). As a result, plural legal and institutional systems are 
an intricate part of historically produced political, economic, socio-ecological and 
cultural systems in natural resource governance (Bob and Banoo, 2002; 
Ramutsindela, 2008). 
 
Legal pluralism is a characteristic feature in various developing countries as there is 
usually limited capacity to ensure coherence between multiple coexisting systems of 
rule, especially in the governance of natural resources (Bavinck and Gupta, 2014). 
Gupta and Bavinck (2014:86) define legal pluralism as “a condition whereby different 
rule systems apply to identical situations and legal jurisdictions and specific groups 
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across legal jurisdictions”, meaning that “different types of rules made by different 
governance actors apply to the same area or group of people.” The plurality that 
emanates from the existence of multiple-rule systems may be a result of history, as 
well as the consequence of a shift from government to governance (Bavinck and 
Gupta, 2014). Bavinck and Gupta (2014) assert that laws usually emerge from local 
customs, and point out that in ancient civilisations around the world, local 
communities developed their own rules to manage resource-use systems, such as 
water and agriculture. However, as time went on and rules spread, new rules were 
developed and were superimposed onto existing rules. Legal pluralism gained 
popularity in the last two decades, especially in interdisciplinary fields like natural 
resource governance, where governance largely involves multiple legal orders, 
consisting of multiple actors with conflicting goals to manage the same resource or 
area (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002; Tamanaha, 2007). 
 
In a study conducted by Abdulai and Siwar (2011) in Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria, 
the findings reveal a strong link between governance and enhanced livelihoods 
sustainability. Allison (2003) also found that within the European context, livelihood 
strategies of rural fishing communities, and their potential to be diversified, are 
impacted significantly by governance systems, especially ones that are based on 
sectoral policies that undermine people’s livelihood strategies. This means that the 
ability of rural people to formulate their day-to-day livelihoods largely depends on 
governance systems that regulate access to resources needed for people’s livelihood 
strategies. 
 
Mehta et al., (1999:39) posit that there is a “nexus of interactions between issues of 
governance, institutions and livelihoods” and this should inform how we understand 
natural resources and their governance in the context of rural livelihoods. This is 
crucial because in marginalised rural contexts along the coast there is an abundance of 
natural resources contested by multi-level and plural governance institutions operating 
at international, national, regional and local levels. It is challenging to understand how 
such governance systems impact on or influence how rural people make a living and 
maneuver within these complex governance structures. 
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Moreover, political ecology debates highlight the challenges presented by 
conservation governance by focusing on the role of power in natural resource 
governance, the social constructions of nature that shape how governance 
interventions are designed and implemented (and by whom), as well as how 
knowledge is valued in decision-making processes (Armitage, 2009). Peet and Watts 
(2004), as well as Robbins (2004) also note that political ecology underlines 
complexities within and between human-environment relationships, which have 
implications on livelihood sustainability. This is pertinent for the South African 
context as the post-apartheid government has since 1994 established policy and 
legislative frameworks to increase the protection of threatened resources and 
biodiversity in order to fulfil international obligations and national conservation 
targets, while simultaneously recognising the rights of previously dispossessed 
communities to benefit from the coastal resources. This has proved to be challenging 
and has led to conflicts between local resource dependent communities and 
conservation authorities (Crane, 2006). Hence, the relationship between biodiversity 
protection and the access of indigenous or traditional communities to resources and 
livelihood needs is highly contested in South Africa. Furthermore, there has been 
limited success in reconciling rural development, environmental governance and land 
reform, especially in rural areas (Kepe et al., 2003; Fabricius and Koch, 2004). 
 
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The overall aim of this study is to enhance understanding about the relationship 
between livelihoods and governance, using the Kosi Bay case study which is located 
in the KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa. This is done with the view to develop 
conceptual ideas that strengthen debates on the relationship between livelihoods and 
governance, in order to highlight the manner in which governance processes and 
practices influence rural livelihoods.  
The specific objectives of this study are: 
a) to describe historical and contemporary livelihood strategies of people in Kosi 
Bay; 
b) to identify and document the statutory, traditional and customary coastal 
resource governance systems in Kosi Bay; 
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c) to explore the norms, discourses, values, images and worldviews that have 
informed the governance of coastal resources in Kosi Bay from international 
down to local level; 
d) to review and analyse the influences of the plural coastal governance systems 
on livelihood strategies of the Kosi Bay community; and 
e) to contribute towards conceptual frameworks that link livelihoods and 
governance analytical frameworks;and  
f) to make recommendations for improved governance in rural areas in the South 
African context. 
 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
 
One of the main reasons why this study is important is that it seeks to contribute 
towards enhancing knowledge about the role of governance, including institutional 
dynamics and power relations, embedded within systems that govern coastal resources 
in shaping the livelihood choices of people residing in rural environments. In the 
conceptual bodies of work within livelihoods and governance literature concerning 
natural resources, much of the emphasis is either on livelihoods or governance, 
respectively. There is very limited literature (Mbatha, 2011; Wynberg and Hauck, 
2014; Sunde, 2014; Sowman, 2015), particularly in the Southern African context, 
which examines the relationships or interactions between plural governance systems 
and rural livelihoods. 
 
One of the pioneers of sustainable livelihoods perspectives, Scoones (2009), suggests 
that in order for livelihoods perspectives to remain relevant in the twenty-first 
century, scholars need to develop theoretical grounds that link livelihoods to 
governance debates. This is pertinent and relevant for the South African context 
where environmental protection and land appropriation during colonial and apartheid 
eras resulted in the exclusion and displacement of many people in rural areas, as 
environmental protection was designed in ways that only focused on ecological and 
economic dimensions, but not adequately (if at all) on human dimensions (Sunde, 
2014). Since the beginning of South Africa’s democracy in 1994, efforts have been 
made to increase the participation of previously disadvantaged communities in 
gaining access to manage and benefit from natural resources (Hauck and Sowman, 
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2003; Ntsebeza, 2004; Mbatha, 2011; Wynberg and Hauck, 2014). One of the primary 
aims of national government in the post-apartheid era has been to decentralise 
decision-making power to local-level actors and to improve the livelihoods of 
previously disadvantaged people by redressing past inequities, such as unequal access 
to land and resources (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2004). However, it 
remains unclear what post-apartheid legal reforms mean for areas where coastal 
resources are governed at multiple levels, and where statutory institutions operate 
parallel to customary institutions. 
 
For instance, in July 1997, South Africa ratified the World Heritage Convention, 
joining 193 other states (UNESCO, 2017). This international policy instrument 
provides the framework that informs the protection and preservation of world heritage 
in South Africa. The rural livelihoods implications of the adoption of such a policy 
instrument and the establishment of South Africa’s first World Heritage Site, 
iSimangaliso, in 1999, are only partially known or understood.  
 
Some of the other factors that influence the manner in which poverty is distributed 
along the coast of South Africa include racial and geographical segregation where 
areas occupied by black and coloured people (former homelands, informal settlements 
and townships) are still marginalised and vulnerable, while those predominantly 
occupied by other racial groups (mostly white) are largely developed (Glavovic and 
Boonzaier, 2007). Increases in income inequality in South Africa in the post-apartheid 
era also highlight the marginalisation of rural areas. Income inequality in South Africa 
is not only racially distributed but also spatially distributed, and its impacts are mostly 
felt in former homeland areas where the highest number of poorest people in the 
country live (Leibbrandt et al., 2010; Neves and du Toit., 2013). Former homelands or 
Bantustans account for 43 percent of the South African population (Neves and du 
Toit, 2013), while approximately 69 percent of South Africa’s poor population resides 
in rural areas (National Treasury, 2011). Consistent with this, the poorest provinces in 
the country are said to be the ones that constitute the former homelands, i.e. Eastern 
Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. This highlights that more work 
needs to be done to improve our understanding of why such trends still persist and 
shape the nature of livelihood strategies in rural South Africa. Also, due to historical 
patterns of racialisation, land dispossession, as well as poor government investments 
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in rural areas since colonial and apartheid periods, many rural households suffer from 
livelihood insecurity (Neves and du Toit, 2013). 
 
Another obstacle facing efforts that seek to promote livelihood sustainability in South 
Africa is the legal pluralism that exists in rural areas. In Kosi Bay, legal pluralism 
prevails as statutory, traditional and customary institutions all play a role in the 
governance of resources and livelihood activities. Customary law in South Africa is 
still relevant in the governance of land and natural resources in various rural 
communities that reside on communal land, and is recognised under Section 211 of 
the country’s constitution. According to Bennet (2008:138), customary law refers to 
the “social practices considered to be obligatory by the communities in which they 
operate”, while “living customary law” further refers to customary law “actually 
observed by the people who created it”. In South Africa, statutory and customary laws 
are recognised as equal sources of law under the Constitution of South Africa, while 
customary law and customary institutions are recognised as long as they are 
consistent with the Bill of Rights.  
 
In the colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, customary law was weakened by 
laws that transferred powers to traditional authorities who were seen as effective 
agents of ruling indigenous communities (Cordell, 1991). Traditional institutions such 
as in rural areas are not usually directly involved in the management of natural 
resources, but they hold significant powers at the local level that were entrenched by 
colonial and apartheid governments in former Bantustans or homeland areas (Koelble, 
2005). These institutions are currently formally recognised in Chapter 12 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
However, since the democratic dispensation in 1994, the roles and functions of 
traditional institutions alongside those of democratically elected institutions (i.e. 
municipalities) within rural areas have remained unresolved. That is why since 1994 
traditional institutions and democratically elected government leaders in rural areas 
compete for political power and legitimacy (Logan, 2008). 
 
During the colonial and apartheid eras, traditional institutions in South Africa were 
given land administration roles and had uncontested powers in rural areas, but were 
unaccountable and undemocratic (Ntsebeza, 2004). However, after 1994, the South 
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African government made efforts to decentralise local government, land 
administration and other administrative powers to newly created democratic local 
government institutions. The Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) and the 
Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) were developed by the post-apartheid 
government in order to dissolve traditional authority powers in rural areas in the 
democratic dispensation (Koelble, 2005). Although these laws have been critical in 
promoting democratic decentralisation in rural South Africa, the government has been 
pressurised by proponents of traditional leadership into simultaneously strengthening 
the powers of traditional authority powers instead of weakening them. This was done 
through the promulgation of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act (TLGFA) (No. 41 of 2003) and the National House of Traditional Leaders Act 
(No. 22 of 2009) which give traditional leaders administrative powers both at 
provincial and local levels (Koeble, 2005). 
 
There remains much ambiguity about the role of traditional institutions in relation to 
customary institutions that exist in places such as Kosi Bay (Sunde, 2014). Customary 
institutions usually predate colonial times in South Africa, but the terms “customary” 
and “traditional” institutions are usually used interchangeably, when they tend to refer 
to two different systems of rule. The ambiguity about the difference between 
traditional and customary institutions could be attributed to the definitions provided 
by pieces of legislation such as the TLGFA (Republic of South Africa, 2003:8) which 
define traditional leadership as “customary institutions or structures, or customary 
systems or procedures of governance, recognised, utilised or practiced by traditional 
communities”. Meanwhile, the Act defines customary institutions as “institutions or 
structures established in terms of customary law” (Republic of South Africa, 2003:6). 
It is apparent that the law does not clearly distinguish between traditional and 
customary institutions, which is arguably erroneous, given that traditional institutions 
in certain rural areas were orchestrated by colonial and apartheid governments, and in 
other areas they were altered from customary institutions, which are usually regarded 
as more representative of wider rural communities and their interests. In communities 
such as Kosi Bay, customary institutions involved in governing coastal resources are 
distinct from traditional institutions and operate in a more democratic and 
downwardly accountable fashion (Sunde, 2013). The authority of traditional 
institutions usually overrides the authority of customary institutions (Ntsebeza, 2006, 
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Delius, 2008). However, there is increasing evidence that customary institutions are 
regarded as the relevant and more accountable sources of authority in various rural 
communities (Sunde, 2013; Sunde, 2014; Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016). Consequently, 
this study seeks to make a conceptual distinction between the traditional and 
customary institutions, which are incorrectly understood as synonymous in various 
contexts. 
 
Understanding local context in terms of livelihoods and governance is significant, and 
this is noted by Scoones (2009) in his review of a decade of livelihoods literature. 
Scoones (2009) reflects on some of the limitations of sustainable livelihoods 
approaches, and on the wide application of simplistic or predictive frameworks that 
render technical the complex nuances of the livelihoods of rural people that have 
dominated development thinking since the early 1990s. This means that the simplistic 
frameworks that have been used over the decades for conducting livelihoods analyses 
that have not taken into account the nuanced complexity that comes with 
understanding livelihoods in different contexts. In this account, Scoones (2009) 
highlights the significance of context and the fact that simplistic frameworks cannot 
capture how different people live in different places. Moreover, Scoones (2009) 
emphasises the significance of interdisciplinary approaches that combine natural and 
social science perspectives in livelihoods analyses. 
 
Among the other shortcomings of livelihoods perspectives listed by Scoones (2009) is 
the fact that livelihoods perspectives have failed to effectively link livelihoods to 
governance debates in the development agenda. Scoones (2009:12) adds that 
livelihoods perspectives  
 
had in many respects got stuck, both intellectually and practically. 
The weak and sometimes confusing and contradictory 
theorization of politics and power, meant that an intellectual 
articulation with both mainstream political science governance 
debates and more radical agrarian change discussions was 
missing.  
 
This means that although the discourses of power, politics and governance within 
sustainable livelihoods debates were introduced by some researchers in the 1990s, 
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these never really surfaced and were shunned for requiring more qualitative rather 
than quantitative analyses (i.e. too complex for economists who focused on seeking 
ways to quantify poverty reduction). Consequently, one of the major criticisms of 
livelihoods perspectives from the past two decades is that they have given little 
attention to issues relating to power and politics involved in the processes of 
governance of natural resources that implicate rural livelihoods in the Global South 
(Scoones, 2009). This is exacerbated by the fact that various scholars of livelihoods 
and commons have adopted economics-based and apolitical analyses of natural 
resource governance. This could be seen as problematic as issues of access, equity, 
marginalisation, insecurity, vulnerability and poor governance are prevalent in many 
cases where governance of natural resources interacts with rural livelihoods (Agrawal, 
2003; 2005). 
 
Brockington and Wilkie (2015) confirm that there is a gap in the literature in terms of 
exploring the link between natural resource governance regimes (i.e. World Heritage 
Sites, Marine Protected Areas, Nature Reserves) and their related practices, and how 
they impact on livelihoods and on the well-being of people on the ground. 
Brockington and Wilkie (2015) also point out that there is a research gap in 
evaluating conservation policies, such as protected areas, using a livelihoods lens. 
This is why in many cases protected areas persistently produce outcomes which 
benefit certain actors, while the losses are skewed towards more marginalised actors 
such as rural communities. These dynamics are not usually highlighted in protected 
area evaluations, and this study uses the livelihoods lens to highlight this. 
 
Through empirical research drawing upon a triangulation of qualitative and 
quantitative data collected using interdisciplinary approaches and methodologies, this 
case study of Kosi Bay seeks to explore and highlight how governance systems 
influence the livelihood strategies of marginalised rural communities. This is 
particularly pertinent because there is a lack of an accurate and holistic understanding 
of the socio-economic and livelihood impacts of international natural resource 
governance instruments on local contexts. This study brings in the voices of rural 
communities, as well as those of other relevant governance actors, in order to provide 
an in-depth and contextual understanding about whether policy objectives of 
conservation governance regimes match realities on the ground, whether they enable 
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or hinder livelihoods strategies of people living among or adjacent to the resources, 
and the reasons for these.  
1.4 CASE STUDY SITE: KOSI BAY, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This research was conducted in Kosi Bay, located in the northeastern coast of South 
Africa, near the Mozambique border. Three coastal villages were chosen in Kosi Bay 
for this study. These villages, Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and KwaDapha (Figure 1.1), 
are under the Tembe traditional authority. Kosi Bayis located within and adjacent to 
the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and within the wider Maputaland1 region that is 
largely occupied by the descendants of the late Thonga king, Mabhudu (Kloppers, 
2003). The people who reside in the area weave together their livelihood strategies 
using coastal resources, and engage in activities such as fishing (in the lakes as well 
as on intertidal zones along the coast), forestry (i.e. harvesting indigenous forest 
products and plantation forestry), eco-tourism and agriculture. There are also 
historical links between communities from the south of Mozambique and Kosi Bay in 
Maputaland, since many of the Thonga people residing in Kosi Bay originate from 
Mozambique (Jury et al., 2009). 
 
Maputaland has been heavily contested over the past four centuries by: a) imperial 
powers which included the Portuguese, the British, Germans and the Dutch, b) the 
South African government (colonial, nationalist and democratic), c) two houses of the 
Tembe royal family (i.e. Ngwanase house and Makhuza house), as well as d) other 
clans in Maputaland (i.e. the Ngubanes, Mathenjwas and Mkhontos) who claim that 
they ruled the land before the Tembe arrived in the area. These contestations are still 
alive in the present day and affect the governability of coastal resources in the area by 
increasing the level of complexity in terms of governance (Webster, 1991; Mthethwa, 
2002; Guyot, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
1Historically, Kosi Bay was part of what used to be the southern Maputaland area, which was 
independent before it was annexed into what is now known as the KwaZulu-Natal province. 
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Figure 1.1: Kosi Bay (modified from Kyle, 2013). 
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The Kosi Bay system consists of five unique ecological systems, i.e. dune forests, 
grasslands, sandy beaches, tidal zones and coral reef zones (Guyot, 2005). It 
comprises an ecologically unique lake system, which, because of its rich biodiversity, 
is part of an environment that is protected as a natural site by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) through the mechanism 
of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. The three villages that were included in this 
study also fall under the Tembe Coastal Forest Reserve and are adjacent to the 
Maputaland Marine Protected Area (MPA) that is regulated by national legislation. 
The iSimangaliso site was declared South Africa’s first World Heritage Site in 1999 
because its natural attributes are considered of global significance, and thus needed to 
be conserved for both local people, as well as the international community. However, 
formal conservation in areas within the boundaries of iSimangaliso has existed for 
over 100 years, and the St. Lucia Nature Reserve is one of the oldest protected areas 
in Africa, having been established in 1895 (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011). The 
reasons for the progressive creation of protected areas within the boundaries of 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site is said to be motivated by the need to protect 
increasing populations of hippopotamuses, sea turtles and black rhinoceros within the 
system (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). The iSimangaliso site was declared to be of 
“world heritage” status as it met three of the ten criteria of UNESCO (2017) for the 
selection of cultural and natural heritage globally. These include: 
a) to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural 
beauty and aesthetic importance; 
b) to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and 
biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh 
water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals; 
and 
c) to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ 
conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened 
species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or 
conservation. 
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The iSimangaliso Authority is the legal entity charged with overseeing the 
management of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. The iSimangaliso Authority 
states that it seeks to promote the preservation and conservation of natural heritage, 
while ensuring that economic benefits from the World Heritage Site be optimised 
where they can contribute towards poverty alleviation in its region, as it is one of the 
poorest regions in the country. According to iSimangaliso Authority (2012; 2016), the 
need to balance the preservation and conservation of resources protected under world 
heritage status while recognising the economic and social problems in the area created 
by historical patterns of marginalisation, is a major challenge. The iSimangaliso 
Authority states that they are aware of the challenges associated with seeking to strike 
a balance between conservation and rural development, especially in a country with a 
democratic constitution that seeks to provide redress to imbalances created by 
colonial and apartheid legacies (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). However, research 
conducted by Guyot (2005) and Hansen (2013; 2014) indicates that communities 
residing within the boundaries of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site continue to 
face marginalisation, and the imbalances perpetrated by colonial and apartheid eras 
persist. 
 
In terms of broader coastal resource governance, the rural coastal community of Kosi 
Bay resides in the midst of a myriad of coastal activities (i.e. fishing, forestry and 
tourism) and governance arrangements for the Kosi Bay system. These include the 
UNESCO World Heritage Site, a Ramsar2 site, the Maputaland MPA, the Tembe 
Coastal Forest Reserve, as well as the Ponta Do Ouro – Kosi Bay Trans-Frontier 
Conservation Area. Moreover, statutory institutions for conservation governance 
operate parallel to traditional authority structures under the Tembe Tribal Authority, 
as well as customary institutions that are long-standing within the area. There is also 
an existing land claim3 on World Heritage Site land by the members of the Kosi Bay 
community that were historically forcibly removed for conservation during the 
apartheid era. The following subsections provide brief overviews of the three villages 
included in this study. Further details on the criteria for case study selection are 
																																																								
2Areas protected under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. 
3As part of land restitution claims laid in iSimangaliso Wetland Park under the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act (No. 22 of 1994). 
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provided in Chapter Two, while Chapter Six provides a detailed overview of the three 
villages. 
1.4.1 Mvutshane village 
 
Mvutshane village (formerly known as Enhlangwini, also currently known as Trelfal) 
consists of approximately 600 homesteads and is located on the northern-most coast 
of Kosi Bay, adjacent to the border between the KwaZulu-Natal province and 
Mozambique (Figure 1.1). This village is currently located on the buffer zone4 of the 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and within the Tembe Coastal Forest Reserve. 
During the time of this research, a large number of people from Mvutshane village 
engaged in livelihood activities that included fishing, agriculture and the harvesting of 
forest products within the bounds of the World Heritage Site. Fishing is mainly 
carried out using fish traps within the Kosi system (Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). 
1.4.2 Nkovukeni village 
 
The second village that formed part of this study is known as Nkovukeni. Not only is 
this village marginalised in terms of livelihoods, it is also geographically remote and 
bordered by Lake Makhawulani and Lake Mpungwini (locally respectively referred to 
as Lake 1 and Lake 2) which separate the village from the mainland (Figure 1.1). As a 
result, local people have to wade (or sometimes swim) across these lakes in order to 
access the nearest town, schools and other amenities. 
People from Nkovukeni rely heavily on marine resources for livelihoods, especially 
fishing with fish traps in the estuary and Lake Makhawulani. Fishing is carried out 
mostly by men and women harvest mussels on the coast. Forests arelargely used for 
firewood, and sometimes for food. 
1.4.3 KwaDapha village 
 
The village of KwaDapha is also geographically remote. People in the village are 
largely involved in tourism, fishing and agriculture. There is also a popular turtle-
																																																								
4This refers to the ‘zone of influence’ established by the iSimangaliso Authority in terms of 
the World Heritage Convention Act and the National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Act that place obligations on park authorities to delineate zones on the outer edges of 
the park that are restricted in order to optimise conservation within the boundaries of the park 
(ISimangaliso Authority, 2016). 
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nesting site in KwaDapha that employs people from the village. People in the village 
rely heavily on forests for firewood because there is no electricity (as is also the case 
in the other two villages). Fishing in Lake kuNhlange (Lake 3), which is closest to the 
village, had been an important livelihood activity in KwaDapha for many years, but 
was prohibited by conservation rules at the time of this research. Increased numbers 
of wild animals such as hippopotamuses and snakes also pose threats to people’s 
livelihood activities. Further details of livelihood strategies of people in KwaDapha 
are discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
	
Figure 1.2: Fish traps on the Kosi estuary and lake system (photo: Philile Mbatha) 
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Figure 1.3: Fish traps on the Kosi estuary and lake system (photo: Philile Mbatha) 
	
1.5 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the context of the study, as well as the 
rationale for why this study is relevant. The broader aim and specific objectives of 
this study were explained, and the case study sites introduced. This chapter also 
outlined the theoretical contribution that this study seeks to make. 
 
Chapter Two outlines the research approach and methodology that were adopted in 
this study. A description of the interdisciplinary, qualitative and quantitative research 
methods used in this study is provided. Data analysis and triangulation conducted for 
this study is also explained in Chapter Two. 
 
Chapter Three consists of the literature review that explains the conceptual framework 
for linking livelihoods to governance debates. The key theoretical ideas and bodies of 
literature relevant to the concepts of governance and livelihoods underpinning this 
study are discussed in this chapter. Other key strands of literature outlined in this 
chapter include literature on legal pluralism, institutions as well as political ecology. 
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Chapter Four presents a historical review of traditional governance in Kosi Bay, 
focusing on the periods from the 1940s to the present day, including the evolution of 
traditional governance, as well as livelihoods. The story of Kosi Bay is told drawing 
from oral histories conducted in this study, as well as from other archival information 
and documentary evidence. This chapter also discusses the influences that colonial 
and apartheid histories had in shaping coastal governance and livelihood strategies in 
Kosi Bay. 
 
Chapter Five outlines the broader legal and institutional context that underpins coastal 
governance in South Africa and Kosi Bay, from the macro-level down to the micro-
level. The different sources of law and associated institutions and institutional 
arrangements related to this study are described comprehensively. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the livelihood strategies of the people of the three villages of 
Kosi Bay where this study is based, i.e. Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and KwaDapha.  
 
Thereafter, Chapter Seven analyses how conservation governance has, over time, 
influenced and shifted the livelihood strategies of local people and the ways in which 
local people have adapted (or not), to the shifts. 
 
Chapter Eight is the discussion chapter of the dissertation. It outlines some of the key 
themes that emerge from this study and relates them to some of the key debates in the 
literature. The links between governance and livelihoods debates are also explored in-
depth in Chapter Eight, after which Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter of the 
dissertation. 
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 CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH APPROACH 
AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes the research approach and the methodology used for data 
collection and analysis. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect 
data. In order to obtain in-depth understanding about the evolution of livelihood 
strategies over time in Kosi Bay, this research utilised a case-study approach. This 
approach involved the use of the Kosi Bay area as a lens for understanding how 
livelihood strategies are influenced by governance systems. Due to the limited 
information available on the linkages between livelihoods and plural governance 
systems in rural contexts in South Africa, the case-study approach, complemented by 
quantitative and qualitative data collection methods, was pivotal.  
 
Qualitative data collection techniques applied in this study included focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, oral history interviews, mapping, transect 
walks, ethnography as well as researcher observations. Household surveys were used 
for both qualitative and quantitative data collection. Relevant policy, legal and 
institutional documentary evidence were also used, together with key informant 
interviews in order to enhance understanding about the governance systems in 
question. Lastly, this study also made use of archival materials in order to enrich 
understanding about the historical context of Kosi Bay and Maputaland. 
 
2.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
2.2.1 The case-study approach 
 
Case-study research is “a research strategy that focuses on understanding dynamics 
present within single settings”, and combines data collection methods like interviews, 
questionnaires and observations to produce qualitative and/or quantitative evidence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:534). In this study, the case-study research is not intended to 
generate findings that are generalizable, but geared towards understanding why things 
are the way they are, and provides an in-depth and rich insight pertaining to the 
	
20	
	
particular problem or phenomenon being studied (Noor, 2008). Kosi Bay is the 
chosen case study site for this research, as it exists in the midst of a myriad of coastal 
activities and governance arrangements for the Kosi Bay system. This research has 
therefore sought to develop an understanding about the livelihoods of the people in 
the area, and how they are influenced by the plural governance systems governing 
land and natural resources in the area. 
Household surveys, focus groups discussions, transect walks, oral history interviews, 
key informant interviews, observations, ethnography and documentary evidence were 
used to collect data about the phenomena that was being researched. A substantial 
amount of the data collected for this study is informed by sources on the ground and 
triangulated with other pre-existing information from historical archives, policy and 
legal documents, secondary documentary evidence (historical and current), and other 
secondary sources.  
 
2.2.2 A systems approach for studying “wicked problems” 
 
Governing coastal resources has been termed a “wicked problem”, as concerns 
relating to the use and management of the resources and rural livelihoods are usually 
in conflict and difficult to reconcile (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2008). Coastal 
governance is also considered a wicked problem because of the inherent complexity 
of sectors, actors, resource uses and institutions that usually co-exist along the coast. 
Moreover, natural systems and social systems that are found in coastal zones are 
complex within themselves, and therefore understanding the interactions between 
them requires rigorous interdisciplinary or systems approaches that bridge biophysical 
and social sciences (Berkes et al., 2003).  
 
“Systems thinking” or “a systems approach” emerged as a critique to reductionism in 
the twentieth century, and is based upon the premise that systemic phenomena, such 
as coastal ecosystems, need to be understood in an interrelated fashion (Flood, 2001). 
This is contrary to a reductionist approach, which is based on studying one 
component of a phenomenon at a time, which would be erroneous in the case of 
wicked problems where an understanding of the interactions between different 
components of the system is required. A systems approach is pertinent for this study 
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in particular because there is an abundance of resources and biodiversity along the 
coast that is contested by various actors and stakeholders at international, national, 
regional and local levels. Kosi Bay is therefore a useful lens for enabling 
understanding about how these multiple governance systems impact on or influence 
how rural people make a living and maneuver the nuances of complex governance 
structures. 
2.3 CASE STUDY SELECTION 
 
Research conducted by various scholars along rural coastal areas in Southern Africa 
(Raemaekers, 2009; Mbatha, 2011; Emdon, 2013; Sunde, 2014), have highlighted the 
apparent mismatches between the stated objectives of coastal governance 
arrangements and the realities of marginalised rural coastal communities on the 
ground. This is what prompted my use of Kosi Bay as a lens to understand how 
conservation governance that is influenced by international instruments such as the 
UNESCO World Heritage Convention, is interpreted and plays out in rural contexts of 
developing countries, and what the implications are for the livelihoods of rural 
communities residing within or adjacent to such areas. This is pertinent in the South 
African context, given that the country has a long history of marginalisation of black 
rural communities (i.e., during the colonial and apartheid eras) in terms of access to 
natural resources.  
 
In order to gain the rich knowledge that a case-study research approach offers, I was 
based in the Kosi Bay community for periods during the years 2012, 2013, 2015 and 
2016. My time spent there was approximately six months in total. During this time, I 
was accommodated in one of the villages within the communities, and obtained 
permission from the traditional authorities and customary structures to conduct the 
research. As a result, I lived with families from the community, partaking in their 
everyday activities. During my stay, I developed a relationship with community 
members and conducted observations of the behaviors and livelihoods of the 
communities. Due to the fact that my first language is isiZulu (which is also the most 
commonly used local language in Kosi Bay), it was easy for me to develop trust and 
rapport with community members. This enabled me to obtain a rich understanding of 
the people in this community and their livelihoods. 
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Field assistants from the community were employed and trained in order to assist with 
the data collection process for this research, particularly for the household surveys 
and focus group discussions. This was done so that the communities could benefit 
from the research and in order to obtain a deeper insight into the different dynamics of 
the communities by obtaining the assistance of people who reside there. Before and 
during the commencement of the household surveys in each community, I conducted 
several informal interviews with community members and coastal resource users, in 
order to understand how they used the resources and their perceptions about resource 
access, use and management. The local field assistants that I had trained and the 
families that I lived with were helpful in educating me about the history and dynamics 
of the communities.  
 
The three villages in Kosi Bay that were chosen for data collection in this study were 
chosen on the premise that they are the only three coastal villages of Kosi Bay, and 
the other villages of Kosi Bay are more inland, and would not have been appropriate 
for this study since it sought to understand coastal livelihood strategies. People in 
these three villages also have a long history of harvesting coastal resources for 
livelihoods (Sunde, 2013; FFG, 2015). Stratified random sampling is used when one 
seeks to produce an unbiased sample that is representative of a community, and 
stratification is used when the studied population falls into natural or homogeneous 
groupings such as districts, villages or gendergroups (Eckhardt and Ermann, 1977; 
Churchill and Lacobucci, 2005). 
 
2.4 DATA COLLECTION 
2.4.1 Data collection methods 
2.4.1.1 Household surveys 
 
A household survey was created by the researcher for this study in order to collect 
quantitative and qualitative information about the villages in the case-study site.  The 
households that were involved in the survey data collection were selected through 
simple random sampling. Simple random sampling refers to a sampling strategy that 
is used when one seeks to provide every member of a given population an opportunity 
to be selected as part of the sample for the study (Yamane, 1967).  Due to the fact that 
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the case-study area was located in a rural marginalised part of South Africa where 
household data is unavailable from government departments, Google Earth imagery 
was used to determine an approximate number of households that are present in 
Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and KwaDapha. After the number of households was 
determined, each household was numbered on Google Earth. Yamane’s (1967) simple 
random sampling for determining sample size and precision was used to determine 
the appropriate sample size for each village (i.e., 10% or more of the target 
population) that would be representative of the whole village (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: Household survey sample sizes in the three case-study sites 
 Mvutshane Nkovukeni KwaDapha 
Estimated number 
of homesteads 
120 33 40 
Sample size 68 homesteads5 9 homesteads6 16 homesteads7 
 
Microsoft Excel was used as a tool to generate a random sample of the households to 
be surveyed, based on the numbers assigned to individual households on the Google 
Earth images. The generated sample and the corresponding coordinates were then 
loaded into a Garmin Geographical Positioning System (GPS) that was used to 
identify the sampled homesteads in the field.  
 
The questions contained in the questionnaire were designed to elicit information about 
the socio-economic background, resource use and livelihood patterns, perceptions of 
local people about resource use governance, as well as perceptions about decision-
making processes (Appendix 1). Prior and informed consent was received from all 
survey participants.  
																																																								
5Mvutshane village is spatially the biggest village with a more sparse distribution of 
homesteads, of the three villages in the case study site. Therefore, in order to ensure 
representation of homesteads across the spread of the area Mvutshane covers, 68 out of 
approximately 120 (i.e. 57 per cent) of homesteads were included in the survey.  
6Nine out of approximately 33 (i.e. 27 per cent) homesteads were surveyed in Nkovukeni 
because the homesteads were spatially more concentrated and fewer, and the people residing 
in different homesteads in Nkovukeni were mostly related to each other. For these reasons, 
fewer households (but still a representative sample size) were included in the survey to avoid 
repetition of data collected.  
7In kwaDapha, homesteads are also sparsely distributed, although the total number of 
homesteads was almost as small as in Nkovukeni. Therefore, 16 out of approximately 40 
homesteads (i.e. 25%) were included in the study to ensure a representative sample.	
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2.4.1.2 Focus group discussions 
 
Focus group discussions play a pivotal role in case-studyresearch because they 
provide in-depth understanding about the issues that require deep enquiry. Focus 
groups usually include a carefully and purposefully selected group of participants who 
have deep insights into a particular issue (Cloke et al., 2004). In this study, purposive 
sampling was used to identify focus group participants. Cloke et al. (2004) define 
purposive sampling as a non-random sampling technique that is applied when one 
seeks to identify respondents who possess specific information that can inform a 
researcher’s study.  Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques including listing, 
timelines, mapping, ranking and Venn diagrams were used during the focus group 
discussions to elicit information about different aspects of livelihoods and governance 
in the communities. The use of PRA techniques when collecting data in rural areas 
where formal education levels are low is pivotal because the interactive nature of 
PRA methods makes it easier for participants to engage with the questions and to feel 
confident about raising their views about different issues that are brought up 
(Driyamedia, 1996).  
 
Four focus group meetings were conducted forthis study; one in each village and one 
with the fisheries committee that has representatives from all the three villages. 
 
Table 2.2: Kosi Bay focus group meetings 
DATE VILLAGE FOCUS GROUP CODE N 
16 April 2015 KwaDapha Fisheries committee FCFG 15 members of the 
fishing committee 
from the three 
communities 
23 April 2015 Nkovukeni Nkovukeni livelihoods NFG 27 community 
members 
25 April 2015 KwaDapha KwaDapha livelihoods KFG 16 community 
members 
27 April 2015 Mvutshane Mvutshane livelihoods MFG 19 community 
members 
 
Focus group participants were selected through non-random sampling or snowballing, 
and consisted of both men and women from the community across different age 
groups. Due to the fact that this study is interested in both historical and contemporary 
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aspects of livelihoods and governance, a diversity of age groups of the population was 
represented in all the meetings.  
 
In the listing exercise that was used in the focus groups, participants were asked to list 
livelihood activities or strategies that people in each village are involved in to support 
their lives. A participatory map was used in order for the participants to illustrate the 
areas within the surrounding coastal environments where those activities are carried 
out (Figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: An example of participatory resource mapping conducted in the focus groups 
(photos: Philile Mbatha) 
 
Timelines are used in PRA to reveal important events that may have taken place over 
time that had a significant impact on local people (Asia Forest Network, 2002). 
Timelines were a crucial exercise in the focus group discussions because they were 
used as a tool for eliciting information about the history of livelihoods and coastal 
resources use in the area and to understand when and how different governance 
interventions took place over time to influence or affect community livelihoods. 
 
As part of the ranking exercise, participants were asked to list all governance actors 
that they perceive to have a role in influencing their livelihood strategies. After listing 
them, participants were asked to use a numerical ranking system in ascending order to 
demonstrate who they perceived to have the most power to the least. The participants 
	
26	
	
would discuss and arrive at an agreement before allocating a rank to each governance 
actor.  
 
Venn diagrams were used to depict power relations influencing livelihood strategies 
of local people, as perceived by them. Venn diagrams are a useful tool for depicting 
power dynamics, networks and relationships among different actors within a network. 
Circular and rectangular shapes were used to depict actors. Actors with any form of 
perceived power in terms of decision-making that influenced livelihoods were 
depicted in circles while actors perceived to have no power were depicted in small 
rectangles. The sizes of the circles within the Venn depict perceived power of actors 
while the proximity of the circles depict the relationships between actors within the 
network of decision making, i.e., circles or rectangles closer together depict actors 
perceived to work closely together in making decisions while the further the circles or 
rectangles are from each other, the farther apart they are perceived in decision-making 
processes. Prior and informed consent was received from all focus group participants.  
2.4.1.3 Oral history interviews 
 
Oral history is founded upon the stories of normal people that paint the picture of how 
things were in the past in order to bring about an understanding of how history has 
played a role in shaping current phenomena. Seale et al., (2004) state that oral history 
is based on the idea of an individual as an active participant whose memories, 
experiences and testimonies from the past about their own lives or collective social 
processes, inform the interview.  The role of oral history in interdisciplinary research 
is pivotal because it opens up avenues for new enquiry about historical events that had 
been forgotten or ignored in the present times. 
Webster (1991:611) states that formulating research findings based on events 
observed in the present may be dangerous as it often eludes history, marking the 
descriptions of an observer at a particular moment in time as a timeless stereotype of 
the norms of a group, when what is being observed may be transient strategies, suited 
to the contingencies of politics or economics of that time.  
Therefore, what is apparent from the investigations conducted in this and other studies 
(Webster, 1991; Mthethwa, 2002; Hansen, 2014) is that evidence drawn from oral 
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histories tends to be cross-referencable across time. This is particularly pertinent as 
existing historical records and evidence that are mostly written by colonial and 
apartheid actors tend to be written from a self-serving perspective that highlights the 
role and interests of the colonial or apartheid governments, omitting several key 
actors and events that pertained to local people and their livelihoods. Thus, Delius 
(2008) notes that the accounts about the nature of African societies written by a large 
number of history writers in colonial times were dominated by assumptions rather 
than facts because they did not fully understand the contexts of these societies.  
 
Oral history interviews proved to be a fundamental method for extracting historical 
data about Kosi Bay. This is because in the pre-colonial times, African societies could 
not document any evidence about their social practices because they were largely 
illiterate, and during colonial times much of the documentary evidence captured by 
colonial rulers almost exclusively contained details that the colonial rulers were 
interested in capturing (Delius, 2008; Mthethwa, 2002). Oral histories have thus been 
used by various history scholars in recent years to elicit specific information relating 
to issues about power and tenure in rural contexts that cannot be provided by archival 
or archeological evidence (Delius, 2008). This study therefore used oral history 
interviews in order to explore with people of Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and KwaDapha, 
their own personal accounts of history that has shaped the character of the Kosi Bay 
community. This was done so as to give the people of Kosi Bay a voice in the writing 
of their own history about their livelihoods and how they have evolved over the years. 
 
Mthethwa (2002) confirms that a large number of historical archives that exist about 
the Kosi Bay area, particularly from colonial and apartheid times, are incomplete and 
consist only of the information about the area that was useful to imperial, colonial and 
apartheid rulers. Therefore, the majority of the historical information about the 
nuances of the customs, traditions, and other aspects of life of local people is mostly 
held in the minds of the older people in the community and often passed down or told 
as tales to younger generations, without being properly documented.  
 
Mthethwa’s (2002) historical study provides a very useful and detailed account of the 
history of people of Kosi Bay, especially covering periods from the colonial and 
apartheid eras, i.e., late nineteenth century to late twentieth century. His study made 
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great use of oral history to tell the story of the local people but does not focus on the 
history of local livelihood strategies and the role that governance processes have 
played in shaping these strategies over the different periods. 
 
Through triangulation with work of other scholars such as Mthethwa’s (2002) study 
and other existing historical accounts on Kosi Bay, the oral history interviews 
conducted in this study provide deep insights into the role played by the history of 
governance in Kosi Bay in carving out people’s livelihood strategies that exist in the 
present day. Moreover, understanding this history from people themselves reveals 
how present-day governance and livelihoods are products of history and the decisions 
that were made in preceding times. Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 identify the oral history 
interviews that were conducted for this study. Participants for the oral history 
interviews were selected through purposive sampling and were mostly older members 
of each village. Some of the oral history interviews were conducted with middle-aged 
members of the community who had been informed about the history of the area 
through their parents and grandparents. Prior and informed consent was received from 
all participants.  
 Table 2.3: Mvutshane oral history interview schedule 
DATE PARTICIPANTS CODE 
21 April 2015 74-year-old woman OHI1 
21 April 2015 76-year-old woman OHI2 
22 April 2015 35-year-old man OHI3 
24 April 2015 46-year-old woman OHI4 
24 April 2015 52-year-old woman OHI5 
30 April 2015 80-year-old headman OHI6 
30 April 2015 56-year-old man OHI7 
 
 
 Table 2.4: Nkovukeni oral history interview schedule 
DATE PARTICIPANTS CODE 
23 April 2015 58-year-old woman OHI8 
23 April 2015 45-year-old woman 
70-year-old woman 
77-year-old woman 
OHI9 
23 April 2015 74-year old-woman 
76-year old-woman 
OHI10 
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 Table 2.5: KwaDapha oral history interview schedule 
DATE PARTICIPANTS CODE 
25 April 2015 34-year-old man OHI11 
25 April 2015 65-year-old woman OHI12 
25 April 2015 67-year-old man OHI13 
25 April 2015 78-year-old man OHI14 
 
2.4.1.4 Key informant interviews 
 
Key informant interviews for this study were conducted with actors that have been 
involved in or had a role in shaping governance and decision-making processes for 
coastal resources. Key informants were sourced through purposive sampling and 
included traditional authority and statutory actors at local, provincial and national 
levels, as well as in local committees. A total of 15 key informant interviews were 
conducted for this study (Table 2.6). Prior and informed consent was received from 
all participants.  
 Table 2.6: Key informant interview schedule 
DATE KEY INFORMANT CODE INSTITUTION/ORGANISATION 
28 April 2015  Ingonyama Trust 
representative 
IT1 Ingonyama Trust  
10 April 2015  Tembe Tribal Council 
representative 1 
TTC1 Tembe TA 
28 April 2015 Tembe Tribal Council 
representative 2 
TTC2 Tembe TA 
28 April 2015  Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
representative 1 
EKZNW1 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
11 April 2015  Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
representative 2 
EKZNW2 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
30 April 2015  Umhlabuyalingana Local 
Municipality 
representative   
LM Umhlabuyalingana Local 
Municipality 
20 August 2015 iSimangaliso 
representative  
WHA iSimangaliso Authority 
21 June 2016  Tourism facility owner 
representative 
TFO Private tourism facility owner in 
iSimangaliso 
21 June 2016 Land claims community 
committee representative 
LCC Land claims community committee 
representative 
21 February 2017 Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
representative (national)  
DEA Department of Environmental 
Affairs  
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2.4.1.5 Transect walks 
 
Transect walks were conducted to obtain an in-depth understanding of the history and 
current status of the local geography, coastal resource distribution, and how people 
from the area interact with the resources now and in the past. A total of three transect 
walks was conducted (Table 2.7).  
 Table 2.7: Transect walk schedule 
DATE WALK PARTICIPANTS 
13 April 2015 Kosi Mouth – fisheries and forestry 1 community member and 
the researcher 
15 April 2015 World Heritage Site forest – adjacent to 
Kosi estuary  
4 community members and 
the researcher  
30 April 2015 Mvutshane agriculture in Mozambique 1 community member and 
the researcher. 
 
The first transect walk was with a community member from Mvutshane through the 
former Nhlangwini village where the participant showed me where the people from 
Mvutshane used to reside inside the World Heritage Site before the conservation 
fence was erected and before they were forcibly removed. The walk led to the Kosi 
estuary mouth where the fish traps of people from Mvutshane are placed, and which is 
where they conduct most of their fishing activity. The participant explained the 
history of trap fishing and demonstrated to me how it works.  
 
The second transect walk was about understanding in detail how local people interact 
with the indigenous forest in order to support their livelihoods, what resources they 
harvest now and what resources they can no longer harvest (Figure 2.2). In the third 
transect walk, the researcher sought to understand agricultural livelihoods in the 
Mvutshane community and how local people are sustaining this livelihood activity 
despite existing constraints (Figure 2.3). The details of the results that emerged from 
the transect walks are provided in Chapter Six. 
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Figure 2.2: A transect walk in the Kosi Bay forest (photo: Rachel Wynberg). 
	
 
Figure 2.3: A transect walk from Mvutshane to the agriculture fields in Ponta do Ouro, 
Mozambique (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
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2.4.1.6 Participant observations 
 
Due to the fact that this study sought to understand the livelihoods of local people 
from their own account and perspective, participant observation was a useful tool for 
obtaining information about the nuances of livelihoods in the three different villages. 
Participant observation involves a process where the researcher engages with, listens 
to and watches people’s daily interactions in order to gain a holistic understanding of 
their experiences (Neuman, 2006). During the stay within the community in the data 
collection period, the researcher documented observations that informed the study that 
did not necessarily emerge from structured data collection methods. This was very 
useful as some in-depth information about certain issues emerged from unstructured 
settings when local people were casually engaging and talking among themselves. 
Moreover, certain local practices and issues may be sensitive for local people to 
openly express to outsiders, and these issues are therefore best documented through 
unstructured observations, as local people would not otherwise mention them 
(Bryman, 1988).  
2.4.1.7 Participation in meetings 
 
As part of the data collection process, I attended various community meetings in Kosi 
Bay in order to interact with people in the community and participate in local 
conversations and processes. Table 2.8 provides the inventory of externally-led 
meetings that were attended as part of the data collection process for the study.  
 
 Table 2.8: Meetings schedule 
DATE VENUE PARTICIPANTS 
8 February 2013 Mvutshane 6 
14 October 2014 Nkovukeni 20 
14 April 2015 Nkovukeni 26 
21 June 2016 ISimangaliso Integrated Management 
Plan (IMP) meeting in Mbazwana 
+/-200 
 
 
2.4.1.8 Historical photography 
 
As part of triangulation, this study made use of a series of chronological historical 
photographs from Kosi Bay in order to visually understand physical landscape 
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changes in the area during the times when various governance interventions were 
introduced. Photographs collected for the study date from 1959 to 2013.  Historical 
archives of aerial photographs from Kosi Bay were collected from the National Geo-
spatial Information centre (NGI, 2016), while ground photographs were extracted 
from the rePHOTOSA project website (rePHOTOSA, 2017).  
 
2.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The primary data was triangulated, together with documentary evidence and other 
secondary sources of information to inform this study. Triangulation is typically used 
for validating observational data and involves data triangulation, theory triangulation 
and methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978; Seale, 2004). Data triangulation is 
where the researcher uses different data sources to provide depth and richness to the 
understanding of a given phenomenon. Theory triangulation occurs when the 
researcher draws from different theories in order to understand how each of them may 
relate to the data, while methodological triangulation involves mixing qualitative and 
quantitative data collection techniques to gain an in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon (Seale, 2004).  
Data analysis for this study was conducted separately for quantitative and qualitative 
datasets. Microsoft Access and Excel software were used to analyse household survey 
data, while thematic analyses and coding were used to analyse all qualitative data. By 
way of triangulation, the key themes that emerged from both qualitative and 
quantitative data were elucidated for further analysis and discussion. Data collection 
and analysis in case-study research are interrelated processes, as analysis starts as 
soon as the data collection commences (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Similar 
phenomena were grouped into categories in order to highlight similarities and 
differences and were coded. Open coding was used to compare and triangulate the 
quantitative data from household surveys, with the qualitative data from the focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews. Open coding is defined by Corbin 
and Strauss (1990:12) as “the interpretive process by which data are broken down 
analytically”. This method involves thorough examination and categorisation of data, 
as well as comparison and triangulation of the data for similarities or differences. 
Comparisons of events/phenomena for similarities and differences gives researchers 
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new insights and creative ways of interpreting phenomena contained in the data. 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), the advantage of open coding is that through 
constant systematic comparisons and analysis of data researchers are able to avoid 
bias and subjectivity.  
 
2.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 
Ethical issues are important to consider and take account of in all stages of conducting 
social research (Ali and Kelly, 2004). Prior and informed consent was received at all 
stages of data collection for this study, including the taking of pictures that are 
included in this thesis. Ethical clearance was also obtained from my study institution. 
This is particularly important for research in rural contexts where one needs to gain 
entry into the communities through appropriate channels and with permission from 
community leaders. This research required tremendous attention to detail when it 
comes to ethical considerations. This is because Kosi Bay is currently a highly 
contested area in relation to land and coastal resources. There is also an ongoing 
conflict between governance actors and members of the community around this, so 
much so that the community was initially reluctant to speak to outsiders regarding 
these sensitive topics. However, the advantages were that the researcher is from 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and therefore was able identify with the culture of the local 
people and also speak the local language. This assisted her to quickly establish a 
positive relationship as a researcher with community members when the study was 
introduced, and it enabled her to gain the trust of the local people.  
 
Moreover, due to the fact that the Kosi Bay community is rural and under the 
authority of traditional leadership, the researcher had to be introduced to the tribal 
authority in order to gain the consent of the traditional leaders and the community 
structures to undertake the research in each area. The research was conducted in a 
way that ensured that the communities benefitted from the research. Local community 
assistants were paid to assist with the household surveys and the researcher was 
accommodated by one of the families in the community, consequently earning the 
trust of the local people. When the study is completed the results and findings of this 
research will also be fed back to the community, as well as other actors involved in 
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the governance of the area, so as to possibly contribute towards improving the 
livelihoods of people in Kosi Bay.  
 
In order to gain deeper insight into the issues that this study seeks to understand, the 
researcher lived within the community of Kosi Bay for approximately six months in 
total between 2013 and 2016. The local accommodation was obtained with the 
permission of the traditional authorities, as well as the wider communities. The stay in 
the area helped the researcher not only directly with data collection for the study, but 
also enabled the researcher to partake in the day-to-day activities of the host family 
and the people within the villages. This was pivotal for building relationships with the 
local people and to earn their trust. The researcher also employed field assistants from 
the local communities to assist with data collection, as a way to give back to the local 
people by employing and teaching them how to collect data for research.  
 
Earning the trust of people in Kosi Bay was not initially easy, as the people in the 
three villages had, over the years, become very skeptical of researchers coming into 
the area to elicit information without ever returning to provide positive feedback 
about the research.  Moreover, people in Nkovukeni, Mvutshane and KwaDapha had 
also become distrustful towards researchers over the years as they expressed that they 
felt that “research” had betrayed them in the past and is the reason why they lost their 
security to livelihoods. In order to overcome these concerns, the researcher had to 
conduct various meetings with community members before commencing with my 
research in order to ensure that the people were satisfied with an understanding of the 
research in order to allow it to proceed. The meetings that were held concerning the 
research are detailed in Table 2.9. 
 
 Table 2.9: Meetings conducted with community members to discuss the aims and 
 purpose of the research. 
DATE VILLAGE NO. OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
8 February 2013 Mvutshane 6 
14 October 2014 Nkovukeni 20 
14 April 2015 Nkovukeni 26 
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On the pilot visit to Mvutshane in February 2013, the researcher had obtained 
permission from the relevant traditional authority figures in the area to conduct the 
research. These included Ncelaphi8, who is in charge of all the coastal villages of 
Kosi Bay, and Mabhudu9 who is the paramount chief over all 48 villages of Kosi Bay 
that span coastal and inland regions of northern Kwazulu-Natal, as well as southern 
Mozambique and parts of Swaziland. The researcher had been informed that 
obtaining the permission of the heads of the community to conduct the research was 
adequate for the research to proceed. However, during the first meeting that was held 
with some community members, they expressed that they did not trust any more 
researchers coming to do work in the area because researchers never come back to 
provide feedback about the research that they conducted and they usually use their 
research to inform laws that end up undermining the customary rights of local people 
to pursue their livelihoods.  
 
The community also expressed that they did not trust white researchers in particular 
because in the past, there have been white researchers who came into the area to 
conduct their research and were welcomed by the local people, but after a while those 
researchers came back in positions of power, imposing rules that went against the 
customary rules that enabled local people’s livelihoods. Before the pilot visit, the 
researcher was unaware about the extent of the negative perceptions that local people 
had about research.  
 
Moreover, the researcher faced an obstacle when visiting the people Nkovukeni 
village for the first time. When people of Nkovukeni saw the researcher and the field 
assistants entering the village after obtaining permission to conduct the research, the 
people of Nkovukeni did not welcome the research and they expressed that they did 
not recognise the permission granted by traditional authorities because they felt the 
traditional authorities did not represent the interests of people of Nkovukeni. After 
being stopped from conducting household surveys in Nkovukeni, one of the leaders of 
the community suggested that he would organise another meeting with people of 
Nkovukeni where the researcher would have to again explain what the research was 
about and the people of Nkovukeni would then decide whether they welcomed the 
																																																								
8Headman, but considered the Chief in coastal villages. 
9Paramount Chief of Kosi Bay. 
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research or not. At that point, it became clear that although the people in the different 
villages of Kosi Bay fall under the same traditional leadership, they were still very 
divided in some aspects as well as distinct and somewhat independent from each 
other. People of Nkovukeni expressed that they did not acknowledge the decisions of 
the chief or headman. Therefore, the researcher welcomed the notion expressed by the 
local people and another meeting was held where the researcher explained about the 
research and answered the questions and concerns that the people had.  
 
After explaining what this research was about in various meetings and how the 
research seeks to highlight people’s own voices about their livelihoods and 
experiences, the community expressed that they welcomed it because they felt that the 
resea identified with the local culture. Living in the area while collecting data also 
enabled the researcher to engage in more depth with community members so that they 
got a better understanding of what the research was about. 
 
The other limitation that was noted in the study was the reluctance of national 
government actors and iSimangaliso Authority members to engage with the 
researcher on issues that affect the livelihoods of people living within and adjacent to 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. Various attempts were made to interact with 
iSimangaliso Authority officials, but they were hesitant to respond, and when they 
did, they mostly provided apolitical and non-comprehensive accounts of issues related 
to power and politics concerning the governance of the site. Certain relevant 
government actors that were contacted also provided excuses about why they could 
not participate in key informant interviews, and it appeared that they were unwilling 
to discuss the politics concerning the governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage 
Site. However, the data that was collected for the study was adequate for providing a 
holistic picture about some of the key challenges pertaining to the governance of 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and ongoing research beyond this PhD thesis, will 
be conducted in order to highlight the need to integrate livelihoods analyses into the 
governance of iSimangaliso World Heritage Site.  
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This study has utilised qualitative and quantitative data collection methods in order to 
obtain an in-depth and broad understanding of historical and current livelihood 
strategies in Kosi Bay, and the manner in which governance processes have 
influenced livelihood strategies over time. Household surveys were conducted in 
order to collect quantitative and descriptive information about the community and 
governance arrangements for conservation. Focus group discussions, which applied 
PRA techniques, as well as oral histories, transect walks and key informant interviews 
with key stakeholders provided an in-depth understanding of livelihood strategies and 
governance issues. Data from primary and secondary sources was triangulated during 
the analysis in order to provide a holistic account of how plural governance 
institutions influence livelihoods of people in Kosi Bay. The following chapter 
provides the literature review and theoretical framework of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
39	
	
 CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE 
INFORMING THE RESEARCH 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a review of the theoretical and conceptual ideas and 
frameworks related to livelihoods and governance in the literature that informed this 
study. Mehta et al. (1999:39) point out that there is a “nexus of interactions between 
issues of governance, institutions and livelihoods” and that this should inform how we 
view natural resources and their governance in the context of livelihoods. Governance 
has become a buzzword in environmental and social sciences, especially with 
increasing environmental and developmental challenges over the past two decades. 
The concept of governance recognises that governing by governments and managers 
alone is not adequate for addressing environmental challenges.  
 
Chambers (1992) defines a livelihood as comprising capabilities, material and non-
material assets and resources, as well as activities that one requires in order to make a 
living. Understanding linkages between rural livelihoods and governance systems 
through empirical evidence and grounded research was a fundamental objective of 
this study. This chapter provides an in-depth account of the schools of thought that 
have informed the understanding of the concepts livelihoods, governance and legal 
pluralism, as well as linkages between governance and livelihoods. The conceptual 
and discursive evolution of both livelihoods and governance perspectives are 
discussed.  
 
3.2 LIVELIHOODS PERSPECTIVES 
3.2.1 Definitions 
 
Chambers (1987) first introduced the concept of sustainable livelihoods thinking 
(SLT). In developing SLT, Chambers (1987) saw it as fundamental to combine the 
thinking of professionals (usually Western) and of poor people in developing 
countries about environment and development by promoting a bottom-up way of 
understanding livelihood issues affecting the poor. Hence, Chambers (1987) made 
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significant strides in influencing policy makers to put the “last” first, following the 
Brundtland Commission Report (1987) where it was clear that environment and 
development discourses were still dominated by the ideas of the rich and powerful. 
According to Scoones (2009), the term sustainable rural livelihoods was possibly first 
coined during discussions of the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report, with the aim 
of putting the realities of rural people and local knowledge on the priority list of the 
global environment and development agenda. In his 1987 publication, Sustainable 
Livelihoods, Environment and Development: Putting Poor Rural People First, 
Chambers critiques the shortcomings of the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987 
for not doing enough to prioritise the needs of the poor.  
 
One of the definitions for livelihoods and sustainable livelihoods that is most widely 
used globally, is articulated as: 
 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, 
claims and access) and activities required for a means of living; a 
livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, 
and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next 
generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods 
at the local and global levels and in the short and long-term 
(Chambers and Conway, 1992:7). 
 
 
Chambers (1987) argued that the tendency of professionals to think of “development” 
and “environment” as separate issues, and to think of policy-making in terms of 
population, resources, environment and development discourses (usually drawing on 
quantitative statistics and economics) without considering the voice of the poor was 
flawed (Chambers, 1987; Chambers and Conway, 1992; Chambers, 1995). Hence, he 
argued for a shift towards putting the poor first. Chambers (1987) critiqued the 1987 
Brundtland Commission Report for arguing that marginalised indigenous and tribal 
groups should be empowered, while the report itself contained traits of professional 
technocratic discourses that view development in a top-down fashion. Moreover, the 
work by Chambers and Conway (1992) was also a reaction to the dominant economic 
growth discourses driving development thinking at the time, seeking to incorporate 
elements of equity and sustainability within human development debates.  
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The concept of equity refers to the empowerment of the most deprived (i.e. women 
and children) through promoting more equal distribution of assets, capabilities and 
opportunities (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Within the livelihoods literature, 
sustainability refers to one’s ability to maintain and improve livelihoods while 
enhancing local and global assets and capabilities (Chambers and Conway, 1992). 
Chambers and Conway (1992) also analyse livelihoods at the household level by 
using four categories. These are: a) people – i.e. their livelihood capabilities; b) 
activities – what they do; c) assets – i.e. tangible and intangible material and social 
means of living; and, d) gains or outputs – i.e. what they gain from what they do.  
3.2.2 Key livelihoods debates 
 
There are various debates about how livelihoods perspectives (particularly in rural 
contexts) gained traction within the global field of development since the late 1980s. 
Morse and McNamara (2013) argue that although the sustainable livelihoods 
discourse became globally popular and widely adopted after the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit and Agenda 21, the concept evolved after the 1960s and following the 
development of the SLA. The development of the SLA was facilitated by the growth 
of agrarian societies and New Household Economics in the 1980s that focused on 
issues such as income, expenditure, household labour and other economic aspects of 
household livelihoods in developing countries (Morse and McNamara, 2013). 
Agrarian research utilizing participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and rapid rural 
appraisal (RRA) techniques surged in the 1970s and into the 1980s. The New 
Household Economics was limited in scope in that it described livelihoods in a 
mechanical and one-dimensional way. It was then that the SLA evolved withan 
approach that promoted development driven both by government and non-government 
actors in order to uplift poor and marginalised groups (Morse and McNamara, 2013). 
This was in line with the 1997 White Paper on International Development that first set 
out the significance of sustainable livelihoods in international development discourse 
(DFID, 1999). 
 
Chambers is said to be one of the pioneers of SLT who managed to influence key 
international development agencies and policy makers to put the needs of the poor 
first by directing policy focus towards issues of poverty and livelihoods in the 
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developing world (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Solesbury, 2003; Scoones, 2009). 
More recently, livelihoods analyses have drawn upon a series of interdisciplinary 
quantitative and qualitative methods in order to conduct livelihoods assessments.  
There is also a significant body of literature that seeks to use natural-resource use as a 
base for livelihoods analysis (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Béné et al., 2003). For instance, 
Neves and du Toit (2013:103) point out that “rural livelihoods need to be 
conceptualised as constituted through both farm and non-farm activities, formal and 
informal, and waged and own-account economic activities”. This is particularly 
relevant in a country like South Africa where rural livelihoods draw from a diverse set 
of livelihood strategies linked to the use of land and natural resources as well as 
opportunities in nearby urban areas (Neves and du Toit, 2013; Hauck et al., 2014). 
Livelihood strategies can thus be understood as “the range and combination of 
activities and choices that people make and undertake in order to achieve their 
livelihood outcomes” (Baumann, 2002:17). Livelihood strategies tend to be complex 
and related to short-term as well as long-term livelihood gains (Baumann, 2002).  
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict five main types of assets identified in the SLF. These 
include: 
a) Physical capital (i.e. house, cars, access to infrastructure) 
b) Financial capital (i.e. savings, credit) 
c) Natural capital (i.e. fisheries resources, land ownership, crops farmed) 
d) Human capital (i.e. capabilities, education, health) 
e) Social capital (i.e. networks, belonging, membership to organisations) 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts Scoones’s (1998) widely adopted sustainable livelihoods 
framework (SLF), which is used to analyse livelihoods outcomes, i.e. how livelihood 
strategies are devised, how institutions and organisations influence access to 
livelihood capabilities and how people devise livelihood strategies.  
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Figure 3.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (Scoones, 1998:4). 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts Allison and Horemans’s (2006) interpretation of the SLF, which 
they used for understanding livelihoods in the context of natural-resource 
management systems. 
 
	
Figure 3.2: A SLF for understanding natural-resource management systems (Allison and 
Horemans, 2006:759). 
 
In the SLF, Scoones (1998) summed up these various forms of capital as “livelihood 
resources”, separate from “institutional processes” and from “livelihood strategies” 
(Figure 3.2).  
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Based on the definition for livelihoods provided by Ellis (2000) and other scholars, it 
is argued that the critical factors for rural livelihoods to recover from stresses, shocks, 
and other forms of vulnerability are :a) the assets that people possess; b) the 
livelihood activities they engage in; and, c) factors that enable or hinder them from 
accessing the former and the latter (Scoones, 1998; Ellis, 2000;Allison, 2003). 
Contemporary livelihoods literature (Cutler et al., 2008; Berman, 2012; Allison, 
2013) discusses factors that affect the ability of rural households to achieve 
sustainable livelihood outcomes. These include the vulnerability context and 
livelihood diversification. 
 
Vulnerabilities, i.e. stresses and shocks that are beyond the control of households or 
the community to manage, may influence their ability to combine livelihood resources 
for sustainable livelihood outcomes (Allison, 2003). Vulnerability can be understood 
as the susceptibility of people to external stresses, risks or shocks, and their capacity 
to overcome or recover from shocks and stresses (Baumann, 2002). Stresses and 
shocks may be environmental (e.g. decline in fish stocks, droughts, flooding), 
economic (e.g. lack of access to finances, insecure land tenure), social (e.g. loss of 
breadwinner within a household, lack of education) or even political (e.g. change in 
policy regimes, poor rural institutions). The diverse nature of vulnerabilities is the 
reason why livelihoods studies increasingly emphasise the importance of diversity 
when it comes to livelihood strategies in rural contexts. Various scholars dealing with 
sustainable livelihood issues within the fisheries sector, for instance, have argued that 
livelihood diversification is a critical element for reducing vulnerability in rural or 
marginalised areas, and also for reducing vulnerability to stresses and shocks (Allison, 
2003;Béné, 2003; Hauck et al., 2014).  
 
Access is another pivotal component of understanding livelihoods because the ability 
of people to formulate livelihood strategies is largely determined by the access they 
have to different types of livelihood resources. Ribot and Peluso (2003:1) define 
access as “the ability to benefit from things; including material objects, persons, 
institutions, and symbols”. The term “use” in natural resource use directly refers to 
the ability to derive and enjoy benefits from resources (Berkes et al., 2003). Benefits 
derived from coastal resources may be direct (e.g. monetary, consumptive use) and 
indirect (e.g. clean air and carbon sequestration). Access control (i.e. the ability and 
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power to control the access of others to resources) and access maintenance (i.e. using 
resources or power to maintain the status quo regarding access to resources) form part 
of the political-economic aspect of the concept of access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
These concepts explain how resources are harvested, used and managed, and the 
relations between those who control and maintain access to resources.  
 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) emphasise “ability” (or power) when explaining access as a 
means of understanding how benefits to things are acquired. The emphasis on 
“ability” instead of only “rights” when seeking to understand factors that enable or 
hinder people from benefiting from resources, is the key distinction between access 
and property notions, and it allows for a deeper comprehension of both social and 
legal factors that influence how people benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003; Langridge et al., 2006). Illegal access may refer to the enjoyment of benefits 
from natural resources in ways that may not necessarily be acceptable by law, but that 
may be acceptable within a local social context (Schangler and Ostrom, 1992). This 
may arise in cases where communities consider it their indigenous “right” to access 
natural resources.  
 
In the SLF, institutions are seen as responsible for making operational rules (i.e. rules 
that constrain or enable individuals’ choices or actions) and collective choice rules 
(i.e. rules made collectively by a group that shape collective choices) (Acheson, 
2006). Policies, principles, regulations, rules and arrangements are institutional 
mechanisms used by organisations managing natural resource use and access. 
According to Umali (2009:5), formal and informal institutions exist as “distinct 
frameworks of rules for doing things”, implemented through organisations to produce, 
reproduce and reinforce social relations. For example, while fisheries authorities may 
develop and enforce rules for natural resource use through allocating permits and 
licenses, local people in a given area can also define their socially acceptable rules for 
using the resources, separate from legal rules (ICLARM, 1998). Understanding the 
mediating role of institutions in customary communities or in marginalised people’s 
access to natural resources is pivotal when seeking to understand how they formulate 
livelihood strategies from using natural resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
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3.3 CRITIQUES OF SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD APPROACHES 
3.3.1 Quantitative nature of livelihood assessment tools 
 
Although it is unclear when exactly the idea of sustainable livelihoods was first 
popularised globally, it is clear that since its inception, the sustainable livelihoods 
approach (SLA) has been applied not just in the research arena, but also for 
livelihoods analyses in the development field within poorer countries or 
disadvantaged areas. This approach has also been used to enhance understanding 
about the interventions needed to help address poverty issues (Morse and McNamara, 
2013). The SLA initially gained purchase globally during the 1960s largely due to 
World Bank-funded projects on Integrated Rural Development. In 2001 the British 
Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned research to further 
develop the SLA. However, there has not recently been any conceptual development 
of SLA and the concept has lost traction in the global policy arena since 2001 
(Solesbury, 2003; Morse and McNamara, 2013). 
 
After the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987, a White Paper was formulated in 
1997 by the government of the United Kingdom (UK), together with partners 
involved in rural development research, as a commitment to focus on issues of 
poverty and livelihoods in developing countries. However, as pointed out in Scoones 
(2009), the work done by these collaborative efforts to focus on livelihoods and 
poverty was largely influenced by institutional economics and tried to appeal to 
economists (see North, 1990; Scoones, 1999; Bebbington and Batterbury, 2001). Thus 
Scoones (2009:6) asserts, “In the notionally trans-disciplinary subject area of 
development, making sense to economists is a must”. This explains why sustainable 
rural livelihoods work in the 1990s was driven by economics discourses and jargon. 
This meant that the focus was largely on the economic attributes of livelihoods, and 
not on broader dimensions of livelihoods thinking.  
 
Scoones (2009) asserts that within the SLF itself, the input-output-outcome 
components of the framework were created so as to make it legible to economists and 
make the framework conducive to quantitative analyses. Hence, the focus of the SLF 
on quantification rather than in-depth qualitative analysis ended up making it more of 
a checklist than a framework. It is also unclear how the causal logic presented in the 
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framework (i.e. context – livelihood resources – institutional processes – livelihood 
strategies – sustainable livelihood outcomes) is determined and how it is to be applied 
methodologically in different rural contexts. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
extent to which the SLA can model reality may be limited (Morse and McNamara, 
2013).  
 
Although the SLF provides a useful way to break down livelihood components of 
households, it depicts livelihoods and capitals as if they operate in a vacuum and as if 
people have complete agency and autonomy to decide how to combine livelihood 
capitals/resources without circumstantial or governance interference. More than this, 
one of the issues embedded within livelihood perspectives literature and the SLA 
observed in this study, and also mentioned in the work of Scoones (2009), is how 
various authors have portrayed, defined or promoted an understanding of livelihoods 
using economics discourses that appeal to economists and policy makers, but that 
detract from the complexity, diversity and nuances of rural livelihoods that cannot be 
represented in such terms (Scoones, 2009). For example, livelihoods literature largely 
employs discourses such as “assets” and “capitals” (i.e. natural, economic, human, 
social and others) to aggregate the components that contribute to how rural people 
make a living. It is usually unclear how one defines or measures these, or even what 
constitutes each of the “assets” or “capitals” in different rural contexts, let alone 
where one asset or capital begins or ends. Moreover, the economics classification of 
rural livelihoods presents a very utilitarian relationship between rural people and the 
environment, and moves attention away from cultural, relational, spiritual, health, 
wellbeing or other intrinsic values that rural people have in relation to their 
surroundings that may play a large role in determining how they devise livelihood 
strategies (Scoones, 2009).  
3.3.2 Weak linkages between livelihoods and governance 
 
Among the other shortcomings of livelihoods perspectives listed by Scoones (2009) is 
the fact that livelihoods perspectives have failed to link livelihoods to governance 
debates in the development agenda. Scoones (2009:12) adds that livelihoods 
perspectives  
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had in many respects got stuck, both intellectually and practically. 
The weak and sometimes confusing and contradictory theorisation 
of politics and power, meant that an intellectual articulation with 
both mainstream political science governance debates and more 
radical agrarian change discussions was missing.  
 
In this regard, Scoones (2009) asserts that although the discourses of power, politics 
and governance within sustainable livelihoods debates were introduced by some 
researchers in the 1990s, these never really surfaced and were shunned for requiring 
more qualitative rather than quantitative analyses (i.e. too complex for economists 
who focused on quantifying poverty reduction). Consequently, one of the major 
criticisms of livelihoods perspectives over the past decade is that very little attention 
has been paid to issues related to power and politics involved in the processes of 
governance of natural resources that impact on rural livelihoods in the Global South 
(Scoones, 2009).  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, the present study responds to Scoones’s 
(2009) suggestion that in order for livelihoods perspectives to be relevant in the 21st 
century, there is a need to develop theoretical grounds that link livelihoods to 
governance debates. In his review of a decade of livelihoods perspectives literature, 
Scoones (2009) reflects on some of the limitations of the SLA, and of the wide 
application of simplistic or predictive frameworks that render technical the complex 
nuances of the livelihoods of rural people that have dominated development thinking 
since the early 1990s. In this account, Scoones (2009) highlights the significance of 
context and the fact that simplistic frameworks cannot capture how different people 
live in different places. Moreover, Scoones (2009) emphasises the significance of 
interdisciplinary approaches to understanding livelihoods that combine natural and 
social science perspectives. 
 
People’s agency in engaging in, creating or combining livelihood resources needs to 
be analysed at a theoretical and empirical level. Apart from small-scale fisheries 
literature (Allison and Ellis, 2001; Béné, 2003; Allison and Horemans, 2006; 
Walmsley et al., 2006; Béné et al., 2010), few scholars (Wynberg and Hauck, 2014) 
have done work on livelihoods that has focused on coastal areas in the Global South. 
Various livelihoods literatures (Scoones, 1998; Ellis, 2000; Niehof, 2004), including 
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that on livelihood diversification, have tended to focus on the agricultural sector, 
using an economics perspective that portrays “poor” or rural households as primarily 
farmers who require alternative livelihoods to decrease the risk of relying on one 
livelihood source. This stereotype is also incorrect as literature reveals that rural 
households can engage in more than one primary livelihood activity that they do not 
view as “alternative livelihoods” (Scoones, 2009; Hauck et al., 2014; Sunde, 2014).  
 
Chambers (1987; 1995) uses the terms “poor”/“rural people”/“resource poor” 
interchangeably to refer to marginalised peoples in the developing world. There is an 
assumption made by Chambers (1995) and other livelihoods scholars that all rural 
people in developing countries are poor, when the spectrum of the data informing 
livelihoods work in the 1990s was largely quantitative and made use of economics 
rather than the narrative of social, cultural or political measures to ascertain whether 
this “poverty” was more than just financial. Chambers (1995) further critiques the 
tendency of international professionals working within the field of development 
(especially economists) to use reductionist approaches to understanding poverty, as 
they tend to focus on poverty-line measurements of groups and regions for 
comparative purposes without accounting for deprivation and ill-being aspects of 
people’s lives that may contribute to poverty. However, Chambers (1995) himself 
defined poverty as “income-poverty” which is arguably still a very Western 
economist approach to defining poverty and does not account for social, cultural and 
other narratives that could help define poverty.  
 
It is argued that the homogenisation of rural people across developing countries by 
livelihoods scholars at large is questionable, given that they refer to case studies 
ranging from India and China to Sub-Saharan Africa, which are completely different 
geographical and social contexts. How the term “poor” or “poverty” is used in 
livelihoods literature is also questionable, and one could argue that standards of 
measuring poverty could vary across different countries and continents. Hence, this 
study will refrain from using the word “poor” to refer to rural communities because 
this could be a misleading term since Kosi Bay, for instance, is an extremely rich area 
in terms of biodiversity, coastal resources and indigenous culture. The problem with 
this area is with the access that rural people have to the natural resources as well as 
marginalisation, which limits the access of local people to education, employment, 
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capacity building, networks and other opportunities. Hence, the term “poor” will be 
replaced with the term “marginalised” in this study.  
 
3.4 NOTIONS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Although there is no universal definition of the term governance, the concept of 
governance can be understood to have two distinct meanings, i.e. normative and 
descriptive or sociological meaning (Cotoi, 2011). The normative meaning of 
governance is usually referred to as good governance (characterised by transparency, 
accountability and participation), or in the adverse situation, bad governance. There 
are various normative definitions of the term governance within the field of natural 
resources. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997: 
2-3), governance can be understood as, 
 
the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet 
their obligations and mediate their differences. 
 
For Hyden et al. (2004:16), the term governance refers to, 
the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules 
that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as 
economic and social actors interact to make decisions. 
 
 
Treib et al. (2007) point out that in politics, governance is associated with a process 
whereby governing shifts away from traditional models where decisions are made by 
certain bureaucrats, towards a process where a change in the composition of actors is 
a significant consideration in the formulation and implementation of policies. This is 
pertinent for defining governance in the context of coastal areas where the dynamic, 
diverse and complex nature of coastal socio-ecological systems requires pluralistic 
and multi-level modes of management and governance. The various discourses, 
narratives and interpretations of governance theory in the literature all provide useful 
knowledge for enhancing understanding about the complexities linked to governance 
in the context of natural resource management. According to Sowman and Wynberg 
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(2014), the focus of governance theory on interactions and processes occurring 
between diverse actors with diverse interests and worldviews distinguishes the notion 
of governance from government or management.  
 
Interactive governance theory is defined by Kooiman and Bavinck (2005:17) as 
 
the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve 
societal problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the 
formulation and application of principles guiding those 
interactions and care for institutions that enable them.  
 
It identifies three modes of governance which include self-governance, top-down 
governance, co-governance, as well as hierarchical governance (Kooiman et al., 2005; 
Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). Decentralisation is also a mode of governance that ised as 
the transfer or devolution of decision-making power and authority for public functions 
from central government to subordinate governments, through enabling lower-level 
actors to exercise some level of autonomy in decision-making processes (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999; Ntsebeza, 2002). Decentralisation is intended to increase public 
participation in local decision-making processes in order to promote more equitable 
and efficient local management forms (Ntsebeza, 2002; Ribot, 2003). Political or 
democratic decentralisation is a type of decentralisation whereby decision-making 
powers are transferred to authorities that are accountable to and represent local 
citizens (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; von Braun and Grote, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2002). An 
understanding of the powers of the involved actors, the realms in which they exercise 
their powers, and the extent to which they are accountable are important prerequisites 
to determine whether meaningful decentralisation has taken place (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999).   
 
3.5 GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS 
 
This section elucidates understanding about the components of governance 
interactions involved in complex human-environment systems where issues of power 
and politics manifest.  
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Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) argue that governance perspectives are characterised by 
three common features which are: a) the belief that governing involves both private 
and public actors; b) the belief that in governing processes both public and private 
interests are equitably shared; and c) the belief that societal development underpins 
governance. In interactive governance theory (Kooiman et al., 2005; 2008; Bavinck et 
al., 2013; Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014), governance systems comprise a governing 
system and a system to be governed. The governing system is made up of institutions 
and related social and legal mechanisms, while the system to be governed constitutes 
two subsystems, i.e. natural and social systems, and the related system of users and 
stakeholders and their interactions (Jentoft, 2007).  
 
The role of the governing system is to facilitate the interactions between the natural 
and socio-economic system being governed. The system to be governed and the 
governing system need to be mutually compatible in order to work together 
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). Governance theory also suggests that socio-
ecological systems to be governed are diverse (i.e. constitute natural, social and 
cultural variability), complex (i.e. characterised by overlapping, interdependent and 
usually conflicting elements), dynamic (i.e. constantly changing and unpredictable) 
and vulnerable (i.e. fragile) (Kooiman et al., 2008; Kooiman, 2008). These 
characteristics can make a system easily dismissed as ungovernable, which may not 
necessarily be the case (Kooiman, 2003; Kooiman et al., 2005; Jentoft, 2007). Jentoft 
(2007) states that the diversity of the system to be governed calls for the governing 
system to be sensitive; complexity calls for inclusiveness; the dynamic nature of the 
system calls for flexibility and adaptability; while vulnerability calls for caution by 
the governing system.  
 
Kooiman and Bavinck (2013: 11) assert that governance interactions are “exchanges 
between actors that contribute to the tackling of societal problems and opportunities”. 
They refer to “actors” as any units of society with agency or power to act (Kooiman 
and Bavinck, 2013). Actors in coastal governance can include individuals, different 
state departments, private sector actors, trans-boundary management actors, 
international actors, as well as affluent and marginalised societal groups from macro 
to micro levels. It is usually difficult to reconcile the views and ideas of disparate 
actors in coastal governance processes. This challenge embodies what Jentoft and 
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Chuenpadgee (2009) refer to as a “wicked problem”. Hence, Sowman and Wynberg 
(2014:6) assert that governance interactions “may or may not be characterised by 
shared values and vision”. More than being a wicked problem, the involvement of 
multiple actors in coastal governance creates challenges in that different actors 
(depending on their level of power and influence, social status as well as their 
physical location in relation to resources) may hold different images, values, 
principles and ideas about how coastal resources ought to be used, accessed and 
governed (Jentoft, 2007). Ngeta (2014:28) confirms this by stating that, “the 
complexity of the actor constellation tends to increase as one moves up the 
governance ladder from the local to the global”. However, although this is largely the 
case, it is argued that the key focus of governance is to aid interactions that promote 
collective action in terms of addressing societal problems and creating solutions 
(Kooiman et al., 2005; Sowman and Wynberg, 2014). Whether or not a system is 
governable is an important question for policy makers and should be of first 
consideration before any governance decisions are made (Bavinck and Salagrama, 
2008). 
 
Interactive governance theory (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014) identifies and distinguishes 
three orders of governance in legal pluralist systems where statutory and customary 
systems co-exist. These governance orders include first order, second order and third 
order or meta-governance. First-order governance refers to the nuances of governance 
that are observed in the daily affairs of management that governing actors and people 
engage in. Second-order governance is concerned with the design of institutional 
arrangements such as rules, laws and norms that are used to address first-order 
governing. Kooiman and Jentoft (2009) refer to the concept of probing into the norms, 
values, images and principles driving governance systems and approaches as meta-
governance; also referred to as third-order governance or governance of governance. 
Jentoft and Bavinck (2014) argue that in studies drawing on interactive governance 
theory, the important points of enquiry in governance systems include the occurrence 
of symmetries, asymmetries as well as representativeness between and within plural 
legal systems. They define symmetry as two-fold, i.e. as adequate coherence between 
the legal orders, as well as the power difference between them (Jentoft and Bavinck, 
2014).  
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It has been argued that systems with higher resilience have higher governability as 
they have a higher capacity to cope with stresses (Kooiman, 2008). On the other hand, 
it is also argued that the more diverse and complex a system is, the less likely it is to 
be governable (Kooiman et al., 2008; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2008; Chuenpagdee 
and Jentoft, 2009). This is because highly diverse systems require governors to 
possess deeper knowledge and understanding of both the natural and social aspects of 
the system, and how these work together. 
 
The body of work on “values” is also significant for understanding governance 
interactions. There are various definitions of value in the literature drawing on 
different disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and resource management. 
Williams (1979: 16) defines values as “interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, 
moral obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, aversions and attractions, and many 
other kinds of selective orientations”. Rokeach (1973: 5) defines values as “enduring 
beliefs that a specific mode of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an 
opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence”. Values are abstract 
and idealistic, and governance is largely driven by their allocation, and the 
determination of values is characterised by issues of power (Song et al., 2013). Song 
et al. (2013) identify twenty-four of the most widely discussed values in fisheries 
governance literature, with conservation, wealth, knowledge and secure livelihoods 
being in the top five. Satterfield and Kalof (2005) also refer to two dominant 
traditions of categorizing values, i.e. axiomatic (usually expert driven and based on 
the idea that certain values are more significant than others), and relativistic (usually 
adopted by practitioners and researchers and based on the idea that there are no right 
or wrong values).  
 
3.5.1 Factors influencing meta-level governance 
3.5.1.1 Discourse 
 
There is a growing body of literature concerning the relationship between the 
influence of global conservation discourses developed in the Global North on 
environmental governance policies and practices implemented in the Global South. 
This body of literature emphasises how these discourses are usually not suitable for 
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use in the contexts on which they are imposed (Agrawal, 2005; Steinberg, 2001; 
2003; Benjaminsen and Overa, 2011; Balboa, 2013). According to Benjaminsen and 
Overa (2013) this literature explores: 
a) how global environmental discourses are reproduced in the Global North 
and by whom;  
b) how these global environmental governance discourses have evolved 
historically;  
c) how they are translated into environmental policies and regulations in the 
Global South;  
d) how they, in turn, affect resource use by marginalised rural communities at 
the local level; and  
e) how they are contested locally by the communities and governance actors. 
 
A central concern of this study is to explore the influence of the discourses of the 
powerful that control how environmental governance takes place by looking at both 
sides of the coin, i.e. how rural people view governance and how governance actors 
view it.  
3.5.1.2 Images and principles 
 
While principles can be understood as codes of conduct guiding the manner through 
which actions and decisions are proposed, made, revised and critiqued (Song et al., 
2013), images constitute ideologies, visions, models, assumptions and convictions 
that governing actors possess about the system to be governed (Kooiman et al., 2008; 
Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). Images, also referred as beliefs or subjective knowledge 
(Boulding, 1956), are implicit by nature and defined as “a way of thinking and a way 
of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally” (Morgan, 1997: 4).	 
 
Governance actors often have some form of implicit image of what they are 
governing that informs how they govern (Jentoft et al., 2010). For instance, 
governance images held by actors responsible for implementing governing 
approaches may differ from those held by communities interacting with the resources 
on a day-to-day basis. This is due to different epistemologies, ideologies and 
motivations for governance held by actors on either end. Ngeta (2014:28) confirms,  
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The image of the world that the actors bring to either of these 
issue areas defines what they perceive as the importance of the 
sector and how it should be governed to achieve its 
objectives…These considerations are informed by actors’ 
assumptions about the world and the information that they have 
about that area…  
 
Images are not usually explicitly discussed in governance processes, which may be 
problematic because they play a significant role in shaping governance practices, as 
they are often acted upon by governing actors without being discussed with other 
affected actors (Jentoft et al., 2010). Images go hand in hand with the knowledge or 
science that is adopted by policy makers and used for governing resources. There is 
also an emerging post-structural literature that demonstrates how the prevailing 
images or ideas that inform most policymaking for resources used by marginalised or 
rural communities, such as forestry and fisheries, are usually based on incorrect 
Western notions and inaccurate science (Cronon, 1996; Fairhead and Leach, 1996; 
Kolding and van Zwieten, 2013).  
 
By providing accounts of how Western images and discourses of environmental 
governance may result in incorrect but widely accepted and dominant management 
discourses in forestry and small-scale fisheries policies, Cronon (1996), Fairhead and 
Leach (1996), and Kolding and van Zwieten (2013) reveal how the assumptions 
underlying Western ideas that influence policy decisions for the governance of 
resources are largely unfounded. Moreover, these are not usually contested if they 
reflect the discourses and images of the powerful. This results in hegemonic 
environmental governance that is detrimental to the livelihoods of marginalised or 
rural communities. This could explain why mismatches and discord between 
normative coastal management and governance objectives (i.e. equitable access, 
benefit sharing and sustainability), and the realities of people on the ground largely 
persist in coastal sectors such as small-scale fisheries, tourism, mining and 
conservation in Southern Africa (Mbatha, 2011; Hauck et al., 2014; Sowman, 2015).  
 
In many developing countries in Asia and Africa, the governing or management of 
fisheries and coastal resources is often strongly influenced by Hardin’s (1968) 
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Tragedy of the Commons discourse, that is based on the idea that resources will 
inevitably be over-exploited if not privatised or under state control (Kooiman et al, 
2008). This discourse has manifested into an image held by various natural resource-
governing actors and largely informs the decisions of natural resource scientists and 
managers in various developing countries. The main problem with governance images 
inspired by Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons thinking is that many 
indigenous people who have a long history of direct interaction with the environment 
and resources do not see themselves as being separate from the environment or 
nature, but rather as being at one with it. Hence, various scholars argue against the 
Western view of separating nature and the environment (i.e. Guha, 1989; Escobar, 
1995; Cronon, 1996; Fletcher, 2009) by demonstrating that many rural people do not 
view the environment as a means to an end to be exploited for utilitarian purposes; 
and they do not have a deterministic behaviour to degrade the environment for 
individual gains. Hence Jentoft et al. (2010) confirm that images can be instruments 
of power used by dominant groups or elites to impose ideas and worldviews on 
society that reinforce their interests and their position in society.  
 
It is significant to note that images held by governing actors are not necessarily 
always true or accurate (Jentoft et al., 2010). Different actors may possess different 
sets of interests and values and this influences the images they have for governance. 
For instance, contrary to the belief of many conservation scientists and managers, 
coastal communities in many parts of the world engage in a suite of livelihood 
activities, over and above fishing, and have a long history of utilizing different types 
of coastal resources and engaging indifferent activities along the coast to support their 
livelihoods (Hauck et al., 2014). Hence, Jentoft et al. (2010) argue that in order for 
governance processes to be inclusive, participatory and to correspond to governance 
needs on the ground, images need to be explicitly discussed among all parties 
involved, in order to allow for interactive and efficient processes for identifying 
solutions to governance challenges in complex environments such as the coast. More 
than that, it is also argued that what informs an image is probably more critical than 
the image itself. In other words, it is important to elucidate at what point in time 
governance images are formed, i.e. historically prior to the establishment of the 
governance processes, or during the governance process based on the interactions and 
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issues arising from the governance process itself. Jentoft et al. (2010:1317) thus 
assert: 
 
Images change as people learn from experience, their own or 
others, as when observations do not conform to what is 
believed…When there is a discrepancy between the new message 
and the current image, an alternate image may emerge.  
 
3.5.1.3 Political ecology narratives on neoliberal constructions of nature 
 
Political ecology highlights the significance of issues relating to power dynamics, 
social constructions of nature, discourses and knowledge valuation in decision-
making processes within governance debates. Such issues are often neglected in the 
literature on governance and institutions, despite their immediate relevance which is 
provided below.  
 
Political ecology strengthens understanding about issues of politics and power that are 
embedded in conservation governance. Its ideas render less technical the challenges 
that are linked to legal pluralist systems, especially those characterised by power 
dynamics, neoliberal strategies, as well as inequities that lead to the continued 
marginalisation of people in rural communities and their customary or traditional 
systems of resource use (Agrawal, 2005; Fletcher, 2009).  
 
When it comes to understanding complex human-environment interactions, political 
ecology debates have focused on five key components of human-nature governance 
processes (Robbins, 2004; Armitage, 2008) that are pertinent for this study. These 
include: 
a) the role of power in shaping governance processes; 
b) the influence of scale and levels of institutional arrangements involved in 
governance; 
c) the social construction of nature and discourses about nature that shape 
governance interventions; 
d) the positioning of actors in terms of networks and power; and 
e) how knowledge is valued and who influences these valuation? processes. 
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This study explores how history, politics, power and context, embedded in the 
governance of complex systems such as the coast, influence rural livelihood strategies 
and outcomes. Political ecology debates are thus at the heart of what this study seeks 
to understand. This is pertinent because understanding the positioning of governance 
actors and their power relationships, as well as the role of context in governance 
processes have implications for the livelihood outcomes of marginalised resource 
users (Peet and Watts, 2004). Armitage (2008:22) confirms that a political ecology 
perspective “on how social actors construct different interpretations of nature-society 
interactions, and therefore, corresponding policy interventions and governance 
strategies, has the opportunity to make resilience interpretations of system behaviour 
more robust”. Such perspectives also provide a useful lens for analysing the impacts 
of different governance strategies on livelihood approaches that are adopted.  
 
Jentoft and Bavinck (2014) point out that in cases where legal pluralism exists, power 
struggles between different legal orders and the people promoting them influence the 
governability of a system. Power is therefore a significant factor influencing 
governance interactions and in turn impacts on the ability of people to benefit from 
natural resources. This is manifested in the ability of certain stakeholders or 
institutions to influence how others benefit from a resource (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
Power is constituted in different mechanisms, processes and social relations and is 
held by certain people and institutions who control and/or maintain access to natural 
resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).  
 
Human-environment systems are governed by multi-level institutions that have 
conflicting views about whether state-centric or decentralised forms of governance 
are appropriate. Within this context, market-based conservation appeals to both 
bottom-up and top-down governance approaches as it is seen to foster a win-win 
situation between conservation and rural development (Roth and Dressler, 2012). 
Market-based conservation is based on the notion that “assigning monetary value to 
nature [was] the most efficient and effective way of saving it, and [had] the additional 
benefit of being able to provide livelihood opportunities for those most affected by 
conservation practice” (Roth and Dressler, 2012:363). The win-win situation is 
achieved when people receive money from conservation initiatives such as 
ecotourism, and are purportedly thus incentivised to support conservation. This 
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approach has been critiqued by political ecologists on the basis that complexities on 
the ground can cause communities to be losers in these processes. For example, such 
processes are largely driven by states and communities do not have much of a say in 
terms of what market approaches should be used and how they can benefit (Roth and 
Dressler, 2012).  
 
Igoe and Brockington (2007) discuss the role that neoliberalism plays in 
contemporary representations of biodiversity protection and the creation of protected 
areas, and provide a useful critique of environmental management. They argue that, 
 
Neoliberalisation involves the reregulation of nature through 
forms of commodification. This, in turn, entails new types of 
territorialization: the partitioning of resources and landscapes in 
ways that control, and often exclude, local people. 
Territorialization is a starkly visible form of re-regulation, which 
frequently creates new types of values and makes those values 
available to national and transnational elites…These networks are 
rhetorically united by neoliberal ideologies and are combining in 
ways that profoundly alter the lives of rural people in areas 
targeted for biodiversity conservation (Igoe and Brockington, 
2007: 432).  
 
Brockington et al. (2008) explore how representations of nature (i.e. the images 
promoted for its governance and the development of environmental consciousness 
and its transfer by certain actors to subaltern actors) evolve over time. They reveal 
how certain environmentalisms (including environmental protection) are not always 
undertaken purely for the purpose of protecting the environment for its own good. 
However, these emerge as part and parcel of certain social and economic agendas of 
those in power; either to improve their power in controlling resources, to increase 
profits from environmental protection ventures (i.e. ecotourism), to win political votes 
or to increase their popularity/sovereignty. Thus, powerful actors can use their access 
to social and economic networks to promote certain representations or discourses 
about nature. Brockington et al. (2008) refer to these discourses as “ungrounded 
environmentalisms” because they are promoted by actors who do not live or rely on 
the environments that they value, and who do not understand how their valuations of 
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these environments correspond to those of communities who live in them and rely on 
them for their livelihoods.  
 
Foucault (1977) refers to the idea of strategic use of regulations to control human 
behaviour as governmentality or “conduct of conduct”. According to Foucault (1977), 
governmentality is about creating institutions and organisations to manage the 
possible or actual impacts of people’s behaviour on the environment, and has less to 
do with management. The environment is seen as self-regulating in nature, and human 
livelihoods are viewed as potentially posing a threat to that self-regulation process. 
Some of the key approaches and critiques of political ecology that are evident in 
contemporary natural resources management strategies worldwide can be classified as 
environmentality, governmentality, neoliberal governance, biopower and discipline 
(Foucault 1977, 1991, 2008; Agrawal 2005). Governmentality approaches not only 
create a romantic and sublime image of nature, but they are also geared towards 
making people environmental subjects. They may be used by powerful international 
actors and states who apply such management strategies to compel populations to 
abide by predetermined resource use rules that will prevent people from “degrading” 
the environment (Agrawal, 2003; Agrawal, 2005; Fletcher, 2009). Less powerful 
states (i.e. developing countries) might subscribe to environmental management 
discourses and strategies promoted by developed and powerful countries which may 
be relevant to first world contexts, but cannot necessarily be fashioned into third 
world contexts where issues like poverty and livelihood insecurity are usually 
pressing concerns. 
 
Institutional arrangements set up for implementing neoliberal conservation are usually 
multi-level and nested institutions, from international to local levels. Hence Büscher 
et al. (2012:4) assert that the neoliberal conservation lens focuses on how 
conservation becomes  
 
 an amalgamation of ideology and techniques informed by the 
premise that nature is ‘saved’ through their submission to 
capital…neoliberal conservation shifts the focus from how nature 
is used in and through the expansion of capitalism, and how 
nature is conserved in and through the expansion of capitalism.  
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Büscher et al. (2012) argue that neoliberal conservation combines capitalism with 
conservation by claiming that its prime mission is to save and preserve the world’s 
biodiversity, and in order for this to be done, nature needs to be commodified for 
economic growth which will promote ecological sustainability. Ramutsindela (2008) 
further argues that changes in nature conservation in post-apartheid South Africa have 
not necessarily been linked to deteriorating environments, but to concerns that the 
black politicians will not prioritise, nor be interested in nature conservation. 
Ramutsindela (2008) also argues that the motivations for creating and designing 
conservation institutions need to be questioned because they may not necessarily be 
founded on a scientific basis, but could be the outcome of socio-political and 
economic processes that are driven by the state.  
 
Over the past decade, various literatures critiquing neoliberal conservation and 
drawing on Foucault’s ideas about governmentality and biopower have developed 
(Ramutsindela, 2008; Fletcher, 2010; Büscher et al., 2012; Roth and Dressler, 2012; 
Büscher, 2014; Brockington and Wilkie, 2015; Nustad, 2015). These critiques argue 
that the rise of capitalism has been paralleled by a rapid increase in the number and 
scale of efforts to transform ecosystems, and that actors in positions of power that 
drive conservation agendas in human-environment systems, tend to transform nature 
for capital accumulation in the name of biodiversity conservation, protected areas, 
transfontier conservation, re-wilding programs, as well as ecotourism (Ramutsindela, 
2008; Büscher et al., 2012).  
 
The present study therefore draws on these various political ecology narratives to 
strengthen understanding about issues of politics and power that are embedded in 
conservation governance at the meta-level. 
 
3.5.2 Factors influencing the second order of governance 
 
Interactive governance theory states that the second order of governance comprises 
institutions (Figure 3.3). Kooiman et al. (2008) assert that in order for governance to 
work, institutional arrangements should be structured so as to ensure that both the 
governing system and the system to be governed work cohesively and coherently. It is 
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important to get the institutions right so that both systems can be effective, and in so 
doing, enhance social justice. Jentoft (2007) argues that the diversity of the system to 
be governed calls for the governing system to be sensitive; complexity calls for 
inclusiveness; the dynamic nature of the system calls for flexibility and adaptability; 
while vulnerability calls for caution by the governing system. Therefore, for 
institutions to address the diverse, complex and dynamic nature of the system to be 
governed, they must equally (but with limits) be diverse, complex and dynamic – but 
not vulnerable (Jentoft, 2007). This means that they must handle these characteristics 
while at the same time maintaining their integrity and operating in a socially just 
manner. If a governing system becomes too complex, diverse or dynamic, it may 
become ungovernable in itself (Jentoft, 2007).  
 
Within the sustainable livelihoods literature, institutions are depicted as playing a role 
of mediating and governing people’s power and access to different types of capitals, 
as well as access to opportunities and livelihood decisions (Morse and McNamara, 
2013). However, by suggesting that institutions and organisations mediate how people 
use livelihood resources to form livelihood strategies, the SLA appears to suggest that 
people are not, or cannot be part of the governing system. This notion is challenged 
because the SLA is supposed to be a people-centered approach that promotes the 
engagement of local people in governing processes (Glavovic, 2006; Tao and Wall, 
2009). Asserting that institutions mediate people’s access to capitals and capabilities 
thus assumes that people cannot be part of governing processes; an assumption that is 
refuted by interactive governance theory. Kooiman et al. (2008) note that the human 
system (i.e. people and their lives) together with the natural system (resources) are 
both part of the overall governance system where governance actors are responsible 
for the role of governing. Governance is not necessarily there to mediate between 
livelihood resources and livelihood strategies; but all form part of the governance 
processes and local people are also actors within the governance system. Interactive 
governance can play a pivotal role in improving knowledge about how people are able 
to access and use resources for livelihoods (Agrawal and Perrin, 2008), as 
institutional processes could be just one aspect of governance and do not holistically 
reflect the governance practices that take place on the ground. 
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There are, however, other literatures that provide more depth on the role of 
institutions in the governance of natural resources in legal pluralist systems which are 
not adequately acknowledged in interactive governance theory. These include multi-
level institutions literature (Ostrom and Janssen, 2004; Brondizio et al., 2009); 
polycentric institutions literature (Gruby and Basurto, 2013); Type I or vertical multi-
level governance and Type II horizontal multi-level governance literature (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2003; Eckeberg and Joas, 2004); resilience thinking literature (Berkes et 
al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005); socio-ecological systems literature (Ostrom, 2005,2009; 
Berkes, 2006); commons literature (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2002); access theory 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003); and political ecology (Neumann, 2005). Although these 
different strands of literature may be similar in some respects and divergent in others, 
scholars such as Armitage (2008) argue that there is value in drawing lessons from 
combining all of them in order to identify points of convergence that could enhance 
understanding about designing appropriate institutions for managing complex socio-
ecological systems.  
 
Two concepts that are widely used by scholars working on socio-ecological systems 
are multi-level institutions and multi-scale linkages (Poteete, 2012). Multi-level-
institutional approaches focus on institution designs as well as the policy implications 
of certain institutional arrangements (Poteete, 2012). Multi-level institutions refer to 
institutional arrangements that are either “based on territorial, usually multi-purpose 
jurisdictions…and those based on functional areas, usually with overlapping 
territories” (Poteete, 2012:136). Agrawal (2005) and Armitage (2008) argue that 
because factors such as political regime shifts and increased commodification of 
resources may cause commons resources to change (posing challenges for the 
livelihoods strategies of rural communities that rely on the resources), multi-level 
institutions are needed at local, national and international levels to address such 
challenges. Commons theorists have thus strongly promoted co-management, 
integrated management and community-based approaches for managing commons 
resources, as examples of multi-level governance; arguing for emphasis on vertical 
and horizontal integration of resource systems.  
 
Institutions scholars (Ostrom, 2007; Armitage, 2008; Blomquist, 2009) that focus on 
issues of scale also argue that multi-level institutions are more resilient and promote 
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greater sustainability because they manage resources at multiple levels. This is also 
referred to as the decomposability of institutions (Ostrom, 2007) - meaning that 
institutions are designed to manage each level of interaction within the system, as 
well as at the holistic level of the system. Hence Ostrom (2007) argues that this 
enables policies to be tested in certain parts of the system without imposing a one-
size-fit-all formula on the rest of the system. 
 
Protagonists of multi-level institutions argue that such institutions provide scope for 
error detection and minimisation in governance practices because multiple 
interventions take place simultaneously within the system, creating learning 
opportunities to monitor what works and what does not work (Ostrom, 2005; 
Blomquist, 2009; Poteete, 2012). Furthermore, error detection and adaptation is 
critical because institutional design for complex socio-ecological systems is also 
affected by the limitations of human nature and the fact that decision-makers cannot 
claim that they fully comprehend the systems for which they make decisions or that 
they have complete or accurate data about such systems (Blomquist, 2009).  
 
Various governance and institutions scholars (Olsson et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2005; 
Kooiman et al., 2005; Ostrom, 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Brondizio et al., 2009) 
argue that in order to overcome complexity in commons governance, governance 
arrangements should:  
a) be multi-layered (in order to enhance cross-level integration and improve 
monitoring of institutional effectiveness); 
b) promote participation and collaboration of actors across scales; 
c) be accountable; 
d) be interactive (i.e. system to be governed and the governing system); 
e) promote knowledge pluralism (by drawing on views and values from all actors 
across scales); and 
f) be networked in order to enhance equitable sharing of benefits from resources. 
 
These attributes are not without critics. For instance, political ecologists argue that 
although these are useful in providing some trajectory for more sustainable 
governance of resources, they suggest that the governance of complex systems is a 
linear process. For example, they assume that if there is increased accountability, 
participation and transparency then the outcomes would be more sustainable and 
challenges would be overcome (Poteete, 2012). Various political ecology scholars 
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thus argue that the key driver underpinning the creation of governance arrangements 
is not merely the pursuit of institutional designs that would enhance equity and 
sustainability of resource use systems, but it is primarily governmentality – a 
technocratic process of regulating human conduct towards natural resources.  
 
Multi-level institutions could also result in two key problems: poor coordination as 
well as blurred accountability, linked to institutional complexity (Poteete, 2012). 
Accountability within multi-level institutions can be reduced where it is not clear for 
people on the ground which institution is responsible for what. It is argued that in 
multi-level institutions, coordination problems arise when institutions involved in 
governing resources fail to acknowledge one another and thus take decisions that have 
contradictory outcomes, or it becomes difficult for them to reach a consensus about 
complex matters. Poteete (2012:138) adds that, “particularly for natural resource 
systems that cross international boundaries, it is common for multiple institutions 
with veto authority to participate in policymaking. In such situations, the risk of a 
joint decision trap is very real”. A joint decision trap is defined as “the production of 
systematically suboptimal outcomes that can occur when two levels of government 
exist and policy decisions require agreement at both levels” (Poteete, 2012:138). 
 
Other scholars such as Young (2006) and Brondizio et al. (2009), however, argue that 
multi-level institutions are necessary for managing the commons, but neither high 
levels nor completely decentralised multi-level governance approaches for governing 
human-environment systems are suitable because of the high levels of functional 
interdependencies of such systems. They argue that the vertical interplay of 
institutions is important in multi-level governance, and that the nesting of institutional 
arrangements at local and larger scales (i.e. national and international levels) is 
important for the sustainable governance of human-environment systems. It is thus 
apparent that those who govern resources within the context of complex systems 
should be aware that complexity and uncertainly may yield management challenges, 
which may perpetuate if managers fail to acknowledge complexity and uncertainty. 
Hence, Blomquist (2009) argues that in the management of complex resource 
systems, policy actions should always go hand in hand with continuous observation of 
the system and its changes. Multi-level governance arrangements are thus seen as 
agents for connecting communities to regional, national and international governance 
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structures to facilitate shared knowledge and understandings of resources and how 
they should be managed (Armitage, 2008). 
 
Designing suitable institutions for the governance of human-environment systems is 
usually a complex task because these systems occur at multiple scales and multiple 
users and stakeholders contest access to the resources. There are also various debates 
in the literature about the appropriate scale or level for the management of complex 
human-environment systems. While the literature argues that globally, natural 
resources are managed in a top-down fashion with poor decentralisation of 
management, some prominent commons scholars tend to argue that polycentric or 
nested institutions are more appropriate for managing resources (Blomquist, 2009). 
Other scholars argue that more local level approaches (i.e. community-based resource 
management) are more appropriate.  
 
When it comes to the governance of systems such as coastal resources, polycentric or 
nested decision-making systems are usually observed. Polycentric systems constitute 
multiple institutions that are intended to make coherent decisions, although operating 
at different scales and in practice may operate independently of one another. Hence, 
polycentric systems are  
 
thought to be more likely to enhance the ability of resource users 
to craft and adjust their own institutions over time, which can 
increase the likelihood of those institutions leading to effective, 
equitable, or sustainable outcomes because they are more likely to 
be well matched to particular social-ecological contexts (Gruby 
and Barsuto, 2013:3).  
 
On the other hand, nested systems are made up of a centralised decision-making body, 
i.e. the state, where power is not necessarily distributed to other stakeholders (Gruby 
and Basurto, 2013). Commons scholars therefore usually advocate for nested 
polycentric institutions for decision-making because they combine the participation of 
local resources users and their local knowledge in the design of institutions and rules 
for governing resource use, while actors such as the state provide broader oversight 
and support for the governance of resources (Gruby and Barsuto, 2013).  
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Literature on socio-ecological systems (i.e. Berkes et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2007) also 
provides useful insights into the challenges related to designing appropriate 
institutions for natural-resource management or conservation areas where the 
complexity of socio-ecological systems manifests.  Socio-ecological systems debates 
also provide useful analyses of the challenges linked to the rates of change that 
systems undergo. This is pertinent because, over time, various factors cause human 
and biophysical aspects of systems to change, and these changes occur at different 
rates; which is why they are complex to manage (Blomquist, 2009). Temporal and 
spatial variations of human-environment interactions are also debated in natural 
resource governance literature, especially where resources are managed at multiple 
vertical and horizontal levels.  
 
Scholars that have studied the issue of scale argue that when the system changes at 
one level, it cannot be automatically assumed that this would affect all other levels of 
the system, and, at the same time, it also cannot be assumed that changes in one 
portion of the system will not have impacts on the wider system (Blomquist, 2009). 
Hence, “scaling up” or “scaling down” governance interventions may have negative 
impacts if the context-specific nuances of a system are not well understood. Hence 
Blomquist (2009:14) states,  
 
Without agreement on which elements of a system best indicate 
its overall condition, scientists and resource managers are likely 
to also lack agreement on what a change in one or more of those 
indicators at any particular time signifies…the selection of policy 
‘targets’ becomes especially unclear…furthermore, if resource 
managers focus their attention on a few selected policy targets, 
undesired and undesirable results may occur as other elements of 
the system shift in unanticipated ways. 
 
Furthermore, Cleaver (2000; 2002) argues against the notion posited by common 
resources scholars that institutions are often crafted for specific functions. Instead, 
Cleaver (2000) argues that resource-use institutions may be multi-functional and are 
created through a process of bricolage. Institutional bricolage may be described as 
“gathering and applying analogies and styles of thought already part of existing 
institutions” (Cleaver, 2000:380). One could therefore argue that institutions are not 
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necessarily rationally crafted, but evolve through multiple conscious and unconscious 
processes and actions. 
 
3.6 LEGAL PLURALISM AND GOVERNANCE 
 
Interactive governance theory (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014) identifies and distinguishes 
three orders of governance in legal pluralist systems where statutory and customary 
systems co-exist (Figure 3.3). Jentoft and Bavinck (2014) point out that interactive 
governance is linked to legal pluralism, as interactive governance is concerned with 
the role of relationships and interactions that occur between different levels and scales 
of governance, and with how different legal systems interact with each other.  
 
	
Figure 3.3: Interactive governance and legal pluralist systems (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). 
 
Legal pluralism is usually found in the global South, as there is usually limited 
capacity to ensure coherence in multiple coexisting systems of rule, especially in the 
governance of natural resource systems (Bavinck and Gupta, 2014). These scholars 
argue that laws usually emerge from local customs, and point out that in ancient 
civilisations around the world, local communities developed their own rules to 
manage resource-use systems such as water and agriculture, and as time went on and 
rules spread, new rules developed were superimposed onto existing rules. Moreover, 
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because communities engaging in different types of livelihood activities coexisted, 
different sets of rules also coexisted in the same areas. This created plurality. 
 
Legal pluralism studies have gained popularity in the last two decades, especially in 
interdisciplinary fields like natural-resource governance, where governance largely 
involves multiple legal orders, consisting of multiple actors usually with multiple 
conflicting goals, to manage the same resource or area (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 
2002; Tamanaha, 2007). Gupta and Bavinck (2014:86) define legal pluralism as “a 
condition whereby different rule systems apply to identical situations and legal 
jurisdictions and specific groups across legal jurisdictions” meaning that “different 
types of rules made by different governance actors apply to the same area or group of 
people”. The plurality that emanates from the existence of multiple rule systems may 
be a result of history, as well as the shift from government to governance (Bavinck 
and Gupta, 2014).  
 
Accordingto Tamanaha (2007:1), legal pluralism occurs where there are: 
 
Multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, 
but that there is diversity amongst them. They may make 
competing claims of authority; they may impose conflicting 
demands or norms; they may have different styles and 
orientations.  
 
The notion of plurality is not only discussed in legal pluralism literature, but is also 
alluded to within institutions literature. Ostrom (1990), for example, uses the term 
nested governance to refer to governance interactions that operate at multiple levels. 
Nested governance refers to the practice of “nesting” local and broader institutional 
arrangements in order to cater for different environmental, societal or other goals that 
do not necessarily go hand in hand. Whether this is actually possible in practice is 
questionable as in the case of many developing countries where environmental 
conservation goals and socio-economic development goals are usually in conflict. 
Coastal areas, for instance, inherently consist of multiple users and institutions with 
overlapping jurisdictions and multiple forms of governance (Charbonneau, 2012). Co-
existence of multiple and multi-level legal orders does not necessarily mean that they 
are equal or that they are equally powerful. In cases where different governance 
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regimes co-exist, state laws are usually more influential in decision-making processes 
and can be used by outsiders with power to gain access to resources in ways that are 
not locally considered as legitimate. Power therefore plays a central role in 
determining who the winners and losers are in cases of institutional plurality 
(Chuenpagdee and Jentoft, 2009). 
 
According to Bavinck and Gupta (2014), legal pluralism is crafted by struggles 
between different actors who seek to prioritise and promote differing and competing 
goals informed by certain scientific, historical or legal perceptions and cultural 
practice.  In most developing countries that are former colonies, statutory legal 
systems regulating natural resources were imposed in areas where customary systems 
of rule were already in place, creating the state of legal pluralism (Jentoft and 
Bavinck, 2014).  
 
Bavinck and Gupta (2014) identify two types of legal pluralism: weak and strong. 
Strong legal pluralism occurs where there is no mutual acknowledgement between the 
state and customary law, while weak legal pluralism refers to where the state 
recognises customary law in certain respects. Moreover, in both developing and 
developed countries, a shift away from top-down governance towards engaging 
multiple actors in the governance of complex socio-ecological systems has 
progressively resulted in the development of competing rules and rule systems. These 
multiple, often incoherent systems of governance that typically characterise legal 
pluralism usually have contradictory impacts on the people on the ground. Legal 
pluralism literature has sought to understand these contradictions, tensions and 
conflicts that arise when concurrent systems of rule are in place (Gupta and Bavinck, 
2014).  
 
Legal pluralism has posed various challenges to the understanding of governance of 
natural resource-use systems, as it affects the quality of governance systems in four 
key ways (Bavinck and Gupta, 2014). First, legal pluralism can result in incoherence 
in legal platforms that facilitate governance due to contradictions in governance 
processes and practices that result from legal pluralism. Second, legal pluralism may 
result in the redefining of rights systems due to differing rule systems, as well as 
power struggles relating to resource access that emerge through formal and informal 
	
72	
	
politics. Third, due to the fact that legal pluralism results in competing jurisdictions 
and roles among actors and between different rule systems, winners and losers are 
created in governance processes. This means that powerful actors that have a greater 
influence in decision-making processes may promote their interests at the expense of 
less powerful actors. Lastly, legal pluralism can affect the efficacy of improved 
institutional arrangements as it perpetuates the status of social conflict.  
 
Where legal pluralism exists in governance systems, there is also usually a prevalence 
of institutional ambiguity and multi-signification (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). 
Institutional ambiguity results in plural governance systems where there is no one-
shared constitution, or set of norms or procedures that serves as a basis for decision-
making. Consensus thus becomes a significant requirement for successful governance 
in plural contexts. Legal pluralism is thus at the heart of this study as it seeks to link 
perspectives on coastal livelihoods to governance debates because it concerns how 
people make decisions about their lives when they exist within a legally plural 
governance context. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
One of the primary objectives of this study is to argue for greater attention into 
governance interactions, processes and practices into livelihoods analyses. 
Livelihoods analyses are useful for highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of 
governance arrangements in the natural resource governance arena. This chapter has 
reviewed livelihoods perspectives and identified gaps within them that this study 
seeks to contribute towards addressing. It was also argued in this chapter that one of 
the major shortfalls of sustainable livelihoods literature is the weak conceptualisation 
of issues relating to governance that impact on livelihood strategies and outcomes. 
Within the governance body of work, this study also highlighted the significance of 
underlining the influence of global discourses, local historical contexts, power 
dynamics, social constructions of nature as well as institutional dynamics on how we 
understand and view the status quo of natural resource governance.  
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 CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES OF GOVERNANCE IN 
THE MAPUTALAND AREA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Situated on the northeastern-most coast of South Africa, Maputaland is a prime 
example of an area where plural governance systems and contestations over land and 
natural resources have existed for over four centuries. A few scholars (Webster, 1991; 
Mthethwa, 2002; Guyot, 2005) have attempted to document this history, as well as 
that of livelihood strategies of people within the area. It is apparent from the 
contextual background provided in the previous chapters that the history of 
governance of land and resources in Maputaland is characterised by significant 
intricacy and complexity. Maputaland has been subject to competition for power over 
the past four centuries by various actors, including government, traditional authorities 
and local tribal groups throughout the colonial and apartheid eras. These contestations 
are still alive in the present day and affect the governability of coastal resources in the 
area (Webster, 1991; Mthethwa, 2002; Guyot, 2005).  
 
The history of Maputaland and its people that is told in this chapter is drawn from 
triangulated evidence emanating from oral histories, as well as interviews, 
documentary evidence, observations and historical archives; all of which were 
collected for this study. The chapter outlines the key historical dimensions of 
governance in Maputaland that help explain current livelihoods, as well as issues 
relating to the governability of land and coastal resources in this area.  
 
4.2 PRE-COLONIAL MAPUTALAND (pre-1850) 
 
Archaelogical evidence reveals that the history of the Thonga people within 
Maputaland can be traced as far back as the thirteenth century, while the existence of 
the Tembe kingdom can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century (Hedges, 1978; 
Webster, 1991). Historically, Maputaland (also known as Tongaland or Tembe-
Tongaland) was an independent country and its boundaries covered parts of what is 
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now Mozambique in the north, while the southern boundaries were annexed by the 
British government in 1897 to form part of what became Zululand during colonial 
times, which later became incorporated into the Union of South Africa that was 
established in 1910 (Webster, 1991).  
 
Before colonialism and the subsequent land dispossession of African people, the rule 
of chiefs was largely influenced by land availability. At the time, there was more land 
than there were people to occupy it (Delius, 2008). As a result, the power, wealth or 
influence of chiefs was dependent on their ability to amass people and hold them as 
their followers. The availability of land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
enabled chiefs to move from one place to another, making it possible for individual 
chiefs to have followers made up of heterogeneous and diverse groups of people 
(Delius, 2008). Chiefs operated with the assistance of councilors or advisors who 
were usually men of high stature in the communities.  
 
By the late eighteenth century, the Thonga people within the Tembe kingdom (under 
the leadership of Mabhudu Tembe) were at the height of their glory with a strong 
trading economy, predominantly with the Portuguese, as well as a strong military 
(Webster, 1991). Mabhudu conquered many clans that were already in the area, 
including the Ngubanes and Khumalos, although there is little oral evidence that has 
been found to explain these events (Mthethwa, 2002). On the other hand, the king of 
the Zulus, Shaka, had by that time established his kingdom as one of the most 
powerful kingdoms in Southern Africa. Although the relations between the Zulu 
kingdom and the Thonga at the timewere generally civil, tensions over land arose 
when King Shaka sought to enlarge his kingdom by conquering adjacent kingdoms in 
surrounding territories. 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, African chiefdoms were not uniform or 
static as they were going through processes of change that impacted on their cultures 
and political nature (Delius, 2008). Powerful chiefs in pre-colonial times could 
expand the boundaries of their effective authority over land to areas where leaders had 
weak power. However, the Maputa king, Mabhudu, decided to pay tribute to Shaka, 
and by so doing, prevented him from conquering Maputaland. As a result, 
Maputaland remained independent during Shaka’s rule (Mthethwa, 2002). The Zulu 
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kingdom under the rule of king Shaka in the nineteenth century was different from 
other areas under traditional authority rule at the time. One of the reasons for this was 
that the Zulu kingdom consisted of headmen that were appointed by the paramount 
chiefs based on military competence (Delius, 2008). The headmen were not 
democratically elected nor did they obtain their positions on a hereditary basis. Their 
role was to lead the people where the paramount chiefs had stationed them within the 
kingdom, but ultimate power rested in the hands of the paramount chiefs.  
 
Delius (2008) points out that the accounts that informed the understanding of colonial 
rulers and officials about chieftaincy in the colonial era were largely influenced by 
their analysis of the Zulu kingdom that existed in the pre-colonial times which was 
not democratic, while the ones that were more democratic were ignored. As a result, 
colonial rule in rural South Africa was largely modelled on the pre-colonial Shakan 
system and led to the erosion of consultative and democratic practices by chiefs that 
largely prevailed in pre-colonial times, except in the Zulu kingdom.  
By the early 1800s, the Zulu king, Shaka, had also imposed himself as a threat to 
many neighbouring kingdoms, including the original Maputa kingdom that was then 
led by Makhasana. Unlike the Maputa leaders, the Zulu king had no positive relations 
with the British colonial powers. However, Makhasana strategically positioned 
himself with the Zulu king in a way that helped him find favour with him (Jackson, 
1967, cited in Mthethwa, 2002). However, because King Shaka had yielded much 
power in areas surrounding the Zulu kingdom, he began to intervene in the affairs of 
the Maputa houses, a legacy that was continued by his successors (Mthethwa, 2002). 
Even when the Zulus were defeated at the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879, they still 
remained a threat to the Maputaland kingdom and it remained unclear if or when they 
would claim back their dominance over the region, especially since Maputaland later 
became part of Zululand (Mthethwa, 2002). 
 
4.3 COLONIAL AND PRE-APARTHEID MAPUTALAND (1850-1947) 
 
African communities were brought under colonial rule in the nineteenth century 
(Delius, 2008). It will be apparent from the discussion in this chapter that the 
contestation of governance in Maputaland is not a contemporary phenomenon, but it 
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is one that emanated because of colonial rule and contestations between colonial 
governments and traditional rulers. Historiography thus reveals that current 
Maputaland has been subject to competition for power over the past four centuries by: 
a) imperial powers which include the Portuguse, the British, Germans and the Dutch; 
b) the government (colonial, nationalist and democratic) and the Tembe royal family; 
c) two houses of the Tembe royal family (i.e. Ngwanase house and Makhuza house); 
as well as d) other clans in Maputaland (i.e. the Ngubanes, Mathenjwas and 
Mkhontos) who lay claim that they ruled the land before the Tembes arrived in the 
area. These contestations are still alive in the present day and affecting the 
governability (i.e. quality of governance interactions) of this area (Webster, 1991; 
Mthethwa, 2002; Guyot, 2005). It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all these 
disputes, and this chapter focuses on the dispute between governments and the royal 
family, as well as the dispute between the two Tembe houses because these have 
emerged as key disputes that have influenced the livelihood strategies of people in 
Kosi Bay.  
As was observed during this study, Mthethwa (2002) emphasises that much of the 
history of Maputaland and the evidence of contestations and the complex history of 
governance in this region is contained in the memories of local people and their 
stories about their histories of geneology, migration and family stories that could be 
interrogated through oral histories. This assertion was confirmed during the research 
that was conducted for this study, as it was apparent that the histories of the people in 
the area were passed down from generation to generation through narration, and the 
coherence between stories told by different individuals across villages and age groups 
was astounding. Figure 4.1 depicts the timeline of traditional leadership in 
Maputaland and the key state interventions that took place in the colonial and 
apartheid eras in the area. 
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Figure 4.1: A timeline of key historical leaders and events that took place in pre-colonial, 
colonial and apartheid Maputaland  (Source: Philile Mbatha) 
 
Government archives on Maputaland contain weak accounts of the conflicts between 
the different clans in the community, and they do not reveal much about the local 
people and their livelihoods at the time. Hence, it is argued that the interpretation of 
rights to land and resources in African contexts in colonial times were strongly shaped 
by notions of racism and social Darwinism in British legal thinking which regarded 
wider African communities and households as of a lower level in social echelons and 
exaggerated the roles of chiefs (Delius, 2008). In general, anthropologists and 
observers have also interpreted African societies and land ownership using Western 
legal concepts. Consequently, land tenure and authority in African communities has 
historically been mostly viewed in the light of traditional authority powers (i.e. chiefs 
and kings) without understanding that traditional authorities were custodians of 
communal land on behalf of individuals that lived in the communities (Delius, 2008).  
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Colonial rulers also saw chiefs as potential agents of rebellion and as hindrances to 
the progress of their agendas. However, in the Natal region, due to limitation in terms 
of financial resources, the colonial rulers resorted to a system of indirect rule where 
chiefs were recognised as administrators over communal land under customary law in 
line with colonial laws. Theophilus Shepstone, a colonial leader at the time, gathered 
groups of people who were part of chiefdoms that had previously been broken down, 
and formed them into tribes and appointed chiefs to rule over them (Delius, 2008). As 
these chiefs received their powers from colonial rulers, they were not accountable to 
wider communities. 
In the case of Maputaland, after 1850, colonial powers, i.e. the British and 
Portuguese, began to squabble over Maputaland as they sought to colonise the south-
east region of Africa (Webster, 1991). Moreover, land and authority claims in the 
Maputaland region by different clans in Maputaland erupted, but the two that stand 
out are the claims made by the Ngubane, Mathenjwa and Mkhonto clans over the 
Tembe rule, as well as the competing claim over the land by two different houses of 
the Tembe family, i.e. the Makhuza and the Ngwanase houses (Mthethwa, 2002; 
DOR4; MOR7). These historical claims are crucial when one seeks to understand the 
history of the area and how these claims have played a role in shaping the manner in 
which governance over land and coastal resources has evolved in the Maputaland 
area.  
The land and identities of Maputaland and its people have been configured various 
times by colonial and apartheid administrations (Mthethwa, 2002; Hansen, 2013). For 
instance, the Portuguese and British colonial governments competed for land in the 
Maputaland since the 1850s. The fight between the Portuguese and the British over 
Maputaland had intensified by the 1870s, which culminated in the French president at 
the time, MacMahon, arbitrating by drawing a line that split the Maputaland country 
into two. He awarded what was north of Maputaland (i.e. Delagoa Bay) to the 
Portuguese and the land to the south of the line to the British (Webster, 1991; 
Mthethwa, 2002). This was during the rule of Madingi in south Maputaland and 
Makhasana in north Maputaland. This line, otherwise known as the McMahon line, is 
currently where the Farazela border separates South African and Mozambique on the 
coast. Webster (1991:615) argues that this line was “cutting what was an untied 
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people in two”, splitting the culture, history and traditions of local people into 
constructed “states”.  
The tampering of local identities by colonial and apartheid powers in Maputaland was 
later perpetrated by the establishment of the Zulu government in the 1970s by the 
apartheid government. Hence Webster (1991:615) states that “…the ravages of 
proletarianisation, and various colonial practices, all took their toll on the Thonga, and 
their coherence as a society began to crumble…as the government’s attempts at social 
engineering can change a person’s ethnicity, race or nationality at the stroke of a 
pen”. Due to spatial and social engineering by the colonial government, Maputaland, 
which was once one of the wealthier places in southern Africa in pre-colonial times 
(especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when trading was at its peak), 
paradoxically became one of the poorest areas in the region due to colonial and 
apartheid policies that aimed to produce underdevelopment in this area (Webster, 
1991).  
 
4.3.1 Tembe versus Tembe: The origins of the contestation between the two 
Tembe houses 
 
South Africa’s historical context needs to be taken into account in order to understand 
the role of traditional authorities as overarching governing institutions. The Tembe 
chieftaincy, for instance, currently has 48 villages and the people in Maputaland are 
currently associated with one of the two Tembe families, i.e. Ngwanase house and 
Makhuza house. On the one hand, the contestation over land in Maputaland by the 
two Tembe houses is ongoing and is a source of much conflict and confusion in terms 
of the governability of the land and resources. On the other hand, the Ngubane people 
claim that they were the original inhabitants of the area under Tembe rule in 
Maputaland. Some of them are headmen under the Tembe rule.  
 
The fraught history of Maputaland is clearly a contributing factor to the conflicts that 
exist in the traditional governance of the area. The contestation between the two 
Tembe houses is deemed controversial because the people in the area refrain from 
discussing it in public, and it is usually discussed in secret, as was observed during 
fieldwork, and also noted by Mthethwa (2002).  
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The competing Tembe houses arrived from the north to the south of Maputaland 
(which is now within the South African boundaries) at different times; i.e. the 
Makhuza house is said to have arrived in the early 1800s, whereas the Ngwanase 
house arrived in the late 1800s when the Makhuza house already held the chieftaincy 
in the area (Mthethwa, 2002; MOH7) (Figure 4.1). The arrival of the Makhuza house 
resulted in a controversial contestation over the land. Historical records and oral 
histories of Maputaland collected in this study suggest that the reason why the 
contestation resulted was because the grandfather of Makhuza, Madingi, ascended to 
chiefdom in 1823 before his father died (Jackson, 1967, cited in Mthethwa, 2002; 
MOH7; DOH4) (see Figure 4.1). Madingi was not heir to his father’s throne, instead, 
it was his half-brother, Makhasana, who was next in line for the throne. However, 
Mwayi decided to give Madingi his own chieftancy, which he then established outside 
the original Maputa kingdom, in the area that is now known as the Kosi Bay.  
In 1896, Ngwanase, who was a descendant of Makhasana, arrived in the south of 
Maputaland. This stirred a debate between the two houses of the family about the fact 
that Ngwanase came from a more senior family of the Tembe family. It was therefore 
concluded that since Ngwanase came from the senior family, and his mother, Zambili, 
was from the Swaziland royal family, it qualified Ngwanase to be more senior than 
Makhuza and take over the chieftancy. One of the key informants from the area 
provided a summarised account of what took place: 
The problem with governance in this area began a long time ago 
with the contestation of authority between three houses, i.e. two 
Tembe houses as well as Ngubane house. The Ngubane’s claim 
that they got here first before the Tembes, the house of Ngwanase 
says they are paramount chiefs while the house of Makhuza says 
it’s them. The house of Madingi came here first before the 
Ngwanase house…Makhuza was the one who extended the 
kingdom all the way down to Mtubatuba (that’s where the name 
comes from because ‘ukutuba’ means ‘ukuncinza’ or to pinch 
something) which means he pinched the land all the way to 
there..When Ngwanase came here running away from the 
Portuguese, he came here wearing a head scarf like a woman and 
he put stuff in his chest that looked like breasts as a disguise, and 
when he arrived here to house of Makhuza, they welcomed him as 
their brother and they knew that in the Mozambique side of 
Maputaland, he was a paramount chief (ingonyama) and the house 
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of Madingi were just headmen. So they hid him at Emfihlweni. 
Since then, umthayi (amarula festival) took place Emfihlweni and 
Makhuza would go and pay tribute to Ngwanase there (OHI7). 
 
However, in 1896, the two families agreed that the two leaders would rule 
simultaneously, and that the Makhuza (or Makhuze) house would rule independently 
on the coastal side, while the Ngwanase would rule the areas that are inland (Figure, 
4.2). This agreement, known as the Phelandaba agreement, was reached in the 
presence of a British colonial official. It was there that Maputaland was divided into 
the two chiefs, i.e. Ngwanase (for inland) and Makhuza (for the coastal parts) (Figure 
4.2).  
 
	
Figure 4.2: The delineation of Maputaland after the Phelandaba agreement (Mthethwa, 
2002:75). 
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Although this was the case, the British government always regarded the Ngwanase 
family as rulers of Maputaland, and it is recorded that in the late 1800s, there was a 
treaty that was signed between the British colonial government and the Ngwanase 
family, recognizing them as paramount rulers of the area (Mthethwa, 2002). Colonial 
rulers intervened in customary leadership in order to choose kings that were 
compliant to them and their administration. This was seen in that they appointed King 
Cetshwayo, Shaka’s successor, as the King of the Zulus and in the Maputa kingdom 
they agreed to intervene by appointing Ngwanase, the son of Queen Zimbili, to take 
over his mother’s throne and become paramount chief (BPP, 1887 cited in Mthethwa, 
2002). According to Mamdani (1996) and Delius (2008), the supreme or paramount 
chief was the lieutenant governor in charge of appointing other subordinate chiefs. 
Law 4 of 1885 was annexed by British colonial rulers from 1877 to 1881 in order to 
reinstate a system of paramount chief rule where certain chiefs were given de facto 
recognition (Delius, 2008).  
The Native Administration Act of 1927 was enacted in order to distinctly set out the 
administrative and legal roles of chiefs. According to Delius (2008), the supreme 
chiefs were given so much power and this enabled them to devolve administrative 
powers to whomever they pleased, and supreme chiefs ruled over all the land through 
issuing proclamations. However, the findings of this study as well as those of 
Mthethwa (2002) reveal that there is substantial oral history evidence from the ground 
in Maputaland that shows that the house of Makhuza was the influential one in local 
politics and in terms of regulating livelihood activities of local people, even though 
the house of Ngwanase was given supreme powers by the colonial government.  
Despite the Phelandaba agreement, the claim of the Ngwanase house on coastal 
Maputaland was echoed in the oral history evidence collected for this study where 
various key people from the area spoke about it (MOH7; DOH3; DOH4). The house 
of Ngwanase had not envisaged that they would ever need to control the coastal 
region because it was not worth much at the time of the Phelandaba agreement asit 
was not developed, and tourism had not developed in the area either. In addition to 
this, the Phelandaba agreement created confusion about the roles of the Makhuza 
house on coastal Maputaland, as they were not supreme chiefs. This confusion left 
local people feeling dislocated and vulnerable, and this was worsened by the 
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pervasive migrant labour system in the twentieth century, that removed many from 
their farming livelihoods that they had engaged in for many years (Delius, 2008). 
In 1895, the British government also imposed a protectorate over Maputaland as an 
annexation strategy (Mthethwa, 2002). The protectorate resulted in south Maputaland 
officially losing its independence as it formally became subject to British control. The 
protectorate ended up working both in the favour of the colonial powers, as well as in 
Ngwanase’s favour as it strengthened the presence and powers of both parties in 
Maputaland. Therefore, when Ngwanase moved into south Maputaland in 1896 to 
seek protection from the British government, it was a favourable situation for the 
British government because allying with Ngwanase meant that they could have easy 
access to most of areas in south-east Africa which Ngwanase oversaw. Therefore, 
because Ngwanase was willing to submit south Maputaland to British rule, the year 
after his arrival (1897) saw the annexation of Maputaland into Zululand, which had 
been made a British colony in 1887 (Mthethwa, 2002). This resulted in the 
redefinition of Zululand and Maputaland boundaries, as in 1889, approximately sixty 
kilometers of the Maputa country (i.e. from Mkhuze river to Lake Sibaya) were lost to 
Zululand which was subject to the British government. 
In the 1890s, the British government also strengthened the powers of traditional 
authorities to maintain peaceful working relations with them. This was in line with the 
system of co-opting traditional authorities by the British government that was 
developed in Zululand. Hence, they were willing to co-opt the Ngwanase. The British 
used a system of indirect rule and relied on Ngwanase to administer Maputaland and 
report to them to ensure that competitors who wanted control in the region (such as 
the Boer Republic, Germans and the Portuguese) could be kept out. However, the 
British colonial government had no plans to develop Maputaland, except to use in its 
strategy to extend its powers throughout south-eastern Africa (Schreuder, 1980; 
Axelson, 1967; Mthethwa, 2002). However, although the British colonial government 
exercised such powers, Ngwanase perceived himself as more powerful than the 
colonial government because he understood that Maputaland was too tricky for the 
colonial government to administer since it was very remote and was a high-risk 
malaria region; thus no British colonial officials were willing to risk their lives and be 
stationed in the area (Mthethwa, 2002).  
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Consequently, Ngwanase became key to the colonial government as he had 
previously shown himself to be a compliant chief. However, Ngwanase began to use 
the weakness of indirect rule by the colonial government to his advantage and to 
increase his own dominance within the British territory, over and above other leaders 
that were there before him, i.e. Makhuza and other headmen who did not receive the 
amount of recognition and powers that Ngwanase was given by the British 
(Mthethwa, 2002). By the early twentieth century, Ngwanase was playing a pivotal 
role for the British government in terms of helping mobilise labour for white farmers 
in Zululand as well as for mines and tax collection. The involvement of the British 
colonial and apartheid rulers (and arguably the post-apartheid government) on the 
ground in Maputaland was very minimal. This is why the area was hardly developed 
by the government. Instead, during colonial and apartheid eras, this area was largely 
used as a reserve for low skilled labour (Webster, 1991; Mthethwa, 2002).  
Historical archives reveal that by the late 1800s, it became difficult for the British 
colonial government to control Ngwanase, and that Ngwanase became a law unto 
himself, performing his duties towards the colonial government, i.e. collecting taxes, 
only when it suited him (Ulundi Archives, 1928). However, despite his behaviour, the 
British colonial government continued to cater to Ngwanase’s needs. 
Delius (2008) points out that during the colonial era, chiefs found themselves 
straddling and having to meet the demands of two different administrative systems, 
i.e. the colonial system as well as the pre-colonial system that was more people 
centred; and they were able to meet demands from either side with differing degrees 
of success. However, with increased pressure to meet the demands of colonial rulers 
from the 1930s, it became more difficult for chiefs to cater for the needs of the people 
they were leading (Delius, 2008).  In the 1930s, due to the introduction of new native 
laws, chiefs were used by colonial rulers as “instruments of policies which were 
determined by logic and priorities external to the society, and which most rural 
residents saw as profoundly invasive and destructive” (Delius, 2008:228).  
While the legacy of Makhuza and Ngubanes in Maputaland was poorly documented 
in colonial government archives, Ngwanase made a substantial mark in the history of 
the Maputaland area as his ability to manipulate the colonial system as well as local 
traditional systems for his own purposes and to advance his own power (Mthethwa, 
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2002) was well documented. Moreover, the Ngwanase house in the Tembe royal 
family has apparently been reluctant to discuss the history of their chieftancy, and 
argued that they should not be made to share power with the Makhuza house because 
the Ngwanase house has historically ruled from the Portuguese territory, all the way 
down to Mkhuze river. As Mthethwa (2002:32) asserts, “The colonial official’s 
tendency to present a favourable picture of compliant chiefs could have resulted in the 
exclusion of other local leaders in the colonial records and Makhuza could have been 
excluded in this context”.  
Over time, Ngwanase applied various tactics in order to consolidate his power and 
control over the land that Makhuza was in charge of. He manipulated family 
relationships and marriage arrangements to win over areas that were led by Makhuza 
and to establish himself as the most dominant power over the entire area of 
Maputaland (Webster, 1991; Mthethwa, 2002). It is also said that Makhuza was 
eventually forced to relenquish all his power to Ngwanase because Ngwanase lodged 
a death threat over Makhuza, which left Makhuza no choice but to give up his 
dominance. Moreover, Ngwanase also played the colonial power by using his relation 
with them to his advantage and challenging the British to ensure that they recognise 
that without him, they had no guaranteed control over Maputaland that was highly 
contested by the Boer Republic and the Portuguese at the time.  
After Ngwanase died in 1928, his son Mhlupheki, took over the chieftancy 
(Mthethwa, 2002). Mhlupheki’s rule was highly contested and opposed by many 
within the extended Tembe family who wanted another family member to be the 
successor. In addition, Mhlupheki’s relations with the British colonial powers was not 
a positive one as he made certain decisions without informing the British officials in 
the region (Mthethwa, 2002). Mthethwa (2002) reveals that Tembe chiefs in 
Maputaland emphasised the need to exercise traditional powers in the weak physical 
presence of the colonial state in the area and they resented being viewed by the 
colonial governments as mere agents of the government. However, the government 
could not convict the Tembe chiefs because they relied on them to collect taxes and 
control the people on behalf of the colonial government. Mthethwa (2002) argues 
that, at the peak of colonialism in South Africa during the 1930s, the colonial 
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government still failed to fully consolidate its power in Maputaland because they 
could not control the Tembe chiefs.  
 
4.4 MAPUTALAND DURING APARTHEID GOVERNMENT RULE (late 
1940s-1994) 
 
During the reign of the apartheid regime, the success of segregrational policies in 
rural areas was dependent on chiefs and headmen, which is why the colonial and 
apartheid administrations were very patient with traditional leaders (Mthethwa, 2002). 
In 1945, NJ van Warmelo, who was a state ethnologist for the colonial government 
argued that chiefs should be given greater recognition and powers in native lands, a 
view which was widely supported by chiefs and was considered favourably by the 
apartheid government (Delius, 2008). The Nationalist Party (i.e. the apartheid 
government) took over the government from the British in 1948 and in 
1951promulgated the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 of 1951) which strengthened the 
powers of chiefs (Mthethwa, 2002). Consequently, the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68 
of 1951), was a key piece of legislation that determined the policies and practices of 
the apartheid government. This Act clarified the administrative roles of chiefs, an 
issue that had not been properly addressed by the colonial rulers. This system enabled 
chiefs to have greatly increased salaries, as well as discretionary powers that made 
them less dependent on their constituents (Delius, 2008).  
 
The apartheid government had the power to split or combine rural communities as it 
wished in order to protect a chief or headman that they had good relations with 
(Mthethwa, 2002). Delius (2008) points out that many people living in rural areas 
revolted against this system because they were concerned that giving chiefs that much 
power would make them more loyal to the apartheid government and less accountable 
to their subjects, but these revolts were crushed by the end of the 1960s and the Bantu 
authority system became dominant. Chiefs then became increasingly corrupt in the 
1970s, causing many people in the communities to resent them (Delius, 2008). In 
Maputaland, the apartheid government assigned traditional powers to the house of 
Ngwanase, enabling the violation of the 1896 Phelandaba agreement. 
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In 1958, the Tembe rulership was proclaimed under the apartheid government and all 
power in areas falling under this authority was centralised in the house of Ngwanase 
under chief Mzimba (the youngest son of Ngwanase) who, from 1953, administered 
the area on behalf of the apartheid government under the Ingwavuma District 
(Mthethwa, 2002).  Just like the British colonial government, the Nationalist 
government recognised chief Mzimba from the Ngwanase house as paramount chief 
in Maputaland, and as a result, the Tembe Tribal Authority was established in 1958 
under the leadership of chief Mzimba, and the Tembe tribal office was opened as a 
satellite of local government administration that was based at Ingwavuma District 
(Mthethwa, 2002). By this time, on the Makhuza side, Walter Tembe had taken over 
the leadership after Mvutshana Tembe passed away in 1956, and was meant to be 
succeeded by Ncelaphi Isaac Tembe, who, however, was still very young at the time; 
which meant that Walter would hold the throne for him until he was old enough 
(Mthethwa, 2002; MOH7).  
 
Between 1967 and 1971, Walter Tembe from the Makhuza house approached lawyers 
in order to seek out answers and investigate about claiming back the chieftancy of the 
Makhuza house in Maputaland (Mthethwa, 2002). Walter was the first member of the 
Makhuza house to challenge the powers of the Ngwanase house under the Nationalist 
government rule, upon hearing that the apartheid government sought to restore the 
rightful chiefly powers to those who had lost it during colonial times. However, this 
enquiry did not materialise, and instead, the 1896 decision of allowing the Makhuza 
house to rule independently remained (Mthethwa, 2002). However, recognizing only 
the Ngwanase house also violated the stated objectives of the apartheid government’s 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 that sought to re-establish traditional chiefdoms that 
existed in the pre-colonial times, which meant that the house of Makhuza could 
rightfully claim back their powers. 
 
Walter reminded the Bantu Commissioner responsible for Maputaland that after the 
Phelandaba agreement, the Makhuza house was regarded as chiefs in the Makhuza 
ward, even though it was agreed that the paramount chieftaincy would reside with the 
Ngwanase house because of family hierarchies that were respected between the two 
families. Walter also alluded to the fact that it was an insult to refer to the house of 
Makhuza as headman because that implies that they were appointed into power by the 
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house of Ngwanase (Mthethwa, 2002). Data collected in this study suggested that 
local people on the coast regard Ncelaphi from the Makhuza house as a chief, not a 
headman, and at the tribal court, he is also treated with more pronounced respect than 
the other headman because he is related to the royal family (MOH7; DOH3; DOH4).  
Although historical records do not reflect this, the evidence collected in this study 
reveal that when the Nationalist government took over and introduced the Bantu 
Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951, the apartheid government invited both chief Mzimba 
from the Ngwanase house and Mvutshane from the Makhuza house to be registered as 
leaders of Maputaland, in line with the 1896 agreement (MOH7). However, it is said 
that Mvutshane Tembe was not a mentally sound man as he had a mental illness that 
prevented him from being up to date with the affairs of his ward. Hence, when the 
government made a call to register the chiefs, Mvutshane did not show up and as a 
result, all chiefly powers were given to Mzimba Tembe and the tribal office was built 
under the Ngwanase authority.  
 
Walter’s attempts to claim back the chieftaincy of the Makhuza house were turned 
down by the Nationalist government, which then silenced him and instead, after 
realizing how complex the claim between the house of Makhuza and Ngwanase was, 
resolved to reinstate the 1896 rule by the British colonial government that enabled the 
house of Makhuza to rule independently, but made the house of Ngwanase 
paramount. The Makhuza house has however, never been satisfied with this decision, 
although Ncelaphi Tembe who succeeded Walter Tembe in the late 1970s did not 
lodge a dispute against the house of Ngwanase for a while.  
 
In 1975, the apartheid government established homeland governments in homeland 
areas, which saw the end the autonomy of the chiefs of Maputaland (Mthethwa, 
2002). This meant that the KwaZulu government assumed power over Maputaland. 
The establishment if the Bantu Administration and the incorporation of Maputaland 
into the KwaZulu homeland, fueled the conflict between the two Tembe families even 
further. Moreover, when the homeland government took over, the Ngwanase house 
had been relinquished from paramount chief status because the apartheid government 
only recognised the Zulu leader as supreme chief (Ingonyama). 
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In the 1990s, the house of Ngwanase drafted a policy to claim the Makhuza area, also 
denying Makhuza independence (Mthethwa, 2002). According to Mthethwa (2002), 
the house of Makhuza allied with the Ngubane house in the 1990s, with Ncelaphi 
Tembe as a leader of the Makhuza coastal region, in an attempt to win it over and 
with the hope that the election of the African National Congress (ANC) government 
in the 1994 national elections would result in the endorsement of the Makhuza clan by 
the ANC. However, this did not happen. The ANC government has since 1994 
continued to recognise the Ngwanase house as the main chieftaincy of Maputaland. 
 
However, since 1994, there remains much ambiguity about the role of traditional 
institutions in relation to customary institutions as well as statutory institutions 
governing land and coastal resources that exist in places such as Kosi Bay. The 
plurality of governance structures that currently exist in Kosi Bay is described in more 
detail in Chapter Five. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Understanding the historical context of governing institutions for rural areas in South 
Africa is significant, as the presence of traditional authorities in parallel to new 
democratic government structures and other governance systems has a profound 
impact on the manner in which rural people access and benefit from resources 
(Ntsebeza, 2004). It is apparent from this chapter how spatial, political and social 
engineering conducted by colonial and apartheid governments thwarted the histories, 
identities and cultures of the people of Maputaland; which has had major implications 
for the governance of this area and the livelihoods of local people. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. Moreover, the historical power of colonial 
and apartheid governments to appoint and depose chiefs as they wished, coupled with 
the impact of the indirect style of rule they adopted, can also not be underestimated. 
This has resulted in the wicked problem of resolving challenges related to traditional 
governance in rural South Africa which the democratic government has failed 
dismally at addressing (Ntsebeza, 2004). Without deep analysis of the role that the 
colonial and apartheid governments played in confusing the system of traditional 
leadership in many parts of South Africa, most people will not realise that some 
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existing traditional leaders in rural areas are not customary leaders, but were put in 
power through the discretion and authority of colonial and apartheid powers.  
 
It is also important to understand the weight of the information emerging from 
historical records and oral history that reveals that, contrary to popular belief, colonial 
states did not have complete dominance over African leaders (Delius, 2008). The case 
of the history of the Tembe chiefs discussed in this chapter reveals that the role and 
power of traditional leaders is often undermined in debates about the governance of 
land and resources, and the state (whether colonial or post-colonial) is usually 
depicted as having absolute control over governance of land resources in areas within 
its jurisdiction, when this may not be the case. For instance, the Tembe chiefs in 
Maputaland have historically not been threatened by the power of the state and 
perceived themselves to have more power than the government (Mthethwa, 2002). 
Moreover, the homeland government of KwaZulu also exercised autonomy within the 
region that was outside the control of the apartheid government. The information 
presented in this chapter reveals that more understanding and analysis needs to be 
placed on clarifying the role of chiefs or traditional leaders and their powers in 
shaping governance practices, especially in areas of limited statehood. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY, LEGISLATIVE 
AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
RELEVANT TO THE CASE STUDY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In South Africa, international law plays a significant role in informing statutory 
natural resource management and governance. At national, provincial and local levels, 
institutional arrangements play a critical role in the implementation of values and 
principles stipulated in legal and policy instruments at national and international 
levels. The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (No. 107 of 1996) 
read with the Constitution of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996) and in particular Chapter 
2 (section 24) of the Bill of Rights, provide the basis for all environmental regulation 
in the country. The World Heritage Convention (1972) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (1992) are the key binding international policy instruments that 
inform the principles guiding the governance of protected natural resources and world 
heritage within South Africa. These conventions promote the sustainable management 
of resources and biodiversity, and encourage the participation and consideration of 
communities within and adjacent to the protected sites, so as to ensure that 
conservation contributes to socio-economic development and human wellbeing. On 
the other hand, statutory governance frameworks informing coastal resource 
governance in rural areas exist parallel to pre-existing traditional and customary 
governance structures. These traditional and customary governance systems draw on 
sources of law, rules and practices that are different from and sometimes in conflict 
with statutory ones, such as in the case of Kosi Bay. This chapter seeks to provide an 
overview of the abovementioned statutory, traditional and customary policy and legal 
frameworks relevant to the case study site. 
 
5.2 RELEVANT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN MAPUTALAND 
 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the key statutory, traditional and customary 
governance structures and rules that currently exist in Kosi Bay to govern various 
aspects of coastal resources. 
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Table 5.1: Statutory, traditional and customary governance structures regulating coastal 
resource use in the case stuy site 
 Socio-ecological 
system 
Scale Key governance 
actors/institutions 
Key rules/regulations 
STATUTORY ISimangaliso 
World Heritage 
Site 
International - 
National - 
Provincial 
- United Nations 
Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural 
Organization 
(UNESCO) 
- Dept. of 
Environmental Affairs 
- ISimangaliso 
Authority 
- Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife 
- KZN Tourism 
Authority 
- Umkhanyakude 
District Municipality 
- Umhlabuyalingana 
Local Municipality 
- Dept. of Rural 
Development and Land 
Reform 
- Operational Guidelines of 
the World Heritage 
Convention (WHC) 
- The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 
(1996) 
- World Heritage Convention 
Act (1999) 
- ISimangaliso Authority 
Integrated Management Plan 
(IMP) 
- National Environmental 
Management: Protected Areas 
Act (2003) 
- Tourism Act (2014) 
- Municipal Structures Act 
(1998) 
- Municipal Systems Act 
(2000) 
- Restitution of Land Rights 
Act (1994) 
- Communal Land Rights Act 
(2004) 
- Traditional Courts Bill 
(2017) 
 Maputaland 
Marine Protected 
Areas (MPA) 
National-
Provincial 
- ISimangaliso 
Authority 
- Dept. of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
- Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife 
ISimangaliso Authority IMP 
Marine Living Resources Act 
(1998) 
Small-scale Fisheries Policy 
(2012) 
 Tembe Coastal 
Forest Reserve 
National - 
Provincial 
- ISimangaliso 
Authority 
- Dept. of Agriculture, - 
Forestry and Fisheries 
- Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife 
- ISimangaliso Authority IMP 
- Forestry Act (1998) 
Ponta do Ouro-
Kosi Bay TFCA 
Regional Peace Parks Foundation  
TRADITIONAL Kosi Bay land Local - Ingonyama Trust 
- Tembe Traditional 
Authority/Tribal 
Council 
- Ingonyama Trust Act (1994) 
- Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act 
(2003) 
- National House of 
Traditional Leaders Act 
(2009) 
CUSTOMARY Fish traps in Kosi 
system 
Local 
(Nkovukeni & 
Mvutshane) 
Kosi Bay fish trap 
customary structure 
Local customary rules (pre-
colonial) 
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The coastal area falling under the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site within and 
adjacent to Kosi Bay overlaps other types of coastal resource uses and governance 
structures, most of which predate the existence of the World Heritage Site. Traditional 
and customary structures responsible for local governance in Kosi Bay have existed 
before various of the statutory governance structures that now exist in Kosi Bay and 
act to govern various aspects of socio-ecological systems found in the area.  
 
In July 1997, South Africa ratified the World Heritage Convention, joining 190 other 
signatory states (UNESCO, 2005). This international policy instrument provides the 
framework that informs the protection and preservation of world heritage in South 
Africa. The Convention was adopted in 1972 in order to identify, protect, conserve 
and present the world’s cultural and natural heritage that is “among the priceless and 
irreplaceable assets, not only of each nation, but of humanity as a whole” (UNESCO, 
2015). The ratification of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention by South Africa 
resulted in the promulgation of the World Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 1999) 
and the country’s first World Heritage Site, i.e. iSimangaliso (formerly known as the 
St. Lucia Wetland Park) was proclaimed in the year 2000.  
 
The World Heritage Convention states that world heritage status is awarded to sites of 
“outstanding universal value” (UNESCO, 2017). According to the Operational 
Guidelines for the Implementation of the Convention (UNESCO, 2005:46), 
“outstanding universal value” means cultural and/or natural significance which is so 
exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for 
present and future generations of all humanity”. In order to protect world heritage 
sites, UNESCO established a fund in 1978 known as the Fund for the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO, 2017). Member states are 
obliged to contribute towards this fund, together with contributions or gifts from 
private individuals, organizations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), as well contributions from the public (UNESCO, 2017). The 
fund assists member states with technical, infrastructural, research and capacity 
building support to ensure the continuity of the protection of natural and cultural 
heritage within their countries.  
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The World Heritage Committee, formally known as the Intergovernmental Committee 
for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal 
Value, is the regulating body for the Convention. It comprises 21 members from 
states that are party to the Convention and elected by other state parties. The 
committee was established by UNESCO and is responsible for defining the criteria 
for the selection of cultural and natural heritage (UNESCO, 2005; 2015). However, 
by 2016, only two members of the committee were from Africa (i.e. Senegal and 
Algeria). There are no representatives from central or Southern Africa.  
The ideas and principles contained in the World Heritage Convention have shaped the 
conceptualization, formulation and design of key national laws and policies governing 
natural resources and biodiversity in South Africa. A representative from the 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) confirmed that the UNESCO 
Operational Guidelines are considered to be “the Bible” for guiding world heritage 
protection in South Africa (DEA1, 2017). The Convention is read together with 
pieces of legislation that include the World Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 
1999), the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (No. 10 of 2004), 
National Forests Act (No. 84 of 1998), National Environmental Management Act 
(No. 107 of 1998) (NEMA), Marine Living Resources Act (No. 18 of 1998) (MLRA), 
as well as the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (No. 57 of 
2003) (NEMPAA). There are other relevant international conventions and instruments 
that South Africa has subscribed to that have a direct or indirect influence on national 
legislation. These include the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
(Ramsar Convention) (1971), United Nations on the Law of the Sea (1982), FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995), and FAO Voluntary Guidelines 
for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (2015). The values and principles that 
are enshrined in these legal instruments are echoed within South Africa’s Constitution 
and Bill of Rights (Republic of South Africa, 1996).   
 
The World Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 1999) embodies the principles and 
values enshrined in the Convention and the manner in which the South African 
government has committed itself to upholding the virtues of the Convention. The 
Convention makes provision for the establishment of bodies governing world heritage 
in signatory countries. In the case of the iSimangaliso site, the body that acts as a 
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governing authority is known as the iSimangaliso Authority. The principles 
underlying the World Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 1999) in South Africa 
stipulate that the management of cultural and natural heritage should prioritize the 
physical, developmental, cultural and social needs and interests of people and must 
promote sustainability. Moreover, the Act stipulates that previously marginalized 
people must be ensured special and equitable access to the sites, and measures need to 
be developed in order to ensure this. Co-ordination among government departments 
that have a role in the management of the sites is encouraged by the Act, and it states 
that policies, legislation and actions relating to sitesof world heritage need to be 
coordinated by intergovernmental departments (Republic of South Africa, 1999). 
Therefore, in order to protect resources and ensure that the values of the World 
Heritage Convention are upheld, the former Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism (DEAT) established a body responsible for the governance of iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site known as the iSimangaliso Authority.  
The national enabling legal framework for the governance of iSimangaliso Park 
includes the:  
a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996); 
b) World Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 1999); 
c) Marine Living Resources Act (No.18 of 1998); 
d) National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (No. 57 of 
2003); 
e) National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (No. 10 of 2004); 
and 
f) Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999). 
 
5.3 GOVERNANCE PROCESSES WITHIN ISIMANGALISO WORLD 
HERITAGE SITE 
 
The iSimangaliso World Heritage Site is 358,534 hectares and makes up 
approximately 9 per cent of the South African coastline (iSimangaliso Authority, 
2011). It consists of five unique ecosystems - a rich tidal zone, grasslands, dune 
forest, coral reefs and sandy beaches - while the Kosi Bay component also consists of 
an estuarine and lake system (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011).  
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Figure 5.1: iSimangaliso Wetland Park (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016) 
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iSimangaliso also consists of the Kosi Bay coast, Tembe Elephant Park and Sodwana 
Bay which are among the major tourist attractions in the KwaZulu-Natal province; 
attracting both local and international tourists.  
The iSimangaliso Authority prides itself on pioneering a model of conservation that 
balances biodiversity conservation and ecosystem protection with social equity and 
rural development, and on ensuring that adjacent rural communities experience 
tangible benefits from the conservation of resources (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). 
This Authority operates alongside other statutory institutions and local government, as 
well as traditional and customary systems at the local level; some of which pre-dated 
the statutory institutions. The iSimangaliso Authority operates through an executive 
staff headed by a CEO, who is charged with managing daily operations of the 
Authority and its interactions with subsidiary statutory organizations such as 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, KZN Tourism Authority and local government 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2011; 2016). Figure 5.2 depicts the key legal and 
institutional framework that iSimangaliso Authority (2016) states that it uses to 
govern the iSimangaliso site.  
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Figure 5.2: Legal and institutional framework informing the governance of iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016) 
 
The duties of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife involve the day-to-day management of 
conservation of terrestrial and marine resources within the site. The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs is in charge of appointing non-executive members of the 
iSimangaliso Board. As such, iSimangaliso Authority is upwardly accountable 
through the national DEA to UNESCO, in order to ensure that they carry out the 
management guidelines and principles of UNESCO within the park (UNESCO, 2015; 
iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). Some of roles of the Authority stipulated under the 
Act involve: 
• developing strategies for environmental and cultural protection of world 
heritage within the site giving effect to the provisions of the Convention; 
• promoting ecotourism as a major mode of economic development within the 
site; and 
• establishing and implementing an IMP. 
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According to iSimangaliso Authority (2016), their mandate explicitly obliges them to 
oversee optimal tourism-based development and the emergence of new tourism 
products and markets and job creation within the zones they have demarcated as 
suitable for tourism within the site. The commercialization strategy for tourism is 
primarily directed at empowering and advancing the historically disadvantaged 
communities adjacent to the site, many of which are claimants of land within the 
World Heritage Site. To this end, the authorities have identified the private sector as 
key players providing resources and expertise to advance commercial tourism through 
equity partnerships with community partners.  
The iSimangaliso Integrated Management Plan (IMP) highlights the fact that 
balancing the need for economic development in the region with the protection and 
preservation of the natural heritage protected under world heritage status is not easy to 
achieve. The Authority asserts, “in order to ensure world heritage values are not 
compromised, conservation objectives need to be foremost, with the emphasis on 
‘development for conservation’” (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011:3). Hence, 
ecotourism development was identified as the appropriate mechanism for advancing 
economic growth in the area since it can promote both conservation and development 
objectives. Moreover, one of the officials from the Authority also confirmed “the park 
is looking for conservation that will work for UNESCO but that will benefit local 
people” (WHA, 2015).  
The iSimangaliso Authority states that it has set up a training and capacity building 
programme created to transform the tourism sector by providing skills and 
infrastructure to assist local people to engage in the tourism businesses. Moreover, the 
iSimangaliso IMP informs the integration of conservation, tourism and the economic 
upliftment of the marginalized communities that are adjacent to the. Hence, the four 
management goals of the IMP (2011:112) include: 
1. To protect, conserve, enhance and present the park’s:  
a. World Heritage values (ecological processes; superlative natural 
phenomena and scenic beauty; and biodiversity and threatened species); and 
its  
b. Cultural heritage.  
2: To promote, manage, oversee, market and facilitate optimal tourism and 
related development in the park.  
3: To promote the empowerment and development of historically 
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disadvantaged communities in and adjacent to the park, particularly 
landowners (former land claimants).  
4: To manage the park through effective and efficient governance, and the 
strongest possible legislative, regulatory and institutional arrangements. 
The zonation strategy in iSimangaliso is associated with development nodes that are 
set aside for tourism activities. The Authority has drawn up a list of tourism activates 
that are allowed within the. These include hiking trails, 4x4 trails and game drives, 
kayaking, motorized boating, fishing, freshwater diving, swimming, recreational surf 
angling, as well as recreational fishing and spearfishing of pelagic species 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2011).  
The iSimangaliso Authority also states in their IMP that their transformation strategy 
involves regular meetings with historically disadvantaged communities within and 
adjacent to the park, as well as providing support to the Regional Land Claims 
Commissioner to settle pending land claims by some of the communities on 
iSimangaliso regulated land (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011). This is because all the 
land falling under the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site has been under claim by 
communities within and adjacent to the park through the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act 22 of 1994. The IMP (2011) has set out the Authority’s strategy for handling 
restitution settlements within the site.  
Due to its perceived success internationally in terms of promoting the preservation of 
world heritage, while identifying opportunities for the development of previously 
disadvantaged communities adjacent to the park; the iSimangaliso Authority is 
regarded by UNESCO as one of the best-practice examples from around the world for 
its management practices (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). The organization prides 
itself in promoting broad participation in the management of the park through 
entering into co-operative governance agreements with various stakeholders at local 
and provincial levels in order to carry out its duties along the coast. These include 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, the national DEA: Oceans and Coasts, as well the Local and 
District Municipalities.  
 
 
	
101	
	
5.4 CONSERVATION GOVERNANCE WITHIN ISIMANGALISO WORLD 
HERITAGE SITE 
 
The iSimangaliso Authority has adopted International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) principles and categories (Dudley, 2008:10) for protected area 
governance to inform their decisions regarding iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. 
These include: 
a) Representativeness, comprehensiveness and balance: including highest quality 
examples of the full range of environment types within a country; includes the 
extent to which protected areas provide balanced sampling of the environment 
types they purport to represent. 
b) Adequacy: integrity, sufficiency of spatial extent and arrangement of 
contributing units, together with effective management, to support viability of 
the environmental processes and/or species, populations and communities that 
make up the biodiversity of the country. 
c) Coherence and complementarity: positive contribution of each protected area 
towards the whole set of conservation and sustainable development objectives 
defined for the country. 
d) Consistency: application of management objectives, policies and 
classifications under comparable conditions in standard ways, so that the 
purpose of each protected area within the system is clear to all and to 
maximize the chance that management and use support the objectives. 
e) Cost effectiveness, efficiency and equity: appropriate balance between the 
costs and benefits, and appropriate equity in their distribution; includes 
efficiency: the minimum number and area of protected areas needed to achieve 
system objectives. 
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Figure 5.3: Marine and terrestrial protected areas within iSimangaliso World heritage Site 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2011) 
 
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 respectively depict the zonation and delineation of marine 
and terrestrial protected areas within the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. The 
different types of zonation include, among others: sanctuary areas, restricted areas, 
controlled areas and wilderness areas. 
 
	
103	
	
 
	
Figure 5.4 Conservation layers in iSimangaliso World Heritage Site (iSimangaliso Authority, 
2011) 
 
5.4.1 Marine environments 
 
Kosi Bay is located along one of two Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) that lie 
adjacent to the iSimangaliso site, i.e. Maputaland MPA in the north bordering Kosi 
Bay and St. Lucia MPA in the south bordering Cape Vidal (Figure 5.3 and 5.4). 
MPAs have been identified as a key tool for conserving marine resources globally, 
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especially after a commitment was made at the Convention on Biological Diversity 
that by 2012, 10 per cent of the world’s marine and coastal zones would be under 
protection(UNEP, 2007). The IUCN defines an MPA as “a clearly defined 
geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other 
effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated 
ecosystem services and cultural values” (Dudley, 2008:8; IUCN, 2012:12). This 
international definition of MPAs has been used to inform the understanding of MPAs 
in South Africa (WWF, 2014). This is because South Africa is party to a suite of 
legally binging international instruments that inform principles for MPA regulation. 
The IUCN also defines nature as “biodiversity, at genetic, species and ecosystem 
level, and often also refers to geodiversity, landform and broader natural values”, 
while conservation is defined as “the in-situ maintenance of ecosystems and natural 
and semi-natural habitats and of viable populations of species in their natural 
surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the 
surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties” (Dudley, 
2008:9). 
 
At the global scale, Day et al., (2012) has drawn up a list of characteristics that define 
areas that are worthy of MPA status. These include: a multi-dimensional environment, 
a lack of clear tenure or ownership (especially with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
of countries), multiple jurisdictions by government departments, difficulties in 
enforcement and management, as well as high connectivity between ecosystems and 
habitats (Day et al., 2012). By 2014, South Africa consisted of approximately 24 
coastal MPAs that had been proclaimed under the MLRA, constituting approximately 
23.2% of the country’s coastline which the government seeks to expand to 25% by 
2028, with 15% of the coast declared as “no-take” zones (WWF, 2014; Sowman, 
2014). However, the post-apartheid government’s rhetoric of MPA creation and 
expansion stated in national legislation is contested by an increasing body of literature 
that reveals that many of these MPAs in South Africa are demarcated in areas 
adjacent to previously disadvantaged black and coloured communities. Various 
scholars have argued that MPA rules affect the ability of these communities to 
improve their livelihoods (Sunde and Isaacs, 2008; Mbatha, 2011; Emdon, 2013; 
Sunde, 2014). This is particularly pertinent to areas within the provinces of KwaZulu-
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Natal and Eastern Cape where MPAs largely occur adjacent to terrestrial forest 
reserves.  
 
Moreover, the South African government has recently enacted a Small-Scale Fisheries 
(SSF) policy that aims to recognise customary rights emerging from customary 
systems at local level (DAFF, 2012). Customary rights of various fishing 
communities along the South African coast have, however, not received formal legal 
recognition within South Africa’s legal statute that governs marine resource access 
and use.  
5.4.2 Terrestrial environments 
 
South Africa ratified the Biodiversity Convention in 1995, and this led to the 
promulgation of the NEM: Biodiversity Act (No. 10 of 2004). The Biodiversity 
Convention promotes the conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from genetic resources (UNEP, 1992). As such, the Biodiversity Act 
promotes the sustainable management and conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity 
through the protection of ecosystems, bio-prospecting and the promotion of equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the resources (DEAT, 2004). This Act provides a 
basis for some of the principles guiding the governance of biodiversity within the 
iSimangaliso site. 
The Biodiversity Convention is an agreement that promotes sustainable development 
by recognizing the significance of the world’s biological resources and the 
significance they have for global social and economic growth (UNEP, 2007). South 
Africa is counted among the 196 states that are party to the Convention since 1996. 
All countries that are party to the Biodiversity Convention are required to develop and 
implement a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) that sets out its 
vision for sustainable biodiversity conservation. The vision of South Africa’s NBSAP 
is to “conserve, manage and sustainably use biodiversity to ensure equitable benefits 
to the people of South Africa, now and in the future” (DEA, 2015). Some of the 
objectives of the Convention and its implementation within the NBSAP’s of 
individual countries are to manage biodiversity in a way that ensures that its benefits 
are used to advance national economies, as well as to promote rural development and 
wellbeing (DEA, 2015).  
	
106	
	
 
The process of the development of South Africa’s first NBSAP between 2003 and 
2005 was parallel to that of the promulgation the Biodiversity Act in 2004. The values 
and principles that guide the national biodiversity legislation are thus informed and 
guided by the Biodiversity Convention and the country’s NBSAP. In the case of 
iSimangaliso, South Africa’s NBSAP has informed the formulation of the 
management plan that guides the management of biodiversity within the iSimangaliso 
park. Within iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, coastal biodiversity protection occurs 
parallel to marine protection as the MPAs are paralleled by terrestrial nature/forest 
reserves (see Figure 5.4).  
 
The Kosi Bay Nature Reserve (Tembe Coastal Forest Reserve) was established by the 
KwaZulu Bureau of Natural Resources (KBNR) in the late 1980s. It was expanded 
from the forest reserve at the Emalangeni village that had initially been established in 
the early 1950s. The Maputaland Marine Reserve (which is now consolidated into the 
Greater St. Lucia MPA to form the iSimangaliso MPA) was established in 1986. This 
was a period in northern KZN when the KwaZulu government had embarked on 
increasing conservation enforcement since the 1980s, which led to many forced 
removals of local people for conservation expansion purposes.  
 
Moreover, within iSimangaliso, marine and coastal biodiversity have been classified 
and zoned into IUCN inspired categories of protected areas where the terrestrial 
component is labeled as “wilderness, restricted and controlled”; while the marine 
component is regarded as “wilderness, sanctuary, restricted and controlled”. Figure 
5.4 illustrates how the IUCN protected area categories have been adopted into the 
planning and zonation of protected areas within the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. 
 
5.5 TRADITIONAL, CUSTOMARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURES IN CURRENT MAPUTALAND 
 
Customary law in South Africa is still relevant in various rural communities that 
reside on communal land, and is recognized under Section 211 of the country’s 
Constitution. Both statutory and customary laws are recognized as independent 
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sources of law, and as equal under the Constitution of South Africa, while customary 
law and customary institutions are recognized as long as they are consistent with the 
Bill of Rights. According to Bennet (2008:138), customary law refers to the “social 
practices considered to be obligatory by the communities in which they operate”, 
while “living customary law” further refers to customary law “actually observed by 
the people who created it”.  
 
Traditional institutions in South Africa are found mostly in the provinces with former 
Bantustans or homeland areas, i.e. KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Free-State, 
Limpopo and Mpumalanga (Koelble, 2005). Various governance actors typically 
regard traditional institutions as democratic institutions that are representative of 
communities. These institutions are often charged with duties that include working 
with local municipalities in providing service delivery and facilitating development 
initiatives, and usually receive support from national and provincial governments in 
the form of financial resources in order to perform these tasks (CLS, 2015). 
 
In colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, customary law was weakened by laws 
that transferred powers to traditional authorities who were seen as more militant and 
effective agents of ruling indigenous communities (Cordell, 1991). In communities 
such as Kosi Bay, customary institutions involved in governing coastal resources are 
distinct from traditional institutions and operate on a more democratic and 
downwardly accountable fashion. However, the authority of traditional institutions 
usually overrides the authority of customary institutions (Ntsebeza, 2006; Delius, 
2008).  
 
However, the view that traditional leaders are the most accountable and effective 
modes of authority in rural areas is increasingly challenged due to the fact that 
colonial and apartheid rule influences on traditional authorities gave traditional 
authorities discretionary powers which made them not as accountable to wider 
communities as they are thought to have been in pre-colonial times (Buthelezi and 
Yeni, 2016). Duringthe colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, customary law 
was tainted by laws that transferred discretionary powers to traditional authorities 
who were seen as effective agents of ruling indigenous communities (Cordell, 1991). 
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In communities such as Kosi Bay, customary institutions involved in governing 
coastal resources are distinct from traditional institutions and operate on a more 
democratic and downwardly accountable fashion, even though the authority of 
traditional institutions usually overrides the authority of customary institutions 
(Ntsebeza, 2006; Delius, 2008).  
 
There is increasing evidence that customary institutions are relevant and more 
accountable sources of authority in rural areas (Sunde, 2013; Sunde, 2014). This is 
why this study makes a conceptual distinction between the traditional and customary 
institutions, which are usually understood as synonymous in various contexts, but 
which are different.  
 
Another issue that affects local governance in Kosi Bay is the fact that the jurisdiction 
of iSimangaliso Authority overlaps with the Tembe traditional authority land, 
customary institutions governing coastal resources, as well as the jurisdiction of the 
Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality. The Tembe Tribal Council is in charge of all 
residential land (i.e. rural settlements) in Kosi Bay, while iSimangaliso Authority is in 
charge of all land within the boundaries of the World HeritageSite. It is not clear what 
this means for traditional authority land within the boundaries of the World Heritage 
Site, as administrative roles between tribal councils and government bodies have not 
been reconciled, particularly in this case. 
 
The promulgation of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
(TLGFA) (No. 41 of 2003) saw the South African government resort to partnering 
with traditional leaders in development by formalizing the status of traditional 
authorities. This was done by giving traditional authorities and local government dual 
responsibility for administration and land allocation within rural areas (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2007).  
 
The enactment of the TLGFA, which was amended in 2009, was meant to recognize 
the authority of traditional councils in statutory law and to enable the government, in 
accordance with the constitution, to define the  
norms and standards that will define the place and role of traditional 
leadership within the new system of democratic governance…to 
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restore the integrity of the institution of traditional leadership in line 
with customary law and practice…whereas the State must respect, 
protect and promote the institution of traditional leadership in 
accordance with the dictates of democracy in South Africa.  
 
All provinces in South Africa, except for the Western Cape, have their own provincial 
laws recognizing traditional leaders as traditional councils under the Framework Act.  
According to the TLGFA, the duties of traditional councils include:  
Section 4(c) supporting municipalities in the identification of 
community needs; 
Section 4(d) facilitating the involvement of the traditional 
community in the development or amendment of the integrated 
development plan of a municipality in whose area that 
community resides; and 
Section 4(f) participating in the development of policy and 
legislation at local level. 
 
In terms of clarifying the roles of traditional councils as opposed to local government, 
i.e. local and district municipalities; the Framework Act and the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act No. 32 of 1998 enable the two institutions to work together 
based on national principles of co-operative governance that enable traditional 
councils to enter service delivery agreements with municipalities. However, how this 
should happen on the ground is not clear. Studies reveal that traditional authorities 
and municipalities in many rural areas in South Africa are in conflict as they compete 
for legitimacy and power in local level governance; many traditional authorities are 
opposed to forms of democratic institutions at the local level (Ntsebeza, 2004; 
Mbatha, 2014).  Mamdani (1996) also concurs that where the system of indirect rule 
prevails, i.e. in rural areas, actors that are given power such as traditional authorities 
tend to be despotic and upwardly accountable, instead of being downwardly 
accountable. Mamdani (1996) further argues that this despotism is prevalent in local 
and national governance of post-colonial African societies, and most widely felt in 
rural areas.  
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This, has therefore left many rural communities in South Africa confused about the 
roles, responsibilities and mandates of traditional authorities, local municipalities, 
local councilors, NGOs, and in this case the iSimangaliso Authority. The functions of 
these institutions have also often been poorly defined and communicated. This is 
because the Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) and the Municipal Systems 
Act (No. 32 of 2000) were developed by the post-apartheid government in order to 
dissolve traditional authority powers in rural areas in the democratic dispensation 
(Koelble, 2005). Both the former and latter pieces of legislation were respectively 
amended in 2003, and although they have been critical in promoting democratic 
decentralization in rural South Africa, the government went against its own efforts by 
simultaneously uplifting traditional authority powers instead of weakening them.  
 
This was done through the TLGFA (No. 41 of 2003), and the National House of 
Traditional Leaders Act (No. 22 of 2009) which give traditional leaders 
administrative powers both at provincial and local levels (Koeble, 2005). The 
conflicting laws, according to Ntsebeza (2006), are the source of confusion and 
tension in the governance of rural communities. Moreover, the lack of support by the 
South African government to elected local councilors in rural areas, as well as the 
indecisiveness of government regarding the roles of traditional authorities within the 
democratic dispensation, leaves the situation of institutional governance in rural areas 
in a state of confusion and consequently leads to compromised democratic 
decentralization (Ntsebeza, 2004). As a result, the ability of people residing in rural 
areas to choose their own leaders and representatives is paralyzed.  Koelble (2005:9) 
thus argues that,  
 
the failure of the State to touch the lives of rural citizens and the 
concomitant failure of the democratically elected but ineffective 
local authorities has opened up several spaces for traditional 
leaders to re-affirm their cultural, social, economic and 
ultimately political power in all sorts of manners.  
 
There also remains much ambiguity about the role of traditional institutions in 
relation to customary institutions that exist in places such as Kosi Bay. Customary 
institutions usually predate colonial times in South Africa, but are usually referred to 
as simultaneous with traditional institutions, when the two are not the same. For 
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instance, in the fisheries sector in Kosi Bay, there is long-standing customary system 
where power is vested at the community level to a downwardly accountable 
committee which manages the trap fishery. The committee is made up of 
approximately eight community members from two villages, and is responsible for 
ensuring that customary rules pertaining to fish traps are observed accordingly. 
Examples of customary rules relating to fish traps include rules relating to uniform 
fish trap construction (using reeds and other material sourced from the edges of the 
estuary and lake), maintaining channels between fish traps to allow for fish to flow 
from the ocean into the estuary and the lakes, the ownership of fish traps by 
individual families, succession of fish trap ownership, resolving disputes related to 
fish traps and other arising matters.   
 
In the post-apartheid dispensation, the ambiguity about the difference between 
traditional and customary institutions could be attributed to the definitions provided 
by pieces of legislation such as the TLGFA (Republic of South Africa, 2003:8) which 
define traditional leadership as “customary institutions or structures, or customary 
systems or procedures of governance, recognized, utilized or practiced by traditional 
communities”.  Meanwhile, the Act defines customary institutions as “institutions or 
structures established in terms of customary law” (Republic of South Africa, 2003:6). 
It is apparent that the law does not clearly distinguish between traditional and 
customary institutions, which is arguably erroneous, especially given that traditional 
institutions in certain areas were orchestrated by colonial and apartheid governments, 
and in other areas they were altered from customary institutions, which are more 
representative of wider rural communities and their interests.  
 
To make matters more complex, within the province of KwaZulu-Natal, land under 
traditional leadership is currently held in trust by the provincial entity known as the 
Ingonyama Trust Board, under the provisions of the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust 
Act (No. 3 of 1994). The Ingonyama (i.e. King Zwelithini), in accordance to the Act, 
is the trustee of land administered by the Trust, on behalf of the wider communities. 
The land under the Tembe authorities thus falls under Ingonyama Trust Land. The 
Ingonyama Trust was established in the early 1990s after the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the former National Party made a deal when the country was about to 
transition to democracy (CLS, 2015). The deal entailed that the Ingonyama [i.e. king 
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of the Zulu kingdom] would be responsible for administering approximately 2.8 
million hectares of communal land in former homeland areas of KwaZulu-Natal 
(CLS, 2015). This includes all the land under the Tembe traditional authority within 
KwaZulu-Natal.  
 
Within the context of Maputaland, the Tembe Tribal Council has two different 
structures. It consists of 48 sub-wards with headmen that form part of the traditional 
council. The traditional council is the main governance structure and consists of 60 
per cent members appointed by the inkosi10 and 40 per cent members democratically 
elected by community members (TTC1, 2016). The elections for democratically 
elected members are held every five years and members include youth and women. 
The traditional council meetings are where policies for governing the area are 
formulated. The headmen solve village issues on a daily basis and they are the 
advisory structures on the ground in each village and they convene four times a year. 
The Umnhlabuyalinga Local Municipality acts as partners to the Tembe traditional 
authority and together they make agreements when it comes to development issues 
(TTC1, 2016). This is according to the Municipal Structures Act of 117 of 1998.  
 
With regards to areas under the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, a representative of 
the Tembe traditional authority stated that,  
 
When it comes to areas under iSimangaliso, we have a right to 
make decisions even for areas inside the park but we have not 
claimed back land or entered into co-management agreements 
with them to own the land under claim and we need to do that 
to see what can happen. The Albert Tembe land claim which 
covers approximately 21 000 hectares has not yet been 
resolved, there are still some internal conflicts among us with 
regards to that.  
 
This is because all the land falling under the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, 
including Kosi Bay, has been under claim by communities within and adjacent to the 
park through the Restitution of Land Rights Act (No. 22 of 1994). The Restitution Act 
																																																								
10The term ‘inkosi’ is used to refer to the leader of the Tembe Tribal Council. It is difficult to 
determine whether it translates as ‘chief’ or ‘king’ in English, as the term ‘king’ is highly 
contested in the area.  
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seeks to restore the rights to land of persons and communities that lost access to the 
land after 19 June 1913, due to racially discriminating laws and practices of colonial 
and apartheid governments (Republic of South Africa, 1994). Of the 14 claims that 
were laid within the iSimangaliso site, only nine have been settled (iSimangaliso 
Authority, 2016); and the land claim of the people from Kosi Bay submitted in 1995 
has not been settled to date. It is unclear how the existence of administrative roles and 
powers of the Tembe traditional authority, as well as the Umhlabuyalingana Local 
Municipality and iSimangaliso Authority may cause confusion or conflict; especially 
for the communities on the ground who have to grapple with understanding which 
institution is responsible for doing what, as well as for the authorities who have 
overlapping and potentially competing jurisdictions. This is an issue that is further 
discussed in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter sought to provide an overview of the key policy and legal framework 
guiding the governance of coastal resources within Kosi Bay (and the wider 
Maputaland area), within and surrounding the boundaries of the iSimangaliso World 
Heritage Site. Clearly, the governance framework that guides the protection of world 
heritage within iSimangaliso includes the World Heritage Convention and the 
Biodiversity Convention. These international policy instruments are among key 
policies that have catalyzed the formulation of key legislation governing iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site. The expanse of the area that is managed by the World Heritage 
Site authority, iSimangaliso Authority, is nested within areas under the jurisdiction of 
various government departments relevant to the management of coastal resources, 
local and district municipalities, as well as areas under traditional authority rule. The 
implications of this nested and plural governance for the governability of coastal 
resources, as well as for the livelihoods of rural communities that are subject to these 
institutions is an issue that is of interest to this study. Moreover, the impacts power 
over traditional leadership by colonial and apartheid governments to appoint and 
depose chiefs as they wished, coupled with the indirect style of rule they adopted, can 
also not be underestimated. This has resulted in the wicked problem of resolving 
challenges related to traditional governance in rural South Africa, which the 
democratic government has dismally failed to address (Ntsebeza, 2004). Moreover, 
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the ambiguity between traditional authority and customary institution roles in rural 
South Africa continues to persist, and will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. The 
following chapter provides an in-depth account of the livelihood characteristics of 
people in Kosi Bay, while Chapter Seven will discuss in detail the role that plural 
governance systems have played in shifting the livelihood strategies of people in Kosi 
Bay.  
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 CHAPTER SIX: LIVELIHOODS AND 
LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN KOSI 
BAY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
People in Kosi Bay have relied on coastal resources for sustenance for many centuries 
(FFG, 2015). They have a long history and custom of using fisheries, forests and 
agricultural resources. With historical livelihood strategies constrained by 
conservation interventions that intensified over the past four to five decades, the 
people of Kosi Bay have constantly found themselves having to weave their 
livelihood strategies around a series of confusing and sometimes competing policy 
and legal instruments nested at regional, national and international levels (FFG, 
2015). These include the proclamation of the World Heritage and RAMSAR11 sites, 
the declaration of a marine protected area, the establishment of a coastal forest 
reserve, an ongoing land reform process, private tourism ventures and the recently 
promulgated small-scale fisheries policy. This chapter presents key findings of this 
study pertaining to livelihoods and livelihood strategies, and outlines the current 
socio-economic conditions in Kosi Bay. Household surveys, focus group discussions, 
oral history interviews, transect walks, participant observations, and documentary 
evidence provided key data that informed the findings presented in this chapter. The 
historical and current livelihood strategies of people in Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and 
kwaDapha villages are also presented. A historical approach is adopted in order to 
reveal changes in livelihood strategies over time, as well as to highlight the reasons 
for the shifting livelihood strategies, which are discussed in detail in chapters Seven 
and Eight.  
6.2 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE KOSI BAY 
COMMUNITY 
 
Kosi Bay falls within the boundaries of Umkhanyakude District Municipality and 
Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality. The Local Municipality is made up of 17 
municipal wards and is 99 per cent rural – 60 per cent of the land falls under tribal 
authority land and is occupied by approximately 99 per cent Africans, while the 
																																																								
11The Convention on Wetlands (1971). 
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remaining 40 per cent consists of commercial farms and conservation areas 
(Umhlabuyalingana, 2014).  
 
The wider Umkhanyakude District and the Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality 
consist of some of the poorest people in South Africa (Umhlabuyalingana, 2014; 
iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). This is largely attributed to marginalisation of former 
homeland regions during colonial times, and more aggressively during the apartheid 
era (as well as in the present time) (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011). Although the 
Umhlabuyalingana Municipality boasts a wide array of natural assets that are among 
the major tourist attractions in the KwaZulu-Natal province attracting both local and 
international tourists, the economy of Umhlabuyalingana is largely poor. For instance, 
70 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the municipality depends on 
community services, as well as informal trading activities in local towns such as 
Manguzi – the main town near Kosi Bay (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011; 
Umhlabuyalingana, 2015).  
 
Kosi Bay is also situated within the boundaries of iSimangaliso Wetland Park/World 
Heritage Site on the northern east coast of the KwaZulu-Natal province. Within these 
spatial boundaries, there are four tribal authority areas, i.e. Tembe, Mashabane, 
Manaso and Zikhali. Communities living in Kosi Bay fall under the Tembe tribal 
authority, and the rural settlements where they live are part of the Ingonyama Trust 
Land12. With no industrial activity and limited infrastructural, social and economic 
development; current land uses in the areas within the Umhlabuyalingana Local 
Municipality and within iSimangaliso include agriculture, commercial timber 
plantations, conservation/eco-tourism, as well as human settlements (mostly rural) 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2011; Umhlabuyalingana, 2014). In 1996, the South African 
government introduced Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs), as part of an effort to 
promote development in previously neglected areas (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011). 
As part of this initiative, the Lubombo SDI was established to promote trilateral 
tourism development in the three bordering countries (i.e. South Africa, Mozambique 
and Swaziland) that could potentially contribute towards poverty reduction. As a 
result of this initiative, the Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Trans-Fontier Conservation Area 
																																																								
12According to the Ingonyama Trust Act (No. 3 of 1994). 
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(TFCA), the World Heritage Site, as well as a new major road (the Lubombo R22 
between Hluhluwe and Ponta do Ouro in Mozambique) were established 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2014; UMDA, 2014).  
Within the wider Umkhanyakude District Municipality, an entity known as the 
Umhlosinga Development Agency (UMDA) was established in 2014 as a catalysing 
agency for promoting agribusiness and tourism as two main economic drivers 
identified for the region (UMDA, 2014). The iSimangaliso Wetland Park is currently 
responsible for approximately 89 per cent of tourism in the area, while Kosi Bay 
specifically contributes 22 per cent towards all tourism within the Park, and the 
Tembe Elephant Park and Sodwana Bay together account for 11 per cent of tourism 
within iSimangaliso (iSimangaliso, 2011; Umhlabuyalingana, 2014).  
6.2.1 Household profiles 
 
Despite the existence of a rich ecology that attracts a lot of attention from 
conservation and tourism sectors at local and global scales, the socio-economic 
conditions in Kosi Bay remain dire.  
 
At the time of the survey in 2014, approximately 81 per cent of the population of Kosi 
Bay had been born in the villages where they currently reside, while 11 per cent stated 
that they were born in another village but had been displaced by forced removals 
during apartheid (Figure 6.1).  
 
Mvutshane	 Nkovukeni	 Dapha/Emalangeni	
In	this	village	 71%	 92%	 90%	
In	different	village	within	district	 20%	 8%	 6%	
Outside	the	country	
(Mozambique)	 9%	 4%	
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  Figure 6.1: Place of birth of Kosi Bay residents across the three villages.  
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The average number of people per homestead in Kosi Bay was 7.5, while the average 
number of houses per homestead was 3.7. This figure is close to the municipal 
average of five people per household (Umhlabuyalingana, 2014). Approximately 53 
per cent of household heads in Kosi Bay were women. This is consistent with the 
municipal percentage of 54 per cent of female-headed households (Census, 2011).  
 
Although the area is predominantly rural, approximately 58 per cent of the households 
resided in dwellings made from corrugated iron roofing and brick (i.e. cement blocks) 
walls. Basic service provision in Kosi Bay was scarce, as many households could not 
afford to pay for these. Only 3 per cent of households had electricity supply (i.e. solar 
or generator) while 97 per cent households used firewood for cooking. Homesteads 
predominantly lacked access to running water; 26 per cent of the households obtained 
drinking water from a public stand post, 19 per cent from a single tap in yard, 14 per 
cent from tap inside yard, 30 per cent from borehole/hand pump13.  
6.2.2 Education, employment and income 
 
Only 22 per cent of the population in Kosi Bay had completed high school education, 
and as a result, employment levels in the formal sector were low in all the three 
villages. Among the respondents that participated in this study, 32% or more were 
unemployed in Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages, respectively.  
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  Figure 6.2: Nature of occupation of respondents in Kosi Bay villages. 	
 
																																																								
13Households generally collected drinking water from more than one of these sources at a 
time. 
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Just as within the entire Umhlabuyalingana Municipality, monthly household income 
levels in Kosi Bay were very low as there were high levels of poverty and economic 
inactivity, as well as low levels of job opportunities. This is confirmed by the 
Umhlabuyalingana Municipality IDP (2014) which reveals that poverty within the 
area manifests through income poverty (i.e. lack of access to adequate income to meet 
basic food and livelihood needs such as clothes, water, electricity and shelter), and 
human poverty (which refers to lack of access to human capabilities such as reading, 
writing, health and food security) (Umhlabuyalingana, 2014). This is indicated by the 
fact that 44.9 per cent of households within this municipality have no access to 
income on a regular basis. 
 
In Kosi Bay, household income ranges were mostly between <R1000 to R7500, and 
only 7 per cent of households earned more than R7500 per month in all the three 
villages combined (Figure 6.3).  
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  Figure 6.3: Monthly household income ranges in Kosi Bay villages.  
 
According to the Umhlabuyalingana Municipality IDP (2014), only 3 per cent of the 
economically active population in the municipality earn more than R1600, while 47 
per cent receive no income at all. Moreover, 44.9 per cent of Umhlabuyalingana 
households receive no annual income and there is generally a high dependence on 
government social grants in the area (Umhlabuyalingana Municipality, 2014). Figure 
6.4 depicts findings of this study that show that 33 per cent of households in Kosi Bay 
received their primary income from government social grants (i.e. old age pension 
and child grants), 28 per cent from employment within the area and in the nearest 
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town; 27 per cent from sale of marine resources, 8 per cent from the sale of crops and 
4 per cent from employment in tourism activities. 
 
	
Figure 6.4: Primary activities contributing to household monthly income 
 
Education facilities were scarcely available within Kosi Bay. Only 22 per cent of the 
Kosi population had completed high school education, while only 1 per cent had 
tertiary education. In the Mvutshane village, there was only one primary school and 
one high school near the village. However, because of better access roads to the 
village, the people in Mvutshane could easily travel to the schools in neighbouring 
villages and in Manguzi town. This was not the case for people from KwaDapha and 
Nkovukeni, as there were no schools at all within the remote Nkovukeni village while 
at kwaDapha, there were two primary schools and no high schools. Within the three 
villages combined, there were four primary schools and only one high school. This 
means that people in the area had very limited opportunities to obtain higher 
education, unless they had access to finances to enable them to send their children to 
schools in the nearest towns or if they had relatives living there.  
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6.2.3 Social dynamics within the villages 
 
At the time of data collection for the study between 2014 and 2016, the average age of 
the population in Kosi Bay was approximately 47, indicating that the population of 
the area was somewhat dominated by the middle-aged population, as opposed to 
younger or older people. This could be due to the lack of job or income opportunities 
for young adults in the area, which sometimes led to them migrating to the nearest 
towns, leaving their parents behind. Another reason could also be the high mortality 
and morbidity rates, as well as low life expectancy of the younger and older 
population within the Umhlabuyalingana Municipality, due to the prevalence of 
conditions such as HIV/AIDS and poverty (Umhlabuyalingana, 2014). The 
Umhlabuyalingana Municipalility (2014) confirms that the HIV rate affecting the 
population within the municipality is approximately 16 per cent. Such statistics are 
concerning because the population growth rate of the municipality is constantly 
declining due to the increased mortality and morbidity rates. This creates an increase 
in demand for health care facilities that are scarcely available in the area, as there are 
only five hospitals within the entire Umkhanyakude District (Umkhanyakude 
Municipality, 2014).  
 
In terms of infrastructure, Kosi Bay had poor road and public transport facilities and 
systems. This is in addition to the very limited number of schools, clinics and lack of 
tertiary education facilities. KwaDapha and Nkovukeni villages in particular were 
extremely remote and only accessible on gravel roads with a 4x4 vehicle. The 
Nkovukeni village is also separated from the rest of Kosi Bay by the Kosi lake 
system, and one needs to wade or swim across the lake in order to get to the village. 
There was usually no boat available for people in this village to commute back and 
forth across the lake on a daily basis. Only the Mvutshane village (among those 
included in this study) can be accessed through a somewhat formal road.  
 
6.3 KEY LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES IN KOSI BAY 
 
Households in Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and kwaDapha generally engaged in multiple 
activities to support their daily livelihoods (Figure 6.5). Approximately 95 per cent of 
households across the three villages relied on harvesting marine resources as a 
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significant livelihood activity14. Households that harvested fisheries resources from 
fish traps within the Kosi lakes and estuary amounted to approximately 54 per cent of 
the population15. Other fisheries resources were harvested from the coast. Key marine 
resources harvested from fish traps included (among others) mullet (Mugilidae), 
spotted grunter (Pomadasys commersonni), river bream (Acanthopagrus berda), 
kingfishes (Carangidae) and springer (Elops machnata). Marine resources harvested 
from the coast included ghost crabs (Ocypode), red bait (Pyura stolonifera), mussels 
(Perna perna) and sea grass. Incema (Juncus kraussii) was harvested from the edge of 
the lake system. About 72 per cent of harvested marine resources were used for 
household consumption, while 19 per cent of respondents indicated that they sold the 
marine resources they harvested.  
 
Fishing had increasingly become a major livelihood activity for many people in Kosi 
Bay when this research was conducted, but this was not necessarily the case in the 
past. The findings of this study reveal that various households engaged in multiple 
livelihood activities. These included the use of non-timber forest products both for 
small-scale commercial and subsistence purposes, agriculture and tourism (Figure 
6.5). Virtually all households within the studied villages harvested timber, mostly for 
firewood, and some non-timber forest products. Forest products were largely 
harvested from within the boundaries of iSimangaliso, even historically. These 
included Aloe aculate, wild berries (locally referred to as izintole, izindoni, amabuwa 
and izinkuhlu), and ilala palm (Hyphaene coriacea) used for making local wine.  
 
Approximately 77 per cent of households in Kosi Bay indicated that they planted 
crops including maize, peanuts, sweet potatoes, cabbage and other crops, as part of 
their day-to-day livelihoods. Crop farming in Mvutshane took place in swampy areas 
adjacent to the village and in the south of Mozambique, while in Nkovukeni and 
kwaDapha crop farming was conducted within the homesteads. Figure 6.5 provides a 
breakdown of key livelihood activities16 in Kosi Bay per village. 
	
																																																								
14This refers to activities that were important for day-to-day lives of people, and not 
necessarily ones that were important for income only.  
15There was also alleged illegal gillnetting activities that took place within the Kosi system, 
but during data collection, people did not mention it much. 
16Important for daily livelihoods, not necessarily for income purposes 
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Figure 6.5: Key livelihood activities in Kosi Bay that do not produce an income. 
 
Crops were usually used for consumption, but 14 per cent of households in Kosi Bay 
indicated that they planted crops for both household consumption and to sell to local 
people or in the nearest town. The planting of crops was a significant livelihood 
activity in Mvutshane and KwaDapha villages, and less so for people in Nkovukeni 
due to increased numbers of hippopotamuses in the lake which have over the years 
discouraged people from Nkovukeni from planting crops on the fertile land along the 
lakes.  
 
The following section highlights the nuances of the livelihoods of people within the 
different villages of Kosi Bay. 
 
6.3.1 Mvutshane village: livelihood strategies 
6.3.1.1 Historical livelihoods (before state conservation interventions) 
 
Apart from engaging in fisheries activities in the Kosi estuary and the coastal zone, 
people from the historical villages of Nhlangwini and Osundwini (which later became 
Mvutshane) were significantly involved in intensive livestock farming and 
agriculture. Before the village of Mvutshane became what it is today, most of the 
dwellings were located inside the boundaries of what is currently the iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site. Nhlangwini and Osundwini were located adjacent to lake 
Zilonda and the Kosi estuary (Figure 6.6), where land was mostly fertile used for 
agricultural activities. 
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Figure 6.6:The Kosi Bay system (ISimangaliso Authority, 2014) 
 
Figure 6.7 is an aerial photograph taken in 1959 showing the patches of land around 
the forest that were occupied by people in Nhlangwini and Osundwini.  
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Figure 6.7: An aerial photograph depicting the north of Kosi Bay in 1959 (NGI, 2016). 
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Figure 6.8: An aerial photograph depicting the north of Kosi Bay in 2004 (NGI, 2016). 
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The Nhlangwini village was where the first primary school in the village was built 
and it used be known as Trelfall. The school is now located in the current Mvutshane 
village, and the old location of the school is referred to locally as the “old school” 
area. This is where agriculture activities took place in plots known as “amadobo” 
[swamps] where local people planted crops in “imijijo” (crop rotation plots). The 
crops mainly included crops such as sweet potato, amadumbe (Colocasia esculenta), 
cassava, maize, sorghum, peanuts, sugar cane and bananas. Local people used to 
create what is known as amadobo in the swamp forest within Nhlangwini and 
Osundwini to plant these crops. At the time, the royal family was highly respected 
and the season of harvesting involved presenting some of the harvest to them 
(between Feb-April). Maize, sorghum and peanuts were most popular crops presented 
at this event. People would take the crops to the inkosi17 as a tradition “beyodlala” [to 
celebrate], and this custom was done not because the traditional authorities demanded 
it, but people did it out of tradition.  
 
Various people in the village alluded to the fact that historically, it was really 
important for women to be involved in agriculture because when the men went to the 
mines, they would go for many years, and if the woman who were left at home with 
the children did not know how to plough crops, her family would be in trouble. One 
of the women in the village recalled,  
 
I raised my children through ploughing crops, my husband 
unfortunately disappeared when he went out to look for a job and 
he never came back. Maize, sorghum, peanuts, etc. were very 
important crops at the time. We would eat these starches with 
marine resources as a stew (MOH2).  
 
In the past, older women also saved seed that was planted year by year. Local women 
were also involved in harvesting reeds for craft making. In focus group discussions, 
people from Mvutshane confirmed that historically, agriculture was the primary 
livelihood of local people, and fishing and other livelihoods were supplementary to 
agriculture (MFG, 2015).  
 
																																																								
17Paramount chief. 
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Figure 6.9 is a historical photograph from 1961 that depicts the historical Mvutshane 
village, showing evidence of clear patches of land (that are currently forested) which 
were used for livelihood activities of the local people back in the day. Figure 6.10 
depicts how the same landscape has changed by 2015, and reveals how it has evolved 
over the years due to changes in land use. The clear patches of land evident in 1961 
have been covered in forest growth after local people were evicted from the area in 
the 1980s.  
 
	
Figure 6.9: A photograph depicting the historical Mvutshane village land near the Kosi 
estuary in 1961 (rePHOTO SA, 2017). 
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Figure 6.10: A photograph depicting the historical Mvutshane village land near the Kosi 
estuary in 2015 (photo: Rachel Wynberg). 
The present study made use of historical photography18 in order to examine the 
historical structure of the landscape in Kosi Bay in order to gather further knowledge 
about some of the perceptions held by local people. People from Mvutshane asserted 
that in the past, most of the coastal land in the old villages was covered by crops that 
they planted, and a few trees. Village members explained that forest growth that is 
now visible in the area was a result of declined agriculture activities within the old 
villages, after conservation authorities forcibly moved them in the 1980s.  
 
Conservation of forests was done differently by the community 
compared to conservation authorities. The little forests that were 
there in the past that were not harvested were the ones that 
produced fruits, thus we conserved them. We knew how to 
conserve every fruit-bearing tree and we only harvested trees that 
did not bear fruit and we replaced them with crops for more food. 
But now we are told to conserve trees that bear no fruit. We do 
not agree with this (MFG, 2015).  
 
6.3.1.2 Current livelihood strategies 
 
Over the past three decades, i.e. after people of Mvutshane were forcibly moved from 
their homes in the 1980s for conservation, the livelihoods of Mvutshane people have 
																																																								
18See appendix for a chronology of aerial photographs depicting change of landscape over 
time.  
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progressively transformed, especially in the post-apartheid era which brought about 
new social welfare programmes for the poor and marginalized. During the year 2015, 
the Mvutshane village consisted of approximately 200 homesteads whose main 
livelihood activities largely comprised harvesting marine resources, ploughing crops, 
harvesting timber and non-timber forest products, involvement in the tourism sector 
as well as conducting trans-boundary activities in and/or with people across the 
border in Mozambique. 
 
Approximately 70 per cent of people in Mvutshane relied on old age pensions and 
government child grants as a form of income. These supported more than 80 per cent 
of households in Mvutshane and KwaDapha respectively, while only 42 per cent of 
Nkovukeni households relied on government child grants. More households in 
Mvutshane consisted of people with formal employment (i.e. teachers, nurses, famers) 
than in KwaDapha and Nkovukeni where only 8 per cent and 3 per cent of 
households, respectively, had members who were formally employed. This could be 
largely attributed to the fact that the Mvutshane village has better access roads, and is 
therefore less remote compared to the other two villages. The road that runs from 
Manguzi town and beyond to the Mvutshane village which is adjacent to the 
Mozambique border and the northeastern boundary of the iSimangaliso is a tarred 
road that makes access to Mvutshane easier.  
 
Although most of the people from Mvutshane village initially moved from the coastal 
land within the current bounds of iSimangaliso (some due to forced removals during 
apartheid), they still conducted a significant portion of their livelihood activities there, 
even though present day Mvutshane is located outside the boundary of the World 
Heritage Site. People in Mvutshane were largely engaged in fisheries activities within 
the Kosi Bay system, as a main livelihood activity. Approximately 96 per cent of 
households in Mvutshane were involved in marine resource harvesting, either in the 
Kosi estuary, the lakes or on the coast near Kosi estuary mouth. In Mvutshane and 
Nkovukeni, fishing activities primarily took place in fish traps in Kosi estuary and 
lakes Makhawulani and kuMpungwini, as well as on the coast where intertidal 
resources are harvested. 
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With regards to the trap fishery in the Kosi Bay system, people in the community 
believe that they owned the fish traps and that the community owned the lakes. The 
fish trap system in Kosi Bay dates back as far as the 1500s, in pre-colonial times 
(Whitelaw, 2009; Sunde, 2013). Each line of fish traps in the Kosi system belongs to 
a single family residing in either Nkovukeni or Mvutshane, and not all families within 
the two villages own fish traps. Fish trap ownership is not transferrable, and is passed 
down within a certain family from generation to generation. The older men in each 
family are the custodians of the family fish traps, and they are usually responsible for 
the maintenance of the traps. Older men usually take the younger men or boys in the 
family to the fish traps in order to pass down the skills for fish trap construction, as 
well as fishing traditions.  
 
Fish trap construction in Kosi Bay has evolved from the use of grass-woven fish 
tunnels for the construction of traps in the olden days, to the use of reeds that are 
sourced from the local forest in recent times (Sunde, 2013) (Figure 6.11). The fish 
trap design is meant to be like a “jail” for fish, where fish can swim into the traps but 
they cannot swim out. At the end of each day, fish trap owners go and check to see if 
any fish swam inside the trap. Local men make spear-like objects (i.e. injungu) from 
the branches of the coastal silver oak tree in order to spear the fish inside the traps and 
along the edges of the lake (Figure 6.11).  
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Figure 6.11: A man from Mvutshane fishing in his fish trap in the Kosi estuary with a fish 
caught with injungu (photos: Philile Mbatha).	
	
This is a long-standing customary system where power was vested at the community 
level to a downwardly accountable committee which manages the trap fishery in Kosi 
Bay. The committee is made up of approximately eight community members from 
Mvutshane and Nkovukeni, and is responsible for ensuring that customary rules 
pertaining to fish traps are observed. Examples of customary rules relating to fish 
traps include rules relating to uniform fish trap construction (using reeds and other 
material sourced from the edges of the estuary and lake), maintaining channels 
between fish traps to allow for fish to flow from the ocean into the estuary and the 
lakes, the ownership of fish traps by individual families, succession of fish trap 
ownership, resolving disputes related to fish traps and other arising matters.   
 
The fishing customary committee in Kosi Bay is primarily made up of men. The 
people in the community stated that it was more common for men than for women in 
the community to manage the fish trap in the families because it was perceived to be a 
task that would be too difficult for women, as the sourcing of the material for 
constructing the traps, as well as maintaining an existing fish trap was seen as 
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laborious. At the time of this study, only one woman in the community owned a fish 
trap in Kosi Bay (Figure 6.12). This was because when her husband was alive, they 
did not have any children, and so her husband used to take her every time he went to 
the fish trap. She therefore learnt through working with her husband how to construct 
and maintain a fish trap. When her husband passed away and there was no man in her 
family to take over the fish trap ownership, the customary committee decided that 
since she had the skills to maintain the fish trap, she should take over the ownership. 
This was unprecedented in Kosi Bay, and since then, she has used her fish trap to 
train one of her woman friends how to build and manage a fish trap.  
	
	
Figure 6.12: The only woman in Kosi Bay who owned a fish trap explaining how she uses a 
bucket to capture the fish inside her trap because she does not use injungu (photo: Philile 
Mbatha).	
Apart from engaging in fishing, Mvutshane residents also harvest fruits from the 
forest inside the World Heritage Site in the “old school” area as part of their 
livelihoods. Fruits and vegetables that are harvested locally included guava, berries, 
oranges, grapes, spinach, and various others. Palms are also widely harvested by local 
people and they used them to construct fish traps and also to make the local alcoholic 
beverage known as “ilala palm wine”.  
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Tourism is also among the key livelihood sectors in Mvutshane. There are two main 
tourism facilities in the village, i.e. Utshwayelo lodge and Mangwane lodge. 
Utshwayelo lodge is community owned while Mangwane lodge is privately owned. 
Many tourists frequently pass by the village to go to the estuary mouth, as the 
entrance to the mouth of the Kosi estuary is located outside Utshwayelo lodge. Local 
people remarked that tourists came to the estuary mouth frequently and took pictures 
of the fish traps.  
 
There was a village committee in Mvutshane that acted as a mediating body between 
Utshwayelo lodge and the wider community, and this committee liaised with village 
members to determine what the money paid as a levy by the lodge should be used for. 
Utshwayelo lodge paida levy to the village through a Trust held by a committee 
selected by villagers. Also, local people were employed in the lodge as cleaners and 
security guards. One of the managers of the lodge was a young man from the village. 
Local people perceived that the lodge is significant for supporting the livelihoods of 
the people in the village (MFG, 2015). One of the lodge committee members 
explained,  
 
A white man called Ken who came in at a crucial time when the 
camp was collapsing because of corruption by previous managers 
who ran the camp. We did not necessarily negotiate what 
percentage he must pay to the community but we gave him a 
figure that we want annually and he uses his discretion to decide 
how much he gives us. Every three months the committee and 
headman meet with him to discuss issues surrounding the camp 
and give each other feedback. The committee meets with the rest 
of the community once a year to decide what the money should be 
used for based on the needs of the community at the time (MFG, 
2015).  
 
The other two tourist facilities, Mangwane lodge (not community owned) and 
Ubuhlebemvelo camp (privately owned by the community manager of Utshwayelo) 
both employ local people, even though there was a perception that they did not do 
much for community. A white businessman who did not reside in the facility owned 
the Mangwane lodge and leased the land from a village member.  
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The manager of Utshwayelo and owner of Ubuhlebemvelo camp was a young man 
from the community who was of Tembe descent. He earned his position in the village 
through obtaining a learnership funded by iSimangaliso Authority after he 
matriculated. He was sent to St. Lucia to learn about natural resources, tourism and 
conservation, as well as about iSimangaliso and why it is important to conserve world 
heritage. This young man explained that in order to establish Utshwayelo lodge, some 
of the funds came from the Department of Tourism. In the beginning, it started as a 
campsite with no chalets, just tents. When the chalets were built, there were no 
showers. However, by the time this study was conducted, it had 18 campsites.  
 
A few families in Mvutshane village also had family or business relations with people 
in the south of Mozambique near the border. Some people in Mvutshane also had land 
in the south of Mozambique. In fact, it was recorded through ethnographic 
observations while residing in the case study area that there was a significant number 
of people from Mvutshane village that had close relatives residing on the other side of 
the border in the south of Mozambique (Ponta do Ouro). The walking distance from 
the border post on the Mvutshane side to the closest dwellings in Ponta is 
approximately 30 minutes. Moreover, young men from Ponta would knock door to 
door in the villages of Kosi Bay every other morning selling Portuguese bread (called 
“ipawu” in the local language) that was made in Ponta do Ouro. These young men 
from Ponta do Ouro did not usually speak isiZulu, but spoke Bithonga, which is a 
local language spoken in the south of Mozambique (as well as in former Maputaland). 
Many people in Mvutshane who still acknowledged their Bithonga roots from old 
Maputaland still understood this language.  
 
Due to strong trans-boundary relations between people in Mvutshane and those in 
Ponta do Ouro (and the rather “porous” border that allows for it), a large number of 
people in Mvutshane purchased clothing items from Mozambique from what was 
known locally as “amabhele” (which directly translates as “bears” in English). 
Amabheleare mini-vans that “illegally” carry large numbers of clothing items and 
sometimes crops that are traded at the border between Mvutshane residents and 
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people coming from Ponta do Ouro19. It was observed various times before that 
people in the three villages that were included in this study seemed to have quite 
fashionable clothes, but the clothes sold in Manguzi (which is where most of them do 
their shopping) were pricey and not the brands that local people seemed to wear. 
Learning about the amabhele phenomenon answered some of these questions. The 
amabhele exchanges were made early in the mornings at the border fence outside the 
sight of border patrol officers. Some of the goods were sold in the villages and some 
in Manguzi town.  
 
During fieldwork, one of the local women in Mvutshanestated that she was part of 
“amabhele” and travels to Ponta do Ouro with the amabhele mini-van once a month 
to buy clothes from suppliers and then bring them back to the village to sell to locals. 
The goods sold through amabhele were cheaper, more fashionable and offered a 
wider variety than what local people could find in Manguzi town, where there were 
much more limited options for clothing at higher prices. Some people from 
Mvutshane hired people from Ponta do Ouro to live in their homesteads to assist them 
with looking after their children, i.e. as au pairs, or with planting crops. Furthermore, 
some of the women from Mvutshane who owned agricultural fields in Ponta do Ouro 
hired women from there to tend to their fields during days when they could not cross 
the border. All this was done in exchange for Rands, which were considered valuable 
for people in Ponta do Ouro due to the lower exchange rate of the Mozambican 
metical. Some people in Ponta do Ouro with relatives in Mvutshane also sent their 
children across the border, so they could receive South African education, which was 
deemed better.  
 
Livelihood relations between people on both sides of the border (who were once 
united as part of former Maputaland) arethus still ongoing and stronger than one 
would expect. This is an indication that the creation of state borders separating north 
and south Maputaland had not completely disrupted these relations.  
 
																																																								
19The exchange of goods (including harvested crops and clothing) between people in Kosi 
Bay and the south of Mozambique, i.e. Ponta do Ouro, was a major activity contributing to 
local livelihoods. However, because this was an ‘illegal’ activity that was only known among 
the people in the area, people did not mention it when household surveys, focus groups 
meetings and interviews were conducted for this study.  
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6.3.2 Nkovukeni village: the evolution of livelihood strategies 
6.3.2.1 Historical livelihoods (before state conservation interventions) 
 
People from Nkovukeni remarked that in the past (from around the 1940s which is as 
far back as the oldest village members could remember), there was extensive planting 
of crops such as maize, peanuts and sorghum in the village, and the whole area was 
filled with crop plantations; they never used to go to the store (NFG, NOH1, NOH2; 
2015). Agricultural activities were conducted mainly along the Kosi lakes 
Makhawulani and Mpungwini (i.e. Lake 1 and Lake 2) where the soil was most 
fertile. 
 
All the land along the lakes and estuary was full of crops and a lot 
of crops grew in this area. We went to sea to harvest intertidal 
resources such as redbait and ghost crabs which were important 
for isishebo [stew] that was eaten with peanuts and mealie meal 
ground from local crops (OHI8, 2015).	
 
In the past, people planted a lot of crops for livelihoods and they 
were abundant in this area. We used intertidal resources for 
isishebo. Also from the lakes we collected mud crabs to make 
isishebo [stew]. These were the main livelihoods in the past 50 
years before conservation (OHI9, 2015).  
	
 
According to the people of Nkovukeni, planting crops was the leading livelihood 
activity before conservation interventions were implemented in the area. Community 
members explained that historically, the Nkovukeni landscape was primarily covered 
with crop plantations, with few trees. Historical aerial photography indicates that the 
landscape in Nkovukeni has changed over time, due to changes in livelihood 
strategies. Figure 6.13 is an aerial photograph from 1959 depicting the Nkovukeni 
village. Figure 6.14 depicts a change in landscape in Nkovukeni by 2004.  
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Figure 6.13: An aerial photograph depicting the Nkovukeni area in 1959 (NGI, 2016). 
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Figure 6.14: An aerial photograph depicting a change in the Nkovukeni landscape by 2004 
(NGI, 2016). 
	
6.3.2.2 Current livelihood strategies 
 
With approximately 33 homesteads, Nkovukeni is one of the smallest villages in Kosi 
Bay. Unlike Mvutshane, many residents in Nkovukeni are of Zulu descent, and a 
large number of people that reside in the village shared the “Ngubane” surname. The 
Ngubane people were among the three tribes that claimed that they ruled the land of 
Kosi Bay before the Tembe people arrived in the area (Webster, 19991; Mthethwa, 
2002; OHI10, 2015). Nkovukeni is also unique in the sense that among people within 
the wider village, there is generally a strong sense of community, compared to the 
other villages.  
 
The findings of this study revealed that people in Nkovukeni have had a long history 
of conducting livelihoods using mainly agricultural and marine resources (NFG, 
OHI8, OHI9; 2015). This was largely a result of the fact that the village is spatially 
enclosed and bordered by the Kosi lake system (i.e. Kosi lakes and estuary on the 
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west and the Indian Ocean on the east). Fishing activities using fish traps in the Kosi 
estuary and Lake 1, as well as the harvesting of intertidal resources along the coast 
were among the main livelihood activities during the time this study was conducted. 
However, there had definitely been a shift in livelihood strategies between the past 
and what was found during the course of this study.  
 
The findings of this study reveal that hippopotamuses were among the major 
hindrances preventing local people from engaging in agricultural activities as they 
used to in the past. According to the locals, the number of hippopotamuses in lakes 
Makhawulani and Mpungwini has increased significantly since conservation rules 
prohibited the “disciplining” of hippopotamuses by local people around the 1980s. A 
large number of people expressed that they had adjusted to living among the animals, 
although they worried that the population of hippopotamuses was increasing, and that 
they poseda threat to their livelihoods. People of Nkovukeni also expressed that it was 
difficult to plant crops within their homesteads due to the lack of access to fresh water 
in the village. Agriculture is less viable as a livelihood option, as people have to walk 
very long and steep distances to access fresh water. This was because historically 
people in Nkovukeni planted crops on the edges of the lakes where the soil is fertile 
and crops did not need to be watered. However, they are now prohibited from 
planting crops there by iSimamgaliso rules.  
 
At community level, there was a general perception in the village that because people 
could no longer plant crops or harvest marine resources freely, livelihoods were 
suffering.  
 
Now we suffer, there is nothing to do. We stopped farming 
because of hippotamuses and wild pigs. When we complain to 
Nature they ask us why don’t we leave…iSimangaliso does not 
want us to plant crops. They don’t want a white man to come 
invest in tourism in this village, they want to promote the idea that 
there is no longer anyone who lives in this village… If it weren’t 
for all these regulations, we would be planting lots of crops for 
livelihoods in this area because the soil is very fertile and allows 
us to do so. When you plant something small, it grows 
tremendously. We now live with pension money, we use it to take 
care of our grandchildren who need to go to school and 
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“siyapatanisa” [struggle to make ends meet] from the little we 
have although we suffer because ‘bayasivala kakhulu’ 
[conservation authorities are heavily oppressing us] (OHI9, 2015).  
 
Tourism was not a viable option for people within Nkovukeni because of constraints 
in terms of physical access to the village that was blocked by the lake system as well 
as the estuary, leaving the village very remote. It was in fact difficult to determine 
which was more geographically remote between Nkovukeni and kwaDapha because 
ofthe lakes and the estuary blocking access on the west, as well as the Indian Ocean 
on the eastern border the Nkovukeni village. It is inaccessible via motor vehicles, and 
in order to get from the mainland to the village, one needed to either wade through the 
lakes at low tide, or swim across at high tide (see Figure 6.15). The width of the lakes 
from the village to the mainland was approximately 300m, and people from the 
village had to wade or swim across every day to commute to work, town, school, etc.  
 
During one rainy and cold day of fieldwork for this study, primary school children 
were witnessed swimming across the lake from the village end to the mainland at high 
tide in order to get into the bus that takes them to school and back every day. The 
children had to remove their school uniforms and swam naked across the lake, while 
one of the taller children carried their uniforms in a bag which he waived high above 
the water all the way across, so that the uniforms would not get wet.  
 
There is also only one primary school in Nkovukeni and the school is under-
capacitated in terms of classrooms and teachers. Moreover, there is no high schoolsin 
the village, and parents have to send their children to Manguzi or the surrounds for 
high school education, and not all parents can afford the transport. Some of the 
children stay with relatives in the other villages during school terms, and it is difficult 
for those without relatives on the other side to attend high school because of transport 
costs. The village contains no clinic or any other public service institution. Moreover, 
unlike the other two coastal villages, Nkovukeni is the only one without any tourism 
facilities.  
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Figure 6.15: Women from Nkovukeni crossing lake Mpungwini to go back home after 
arriving from Manguzi town (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
 
For people in Nkovukeni to travel to the nearest town of Manguzi to do shopping or 
run errands, they have to form a group and only then can they hire a car to take them 
to the town. There were only two people in the village that owned mini-vans that were 
able to provide transport, but these had to be booked in advance. The return trip to 
town is considered pricey by local people, given that they do not have much money. 
People in Nkovukeni also consider it expensive to send their children to school every 
day outside the village due to transport fees. Therefore, due to limited financial 
resources, some of the people in the village resort to walking to Manguzi, which is an 
approximately two-hour walk one way.  
 
It also appeared from the findings that there was competition and conflict between 
people of Nkovukeni and those of adjacent villages inland over coastal resources. 
People in Nkovukeni appeared to share the belief that they were entitled to harvesting 
resources (i.e. fisheries resources and reeds) in the two lakes adjacent to the village, 
and in the coastal intertidal zones. 
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Figure 6.16: A woman from Nkovukeni harvesting reeds from Lake Makhawulani (photo: 
Philile Mbatha). 
 
 
During fieldwork, various women and men from an adjacent village were found 
respectively harvesting reeds and fish from the lakes. It also appeared that there were 
people from the adjacent villages who owned fish traps. Informants from Nkovukeni 
expressed that they were weary of people from other villages who harvested resources 
from the lakes, because they did not participate in the customary structures governing 
fish traps and the lake and estuary, and there was a belief that those from other 
villages contributed greatly to the illegal gillnetting in the lakes at night that is making 
it difficult for trap owners to catch any fish within the traps.  
 
Women in Nkovukeni also expressed that harvesting reeds was important for the 
livelihoods of women, especially single women who could not build houses made of 
bricks on their own, but relied on reeds to build. They accused women from the 
adjacent villages for using destructive tools to harvest reeds and expressed that the 
resource belongs to women of Nkovukeni. 
 
Lastly, as part of current livelihoods, 83 per cent of women in Nkovukeni stated that 
they harvested intertidal resources, and received permits issued by Ezemvelo 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Wildlife to harvest intertidal resources and marine resources 
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from the coast. These women stated that they only harvested intertidal resources once 
a month, as was stipulated in their permits. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife employ young 
adults within the village who worked as monitors for the harvesting of intertidal 
resources by local people. Although this was the case, some people in the village 
rejected the idea of permits. 
6.3.3 KwaDapha village: the evolution of livelihood strategies 
6.3.3.1 Historical livelihoods (before state conservation interventions) 
 
The oldest person from kwaDapha that participated in this study was 86 years old and 
he shared very useful insights about the history of the village in terms of traditional 
leadership, natural-resource use and livelihoods. He stated, 
 
I was born long ago during the time of Mvutshane. The first 
people in this area were Ngubanes. Even what they call Banga 
Nek, there is no such thing. This name came from Mbange, a 
Ngubane man who used to live here long ago. There is also a hill 
near this beach called Nondo, that name also came from a 
Ngubane man. The problem is our great grandfathers were not 
educated, so they did not record this history but that is it (OHI13). 
 
Another older man from kwaDapha added, 
 
My family originated from Eshowe and we moved around the time 
of Shaka to Ngwavuma. Our great grandfather trekked all the way 
to Mozambique and then to this area in Nkovukeni, and then he 
came to kwaDapha and settled here and he came to fetch my 
grandfathers to come and establish themselves in this village…as 
far as I know, the Ngubane people are supposed to be kings here. 
But the Tembes won over the chieftaincy because the Ngubanes 
could only slaughter a cow using a machete (used to harvest 
mussels) while the Tembes had a more advanced technique that 
was more efficient. The Ngubanes tried this method not knowing 
that in Tembe culture, agreeing to that would make the Tembes 
kings over them. That’s how they won. Even now there is a big 
debate here that the Ngubanes should be the ones in 
power(OHI14).   
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As vague as the story about how the Tembes defeated the Ngubanes sounds, it formed 
a very strong part of the oral history told by people of Nkovukeni and kwaDapha. It is 
also confirmed in Mthethwa’s (2002) work. However, it is beyond the focus of this 
study to delve deeply in that aspect of oral history.  
 
In terms of historical livelihood strategies, people from kwaDapha used to conduct 
their livelihoods using coastal resources before external conservation interventions 
were introduced. Just as in Mvutshane, people of kwaDapha explained that most of 
the area that is currently covered in forest within the village surroundings used to be 
crop-farming land and people’s homesteads, and a few trees that were harvested for 
firewood (OHI12, OHI13, DFG; 2013).   
	
People from kwaDapha stated that, historically, they never had to buy anything from 
the shops because all the food they needed, they could grow themselves. Historically, 
a large portion of the land in kwaDapha was occupied by people’s homesteads, plots 
for crop farming, as well as communal kraals for livestock (DFG, 2015). Aerial 
photography provides some evidence that possibly verifies these assertions by people 
from the area about increasing forest growth over the years as a result of declined 
agriculture activities. Figure 6.17, an aerial photograph from 1975, depicts how the 
land of kwaDapha village was mostly clear of forest cover or natural vegetation. 
Figure 6.18 depicts how that had changed by 2004.  
 
	
145	
	
Lake 3 
Lake 4 
kwaDapha 
village 
Year:	1959	
	
Figure 6.17: An aerial photograph depicting the kwaDapha landscape in 1959 (NGI, 2016). 
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Figure 6.18: An aerial photograph depicting a change in the kwaDapha landscape by 2004 
(NGI, 2016). 
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Some of the older people from the village and those who knew the oral history of the 
village well asserted that before the 1950s (i.e. before the Coastal Forest Reserve was 
established near kwaDapha in 1952), livelihood conditions were the opposite of what 
they are now (FFG, DFG; 2015). They asserted that before the 1950s, there were 
plenty of agricultural fields everywhere and people led good lives.  
 
There were extensive agricultural crops planted by local people. 
The land you see now where people live, all of it was an 
agricultural field – we planted for ourselves the things we ate in 
the past, this is why we do not age quick. There was also lots of 
livestock farming – many cattle everywhere, in many families, 
and six communal kraals. There was also lots of fishing and 
harvesting of marine resources from the lakes and ocean – we 
used to fish using a stick called uzi, not rods. We were free when 
we were growing up (DFG, 2015). 
 
6.3.3.2 Current livelihood strategies 
 
The village of kwaDapha consisted of approximately 60 homesteads at the time this 
study was conducted. KwaDapha is a very remote and marginalized village in 
geographical terms and people from kwaDapha struggle immensely with physical 
access. In terms of the amount of time it took to travel from the tar road in Manguzi 
town to the village, it took approximately two hours to travel to the village one way 
on a 4x4 vehicle. The gravel road to kwaDapha is also arguably worse compared to 
the one going to Nkovukeni.  
 
KwaDapha village has only two primary schools, no high school and no health 
facilities. The activities in the area were concentrated around the two tourism 
facilities, i.e. kwaDapha lodge and camp. Both of these tourism facilities are run 
mostly by local people and located near the house of the kwaDapha headman.  
 
At the time this study was conducted, marine resources (i.e. linefish, red bait, mussels, 
sea urchins) were important for livelihoods in kwaDapha because not everyone got 
the opportunity to participate in tourism and relied on being able to harvest marine 
resources. However, during the data collecting, people from kwaDapha indicated that 
they did not receive permits to harvest marine and intertidal resources. People of 
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kwaDapha also explained that there was a perception by conservation authorities that 
local people overharvested marine resources, which they stated was not true because 
when tourists visited the area, they usually snorkelled in shallow waters and 
sometimes caught fish. They stated that local people only harvested linefish, red bait 
and mussels; the rest of the marine life was only harvested if it was dead or beached, 
e.g. shells and seaweed. Red baitwas popularly used for making stew for dinner in 
kwaDapha. However, fishing activities were no longer as popular in kwaDapha as in 
the other two villages because the lakes adjacent to this village were full of 
hippopotamuses and the physical distance between most of the households and the 
lakes was large.  
 
Wood is harvested for making fire and for selling on the road to tourists, as there is no 
electricity in the area. Forest products are also used for building material for houses, 
fencing and for food.  Local people stated that they could not build with cement 
because the biggest problem in the area is transport. They also explained that 
iSimangaliso refused permission for a road to be built and it was therefore difficult to 
hire people’s cars to deliver cement because only 4x4 vehicles could reach the village. 
As a result, local people relied on the forest and reeds from the lake for building. 
Firewood is also harvested locally and used as the main source of energy. Some 
people sold firewood on the road to tourists who came to the area to camp privately. 
Most of the dwellings in kwaDapha homesteads were made from natural materials as 
people used forest products as building material for houses and fencing, as well as for 
food.  
 
Agriculture activities in kwaDapha were conducted mostly within people’s 
homesteads, but most people complained that it was difficult for them to plant crops 
because of world heritage site rules, as well as the increased numbers of 
hippopotamuses that roam around at night and eat crops in people’s gardens (DFG, 
2015). 
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Figure 6.19: A man from KwaDapha showing the land where he used to plough crops which 
were destroyed by hippopotamuses (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
 
There was, however, more tourism activity taking place in kwaDapha compared to the 
other villages due to the turtle-nesting site in Banga Nek (i.e. which is on the coast of 
kwaDapha). The existence of the nesting site made this village a tourism hotspot and 
provides employment to local people in tourism activities such as tour guiding as well 
as ownership of the camp. People in kwaDapha are also employed by conservation 
authorities as monitors in the turtle nesting sites andas beach cleaners.  
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Figure 6.20: KwaDapha Beach Camp (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
 
The profit from the tourism camps is split among all households in the village, 
making these camps the financial backbone of the village, employing approximately 
seven community members. The camps are usually busy during peak seasons and 
young people also benefited when they came back from school because some of them 
carried goods for tourists and accompanied them when they went fishing. However, 
the benefits from the camp are difficult to disseminate as local people asserted, 
 
The benefits are there, but we are not really feeling them that 
much…its like if you take a drum that is leaking, the more you 
pour water in, the more it starts leaking. However, there are times 
when the camp does make money and each household in the 
village gets money from that, it is split evenly. This year we have 
not gotten it but last year every household got it; we last got 
R1200 per home. The previous year, each home got R500.  The 
year before that, it was R1600. The money is split and distributed 
at a community meeting held at the headman’s place. We do not 
know how the figures are determined beforehand, we only find 
out at the meeting how much we will be getting. The issue is that 
the condition that the camps are in is not conducive for the camp 
to be generating large sums of money. For instance, if it had to 
start raining right now, you will see something shocking; rain will 
start pouring on top of us all. No tourists will pay a lot of money 
for that. But whatever does come through, something does reach 
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the community. It is difficult to run a business with no business 
plan because there are no targets put in place to define how well 
the business needs to do. There are also no audits (DFG, 2015).  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined the socio-economic context of Kosi Bay, as well as the 
historical and current livelihood characteristics of the local people. The findings of the 
study reveal that livelihoods of people in the respective villages of Kosi Bay are 
dynamic. Local livelihood strategies have also shifted over the years largely due to 
governance interventions, mostly related to conservation. This will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. It is apparent that while historical 
livelihoods in Kosi Bay largely involved agriculture and fishing activities, the extent 
to which the people from the community can currently sustain their livelihoods 
through these activities has significantly declined over the past 50 decades, and in the 
face of this, activities such as tourism have emerged as the backbone for livelihoods 
of some villages in the area. The results also reveal that fisheries has become a 
significant livelihood activity over the years, as an alternative to agriculture when 
conservation rules strengthened and constrained people’s abilities to conduct 
agriculture livelihoods in fertile land inside the World Heritage Site. The findings of 
this study revealed interesting insights about the nuances of village life in the coastal 
villages of Kosi Bay, which vary from village to village, highlighting that livelihoods 
and backgrounds of people within the Kosi Bay villages, are not as homogenous as 
expected. This means that although people in the area largely share the same customs 
and traditions, and have the same traditional leaders, certain practices and worldviews 
held at village level differed from village to village, making livelihood experiences 
unique in each village.  
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 CHAPTER SEVEN: LINKAGES BETWEEN 
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES AND 
LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
	
With a history of dispossession and exclusion from coastal resource use, restrictions 
on agricultural activities, coupled with impoverished living conditions, high 
unemployment levels and limited livelihood options; the livelihoods of people in Kosi 
Bay have been influenced by various governance processes occurring over the years. 
The declaration of the World Heritage Site and the creation of the Coastal Forest 
Reserve and Maputaland Marine Protected Area adjacent to Kosi Bay over the 
decades have meant increasingly restricted access to coastal resources for the Kosi 
Bay community (Guyot, 2005; Jury et al., 2009). Over the years, the existence of 
plural governance systems (i.e. statutory, traditional and customary) in the governance 
of coastal resources in Kosi Bay has had implications for the ability of community 
members to formulate their livelihood strategies. Indeed, approximately 68 per cent of 
respondents in Kosi Bay indicated that their livelihood strategies had been impacted 
by governance interventions over time, mostly linked to conservation. At the time this 
study was conducted, respondents indicated that they felt that conservation authorities 
cared more for “nature” than for the people in the community. For example, in a 
meeting with community members in the Nkovukeni village, local people stated that,  
 
It is almost as if iSimangaliso came here with a tent full of 
coastal resources in the back of a truck and they pulled it out 
here and placed the resources and then protected them…as if 
we were never even here when they came (FFG; 2015).   
 
There was a general consensus among the respondents that they were hardly 
consulted in governance decision-making processes and that there were too many 
restrictions imposed on different aspects of livelihoods.  
 
This chapter seeks to outline the various influences of governance systems on the 
livelihood strategies of the people in Kosi Bay. 
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7.2 KEY GOVERNANCE PROCESSES INFLUENCING LIVELIHOOD 
STRATEGIES IN KOSI BAY SINCE 1948 
 
Various events and processes have taken place over time to make coastal governance 
in Kosi Bay the way it is today. These have influenced the manner in which the Kosi 
Bay community has accessed and used coastal resources historically and currently. 
Figure 7.1 lists some of the key governance processes and interventions that have 
influenced the governance of the Kosi Bay system and local livelihood strategies over 
the years.  
 
1952  Coastal Forest Reserve proclaimed in Kosi Bay near kwaDapha village 
1970s  UNESCO World Heritage Convention proclaimed 
Kosi Bay incorporated under KwaZulu homeland government 
1980s  
1992  
1995  
1997  
1999  
2000  
1948  Apartheid government took over in South Africa 
Forced Removals of Mvutshane people from the Coastal Forest Reserve  
Conservation started in areas under Tembe TA  
Maputaland Marine Reserve established  
Kosi Bay Nature Reserve established by KwaZulu government  
Gill-netting introduced in the lakes and allocation of experimental permits  
Tembe Royal House submitted a Land Claim  
South Africa ratified World Heritage Convention 
1994  First democratic government was elected in South Africa; end of apartheid era 
World Heritage Convention Act promulgated  - Greater St. Lucia Wetland 
Park established 
Greater St. Lucia Wetland Park enacted as South Africa’s first 
World Heritage Site (renamed iSimangaliso in 2004) 
TIMELINE 
	
Figure 7.1: Timeline of key governance interventions that have influenced the use of coastal 
resources in Kosi Bay (source: Philile Mbatha)	
 
The timeline depicted in Figure 7.1 highlights key coastal governance interventions 
that Kosi Bay community members perceived had a direct and indirect influences on 
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their livelihood strategies over time. These are discussed in more detail in the 
following section.  
 
7.3 LOCAL NARRATIVES ABOUT SHIFTING LIVELIHOODS AS A 
RESULT OF GOVERNANCE PROCESSES 
	
Livelihoods of the people in Kosi Bay have evolved significantly over the course of 
history due to certain events linked to governance interventions, processes and 
practices in the following sectors.  
	
7.3.1 Agricultural livelihoods 
 
Agriculture has been the key livelihood strategy of many people in Kosi Bay over the 
past seven decades, especially before the conservation interventions in the area 
intensified, and before wild animals began to pose serious problems for local farmers. 
Respondents in Kosi Bay rated agriculture as the most significant livelihood for most 
of the twentieth century, especially around the time when men left the villages to go 
to look for jobs in the gold mines in Johannesburg during the apartheid era (MFG, 
NFG, DFG; 2015).  
 
Although approximately 90 per cent and 20 per cent of people in kwaDapha and 
Nkovukeni respectively engage in agriculture, crop yields from these villages were 
much lower than in Mvutshane village. This is due to the fact that crop farming in 
Mvutshane primarily occurs in fertile swampy areas outside the World Heritage Site 
and in the south of Mozambique near the border. On the other hand, Nkovukeni and 
kwaDapha villages are enclosed within the bounds of the World Heritage Site. This 
means that local people could only plant crops within their homesteads where the land 
is not as fertile as in the swampy areas adjacent to the lakes in the Kosi system where 
agricultural activities were prohibited by the iSimangaliso Authority.  
 
A number of respondents in Kosi Bay indicated that their agricultural livelihood was 
negatively impacted by conservation rules as well as by wild animals such as 
hippopotamuses, monkeys and pigs. The creation of the Kosi Bay Nature Reserve in 
1987/88 resulted in forced removals of local people from their land in the historical 
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villages of Mvutshane, and they were subsequently prohibited from planting crops in 
the forest within the area where they had been evicted. People recalled that 
conservation authorities at the time erected a fence that enclosed their homesteads and 
told them that all the land inside the fence was going to be conservation land 
(Mthethwa, 2002; Sunde, 2013; MFG, 2015).  
 
People in Kosi Bay also claimed that the number of hippopotamuses in the lakes had 
increased, and that there were increased incidences of the wild animals invading 
people’s homesteads and their home gardens. According to the local people, in the 
past, they used to “manage” disruptive hippopotamuses by “disciplining” them (i.e. 
they would trap and kill a hippopotamus that was found invading one of the 
homesteads so that the other hippos would know to keep out) (MFG, 2015). People 
from Mvutshane village explained that historically, they did not want to keep killing 
the hippopotamuses that were problematic and that was why they had approached 
conservation authorities to fence off the lakes so that the animals would not wander 
too far out at night. When conservation authorities introduced the fence as a response, 
local people thought the fence was meant for fencing off hippotamuses, but they were 
confused when they saw it extending to areas beyond the homesteads. People in 
Mvutshane village said that they did not like that the fence that had been constructed 
was barring them from areas where they conducted their livelihood activities. As a 
result, people in the village stated that they had no choice but to destroy the fence 
because there was miscommunication between the local people and conservation 
authorities about the purpose of the fence (MFG, 2015; EKI2, 2015).  
 
In a key informant interview, one of the officials from the conservation authority who 
was present at the time explained,  
At the time, it was agreed that people could carry on using 
traditional ways of harvesting resources such as fish in fish 
traps and grass along the lakes, at traditional levels. 
However, there were no written records about all this and 
most of the people that were involved in these agreements 
have died. I believe people were consulted in making the 
rules but then again, nobody consults adequately with 
anybody and local people may not have been properly 
consulted and the government at the time was not 
democratic, as well as the traditional authority rule; and 
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many people on the ground were ignored by both… (EKI2, 
2015). 
 
Moreover, local people pointed out that, over the years, the land outside the World 
Heritage Site boundaries has become drier, and that is why large numbers of livestock 
that local people used to farm also dwindled. In recent years, increasing drought in 
Mvutshane has made food security difficult, especially over the past two to three 
decades (MFG; 2015). Therefore, restrictions from conservation and water shortages 
in places where people in Mvutshane had been forcibly moved to, were among the 
complex factors contributing towards agriculture livelihoods becoming more difficult 
to pursue in the present day compared to historical times. For this reason, women in 
Mvutshane developed an alternative way of continuing with the agriculture livelihood 
in the south of	Mozambique.	One	of	the transect walks conducted for this study was 
with a woman from the Mvutshane village who, together with other women from the 
village, crossed the country border illegally on a daily basis into Ponta do Ouro to 
plough and harvest agricultural fields that she owned on the other side. When I asked 
the woman why she risked her life in order to continue her agricultural activities, and 
whether it was out of desperation for food; she responded: 
 
I do not do this because I desperately need food or money, I 
do this because agriculture is a way of life for me, it gives my 
life meaning. If am not able to do this every morning, I feel 
like something is missing in my life. It has been very difficult 
for us since iSimangaliso prevented us from planting our 
crops inside the fence, because that is where the fertile land 
is. So if we cannot do it here, we will go to Mozambique 
because the rules there are not strict (OH3).  
 
 
This indicates how important the agriculture livelihood is for people in Mvutshane, so 
much so, that they “break the law” in order to undertake this livelihood strategy.  
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Figure 7.2: A woman from Mvutshane village illegally crossing the border to Mozambique to 
plough her agriculture fields (photo: Philile Mbatha).	
	
On the other hand, for Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages that are within the World 
Heritage Site, conservation rules that have been imposed by the iSimangaliso 
Authority preventing people from pursuing historical agriculture livelihoods are the 
primary reason for dwindling agricultural practices. In kwaDapha, people expressed: 
 
iSimangaliso sends Nature enforcement every Tuesday and 
Sunday and they would fill up a truck carrying guns and pour 
onto your property and say they are here to check up on 
you…they were here just this past Tuesday here at 
kwaDapha. They don’t even greet you or anything, but you 
just find them roaming around your homestead telling you 
they are here to check on you. They come all the way from 
Madlangula just to check on me? And they say yes, 
iSimangaliso sent us to check on you. They come to do that 
twice every week. They don’t even ask for permission to 
enter your property, they just come to do what they want. 
These are some of the things we deal with here. This is why 
we now rely so much on marine resources and activities there 
for livelihoods because whatever we try to do here in our 
land, we are prohibited and oppressed to pursue (DFG, 
2015). 
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Umkhanyakude Municipality once wanted to assist us with 
gardens and bought us all the amenities like water tanks, etc. 
However, the hippos came in and started destroying 
everything and when we asked iSimangaliso for a fence they 
said no, so we gave up and now we don’t plough those 
gardens...It is really discouraging to carry on sometimes 
because it is hard to do anything when someone is busy 
sitting on your shoulders (DFG, 2015). 
 
Moreover, the increase in the numbers of wild animals such as hippopotamuses, 
monkeys and pigs over the years due to strengthened conservation has become a 
secondary reason for declining agricultural practices in villages within the World 
Heritage Site. 
 
For these reasons, many people from Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages 
have tended to shift more towards fishing as a key livelihood activity.  
7.3.2 Fishing livelihoods 
	
More than 96 per cent of people in Mvutshane, Nkovukeni and kwaDapha combined 
considered fishing an important livelihood activity. In focus group discussions, 
however, community members explained that fishing had not always been their 
primary livelihood activity (FFG, MFG, DFG, NFG; 2015). In the past, fishing was 
not only a customary or subsistence activity for local people, but fisheries resources 
acted as a complement to agricultural resources that were consumed daily as a staple. 
Local people perceived that fishing activities in Kosi Bay were negatively impacted 
on by prohibitions on the harvesting of marine resources and the imposition of rules 
that restricted historical livelihoods.  
 
People recalled that from 1962 to 1966, they started observing officials from Nature 
who used to chase them away when they were fishing, with no explanations provided. 
 
There used to be a man with binoculars who would observe us 
from afar when we were fishing and as soon as we were done, 
he would come and take pictures of our fish and us. After 
some time, he then started telling us that we were wasting the 
fish. After a while, another scientist who was a student came 
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here and would call local fishermen to put nets in the estuary 
mouth for him and he would catch all sorts of fish without 
telling us what he was doing.  He would dissect the fish and 
put their insides in bottles and labeled them. Initially, he would 
let us take the fish home when he was done but eventually he 
stopped giving us the fish. We had no idea what he was doing, 
that he was busy writing laws about how we should use the 
fish…they said he was a doctor of fish and no one had told us 
that there was a doctor coming here to cure fish…while we 
were being killed, he was busy healing fish – that is what 
confused us a lot because we wondered how could a doctor be 
sent to heal fish and none sent to heal us as human beings. 
Only later we realized what exactly he was here to do. Even 
so, the homeland government increasingly sent police from all 
over…and no one from this area was hired to be part of these 
police sent here – our only involvement was through being 
arrested and taken to court, for no known reason. To this day, 
no one has told us whose goods we have stolen that we 
deserved to be arrested (FFG, 2015). 
 
Kosi Bay fishers further stated that 1983 was the worst year for them as this was 
when the presence of Nature within the area intensified. They also added that 1984 
was the most traumatic year as many people, including youth, lost their lives through 
being shot for fishing “illegally” (FFG, 2015; MFG, 2015). According to local 
people, many people from Nkovukeni lost their lives and their relatives during those 
years, as they were shot dead by conservation police.  “Those years were very hard, 
even to this day we still mourn that. There was even a child who got mentally ill 
from the events that took place in that period because he was beaten” (FFG, 2015). 
People from Mvutshane pointed out that there was a decline in fishing activities in 
the fish traps within Kosi estuary in the mid-1980s, due to the fact the people were 
progressively being forcibly removed from the historical villages, and had to 
relocate outside the boundaries of the conservation fence. Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 
are ground photographs that visually depict the change in the trap fishery between 
the years 1971 and 1986 in the Kosi estuary. 
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It is evident from comparing the two images that by 1986, the trap fishery had 
declined. Local people stated that this was due to poor maintenance20 of fish traps at 
the time due to the disruption of livelihoods by the forced removals that took place 
in the mid-1980s.  
 
In 1992, conservation authorities introduced an experimental gillnet fishery targeting 
fish species thought to be able to sustain further fishing pressures (Kyle, 1999; 2013; 
Sunde, 2013).  The establishment of a legal gillnet fishery was also promoted due to 
conflicts between illegal netters and trap owners, as netters were suspected of 
poaching fish and damaging traps. Consequently, in 1992, five permits for gillnet 
fishing in the lakes were introduced at kwaDapha, and by 1995, 35 permits had been 
issued across the three villages (Kyle, 1999). According to Kyle (1999; 2013), the 
most targeted species for gillnetters at the time were species such as Oreochromis 
mossambicus (commonly known as Mozambique Tilapia), as well as species 
(including mullet and kingfish) from the respective Mugilidae and Carangidae. By 
1995, legal gillnetting and fishing in fish traps were the two leading fishing activities 
in the estuary and lakes providing most of the “legal” food produced from the Kosi 
lakes (Kyle, 1999).  
 
																																																								
20People in Kosi Bay use material from the natural vegetation surrounding the lakes and 
estuary in order to construct fish traps. These materials thus have to be maintained and 
changed every now and again.  
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1971	
	
Figure 7.3: The trap fishery in Kosi estuary in 1971 (rePHOTO SA, 2017).	
	
	
Figure 7.4: The trap fishery in Kosi estuary in 1986 (rePHOTO SA, 2017).	
	
Conservation authorities reported that there were significant improvements in the 
relationship between the conservation authorities and the community during this 
period (Kyle, 1999). However, the version of the local people was that they tried to 
resist rules imposed by the government because they disagreed with the permit 
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system (FFG, 2015). The resistance was also because the trap fishery in Kosi Bay 
had, since its establishment, been managed by a long-standing customary system 
where power was vested at the community level to a downwardly accountable 
committee. In focus group discussions, fishers in Kosi Bay remarked that, initially, 
they were not opposed to working with conservation authorities when the gillnetting 
was introduced. Indeed, local people stated that during that time, the relationship 
between themselves and conservation authorities had improved. However, when 
community members realized that conservation authorities persisted with issuing 
them with permits for fishing (which were shunned by the community), local people 
became disgruntled. This was because community members believed the fishery and 
the resources belonged to them and that since they had traditionally fished in the area 
for so many years and had already existing customary institutions for managing the 
fishery, no outsiders had the right to dictate how fishing should take place in the lake 
system.  
 
With regards to the trap fishery in the Kosi Bay system, people in the community 
believed that they owned the fish traps and that the community owned the lakes. A 
long-standing customary system where power was vested at the community level to a 
downwardly accountable committee managed the trap fishery in Kosi Bay. Moreover, 
people in Kosi Bay established land claims and human rights committees to defend 
their rights of access to land and fisheries resources. This was after the establishment 
of the iSimangaliso site, when people felt that those in power, i.e. the iSimangaliso 
Authority and traditional authorities, were not prioritizing their livelihood needs and 
priorities. Kosi Bay fishers managed to keep Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife from 
penetrating the management of the trap fishery and imposing their ideas over their 
customary rules. People from Kosi Bay resisted this by arguing that no one could give 
them permits for a resource that they were given by God (Sunde, 2013).  
 
Community members in Kosi Bay also argued that their customary institutions have 
always been concerned about the sustainability of the trap fishery, so much so that 
over the years, they redesigned the fish traps so that the traps could only capture 
bigger fish instead of small fish, so as to make the system more sustainable. 
Moreover, the fish trap customary institution had remained skeptical of gillnetting 
activities that had been imposed by Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife within the Kosi lake 
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system because they believed gillnetting had resulted in a gradual decline of fish 
stocks within the lake system due to illegal gillnetting activities that took place at 
night.  
 
In the year 2000, conservation authorities ended up recalling gillnetting as a legal 
activity in the Kosi Bay system. According to a conservation authority official,  
 
On the scientific side gillnetting worked, but from a 
management point of view it did not and most importantly 
there was no way to keep gillnets from channels because fish 
have to migrate and we had only allowed people to gillnet 
outside the channels. However, at night people put gillnets 
inside the channels and it became impossible to control and 
at the same time, the number of fish traps increased and 
gillnetting had to be stopped and gillnetting became illegal in 
all estuaries in the country around the year 2000 (EKZNW1, 
2015). 
 
Although gillnetting was halted as a legal activity, fish trap owners in Mvutshane and 
Nkovukeni believed that this activity was still taking place illegally within the estuary 
and lakes at the time this research was conducted. They remarked that illegal 
gillnetters21 cast their nets mostly at night, and as a result people using the traps 
struggled to catch fish.  
 
At the time of this research, approximately 27 per cent of respondents in Kosi Bay 
indicated that they sold fish catches in Manguzi, while others used it mainly for 
consumption and sharing with those who did not have fish traps. Some of the local 
fishers remarked that they sold fish primarily due to poverty in the area. This has 
resulted in a perceived decline of fisheries resources within the Kosi lake system from 
the point of view of conservation authorities who argue that, 
 
More recently…the rising numbers of fish being caught 
																																																								
21Illegal gillnetters were generally perceived by local fishers to be people from Kosi Bay 
villages that were not on the coast, and therefore who did not understand customary rules for 
fishing in the traps. Others also suspected that younger people from the community whose 
families did not own fish traps, or who were either unemployed or were desperate for ways of 
accessing food or money, participated in illegal gillnetting.  
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(especially immature fish of important species) and the 
increasing efficiency of the traps have raised their off-take 
proportion markedly to levels that are likely to be 
unsustainable. While traditional trapping and other fisheries 
in Kosi Bay likely coexisted sustainably in the past, there is 
now compelling evidence that overall catch rates for many 
species are unsustainable. Management intervention is now 
required to reduce overall fishing effort and to monitor the 
changes in the construction and thus efficiency of the traps. 
Action is now required to reduce catches to levels that appear 
to be wise, sustainable and appropriate for this World 
Heritage Site, to the mutual benefit of local trappers and 
other fishers (Kyle, 2013:77). 
 
On the contrary, people from Mvutshane and Nkovukeni argued that the conservation 
authorities were the ones responsible for the decline of fish stocks within the lakes, 
especially when they introduced gillnetting. People from Mvutshane and Nkovukeni 
constantly remarked about a certain yellow substance in the lakes that they suspected 
decimated fish entering the traps within the lake system (FFG, 2015; MFG, 2015; 
NFG; 2015). They suspected that the conservation authorities were responsible for 
this as an effort to destroy the tradition of trap fishing. People remarked that in the 
2000s, some substance spilled in the estuary and lakes caused many fish to die, and 
after that the number of fish dwindled from the estuary.  
 
When the number of fish dwindled we started to suffer 
because selling fish is a quick business and we knew that if 
we caught and sold, we are able to have money to buy 
household essentials in Manguzi and life moved forward. 
This has become increasingly important since agriculture is 
no longer easy to pursue (MFG, 2015).  
 
A conservation official remarked that they are aware of this accusation, 
With regards to the yellow substance…it is created from 
underwater mixing. For instance, the one lake is 18m deep 
while the other is 40m deep. In lake 1, water mixes but in lake 
2, water does not mix and when there is no oxygen, oxygen 
sulphate forms and it creates a smell. This happens when after 
not mixing, water turns over and stirs on top and this is toxic 
and when there are fish there, they die, including fish in the 
fish traps (EKZNW1, 2015) 
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What is apparent from the findings of this study was that there were high levels of 
mistrust on the part of the community towards conservation authorities, and there was 
also a lack of engagement on scientific and ecological matters between the two 
parties. This points to the fact that there was poor interaction and consultation 
between conservation authorities and community members. The following section 
focuses on the tourism sector and underlines some of the key influences of 
governance on livelihoods within the sector.  
7.3.3 Tourism livelihoods 
	
Tourism was among the key livelihood activities in Kosi Bay, especially over the past 
three decades. Approximately 52 per cent of people in kwaDapha were directly or 
indirectly involved in tourism activities, while only 20 per cent of people in 
Mvutshane, and only 2 per cent of people from Nkovukeni (as there were no tourism 
ventures in Nkovukeni) were involved in tourism.  
 
kwaDapha consisted of two village-owned tourist camp facilities, while Mvutshane 
had one village-owned tourism facility, and two privately-owned facilities. There was 
a village committee selected by village members in Mvutshane that acted as a 
mediating body between the village-owned tourism facility located on the boundary 
of the World Heritage Site and the wider community. This committee liaised with 
village members to determine how money generated by the tourist facility was used. 
The tourism facility paid a levy to the village through a trust held by the committee. 
Also, local people were employed by the tourism facility as cleaners and security 
guards. One of the managers of the lodge was a young man from the village. Local 
people perceived that the lodge was significant for supporting the livelihoods of the 
people in the village (MFG, 2015).  
 
The other major tourist facility in Mvutshane was located in privately-owned land 
near the community-owned tourism facility, and also employed local people as 
cleaners and security guards. However, there was a perception by local people that it 
did not do much for the village, as the owner was a businessman who did not reside in 
the facility and rented the land from a village member.  
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The manager of the village-owned tourist facility was a young man from the village 
who was of Tembe descent. He earned his position in the tourist facility through 
obtaining a learnership funded by the iSimangaliso Authority, after completing high 
school education. The manager explained that in order to establish the village-owned 
tourist facility, some of the funds were provided by national government (Department 
of Tourism).  
 
In the beginning, it started as campsite with no chalets, just 
tents. When the chalets were built, there were no showers. 
However, the facility has accumulated 18 campsites. Ithala 
bank and the National Lottery (Lotto) were among the 
organizations that sponsored the facility with funds over the 
years to achieve this growth. Lotto sponsored R1million 
(MOH3).  
 
In kwaDapha (within the boundary of the World Heritage Site), tourism activities 
took place within the park. People from kwaDapha generally traced external 
conservation activities that they first became aware of to have taken place around 
1970s. They recalled that around 1975, they became aware of Nature with its many 
rules when the homeland government came and took over. Rules were mostly 
pertaining to agriculture and harvesting from the forest. “They said we eat for free 
from nature and they did not like it, so they introduced their own rules” (DFG, 2015). 
Although the people of kwaDapha indicated that there was a significant period of time 
in history when the relationship between themselves and Nature was relatively good, 
they recalled that they still did not understand the role of Nature in terms of 
conserving natural resources. The good relationship between the two existed when 
hippopotamuses were posing a problem to local people’s livelihoods in the past, and 
conservation officials would come and shoot the problematic animals and give the 
meat to the locals. This was between the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was also the 
time that saw the rise of tourist camps in the village. One of the two tourist camps that 
were owned by the people of kwaDapha during the time of this research was initially 
established by Nature, which later handed it over to the people of kwaDapha before 
the establishment of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site.  
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Local people established the other tourist camp with the assistance of outsiders. 
Residents of kwaDapha strongly asserted that it was because of David Webster22 that 
the community awakened to the idea of tourism as a livelihood activity that could 
help improve the economy of the village. When Webster passed on in 1989, people 
decided to make his former house a village-owned tourist camp.  
 
David Webster was the one who initiated the idea of a tourist 
camp because the idea was that if the camp was built 
successfully, there would be few chances that this land would 
be taken away from the people during apartheid when other 
communities were being removed forcibly for conservation. 
That is when we decided to make this a tourist camp. There 
were other white people that used to work with David 
Webster who were fighting against apartheid. These were 
also the people who helped open the eyes of the community 
to what was happening and they acted as advisers to us even 
after David Webster died.  When the white people were here, 
the camp worked professionally until the 1990s. Upon his 
death, Webster’s friends advised us on how to start the 
business and move it forward. They sponsored us with a car 
and a boat to take tourists on (DFG, 2015). 
 
The first tourist camp that existed in the area in the early 1990s was called KEN 
(KwaDapha, Emalangeni and Nkovukeni). The camp was created as a joint venture 
between these three villages. One of the current officials within the iSimangaliso 
Authority was involved at the time with establishing KEN. People from kwaDapha 
recalled observing the iSimangaliso Authority official working as a tourism student in 
the village to establish KEN after Webster passed on.  
 
After some time, Emalangeni and Nkovukeni villages were excluded from KEN and 
only kwaDapha remained in the project (for contested reasons). Some argued that it 
was because people from kwaDapha decided to drop the others so that all the benefits 
would not be shared between the three villages because it was too many people to 
share with.  Others claimed the kwaDapha headman declared that people from 
Emalangeni and Nkovukeni should step aside so that the people who would run the 
																																																								
22An anthropologist/academic/activist/author who resided in the village for a significant 
amount of time before his assassination in Johannesburg in 1989.	
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project would only be those from kwaDapha. Some claimed it was a unanimous 
decision by people from kwaDapha to get rid of the other two villages from the 
project because there was a perception that the people from other villages were 
benefiting more, so people from kwaDapha complained to their headman. Either way, 
KEN was dissolved shortly after it had been established, and kwaDapha was the only 
village out of the three that proceeded with tourism ventures.  
 
After KEN was dissolved, other outside investors came into the picture. However, this 
was not without challenges for the people of kwaDapha. The investors assisted people 
from kwaDapha to effectively manage and market the tourism businesses, hence the 
money started coming in. This was around 1998. However, people from the village 
became concerned because none of them knew how much money the investors were 
really making from managing and marketing the camp on behalf of the village. People 
suspected that the investors had “hit a jackpot” because there was no village 
institutional structure to keep the investors accountable. According to the locals, their 
suspicions were proven right when they discovered that one of the investors was 
fraudulent.  
They [the investors] controlled all the accounts but they 
would not even show us how much they were really 
making…they also just hit a jackpot and were not 
accountable. They would also lie to us about how much he 
was making, keep the money to build their own houses 
elsewhere, and give discounts to their friends (DFG, 2015). 
 
Currently, various people asserted that the major hindrance preventing the camps 
from generating more income was the fact that the current condition of the camps was 
not conducive to tourism growth (DFG, 2015). For instance, the roofs in the chalets 
were leaking and that was not good for attracting tourists to stay in the facilities. 
Other village members also explained that it was difficult to run a business with no 
business plan because no targets were put in place to define how well the business 
needed to do. There were also no audits for both camps. Those who worked in the 
tourist camp also pointed out that they were prohibited by Nature and iSimangaliso 
Authority to renovate the camps, even if they obtain assistance from outside to do so 
(DOH1).  
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People from kwaDapha explained that the camp had not been in a good condition for 
a while, and things were getting worse; making it difficult for local people to 
successfully run tourism ventures to benefit their livelihoods. The lack of strong local 
institutions, capacity, training and resources for local people to run the venture, 
coupled with restrictions imposed by the iSimangaliso Authority, are major blockages 
preventing the development of sustained livelihoods from tourism activities in 
kwaDapha village. 
 
It is therefore apparent that, among other factors, governance interventions mostly 
linked to coastal resource use and conservation in Kosi Bay have played a key role in 
impacting and influencing the livelihood strategies of people in all three villages, in 
one way or another. The following section focuses on the perceived and existing 
power dynamics that have been involved in these governance processes and practices 
that have influenced livelihoods in Kosi Bay. 
	
7.4 DISCOURSES, IMAGES AND VALUES PROMOTED BY ACTORS 
INVOLVED IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES CONCERNING 
THE ISIMANGALISO WORLD HERITAGE SITE IN KOSI BAY 
	
The iSimangaliso World Heritage Site received its status in 1999 after being 
nominated as a World Heritage Site by the national Department of Environmental 
Affairs (DEA) of South Africa, which is responsible for putting forward nominations 
to UNESCO of sites with “outstanding universal value.”  
 
When potential world heritage sites are proposed to UNESCO, the nominating state 
has to develop a nomination dossier with relevant information about the site in order 
to prove that it is “outstanding” and has universal or global significance (UNESCO, 
2017; DEA1, 2017). The nomination file has to contain information about the 
integrity of the site, the authenticity of nomination, as well as the capability of the 
nominating agent to manage the site. Anyone within a ratifying state may nominate a 
site to UNESCO for World Heritage status, as long as they have collected relevant 
information indicating where the site is and why it should be protected (DEA1, 2017). 
The nomination dossier also has to contain information about how conservation 
activities would be balanced with tourism activities in order to ensure that the 
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international community is aware of the site, and in order to provide buy-in from, and 
benefits to local communities that are likely to be impacted by the declaration of the 
site.  
 
According to a DEA representative, the communities within and adjacent to 
iSimangaliso were consulted about the nomination of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park 
as a World Heritage Site before it was declared, because stakeholder engagement 
forms a significant part of the nomination process for sites to be approved by 
UNESCO. However, 95 per cent of respondents in Kosi Bay stated that they were not 
consulted about the establishment of the World Heritage Site, nor did they understand 
what a “World Heritage Site” is.  
 
Nevertheless, sites like iSimangaliso are regarded as important at national level 
because they put the country on the global map by showcasing its biodiversity to the 
world in order to attract a wide range of tourists (DEA1, 2017). World Heritage 
listing is perceived by statutory actors as a prestigious listing because it promotes an 
image of the country as one that is conscious about sustainable development and 
biodiversity conservation. World Heritage status is also considered important because 
of the revenue that is paid by the UNESCO Fund for the maintenance of the sites, as 
well as revenue generated from tourism activities that result when a site is listed as a 
World Heritage Site at international level, rather than just a protected area managed at 
national level (DEA1, 2017).  
 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is the key agency used by 
UNESCO to determine whether or not sites, such as iSimangaliso, qualify as natural 
sites under the 1972 World Heritage Convention. Upon nomination of natural sites, 
UNESCO relies on the IUCN to make recommendations about whether or not sites 
meet the criteria of “outstanding universal value”. This is why within the Integrated 
Management Plan (IMP) of the iSimangaliso Authority IUCN categories for protected 
areas largely inform the delineation of terrestrial and marine protected environments 
and their boundaries within iSimangaliso. Therefore, since IUCN is the main advisory 
body to UNESCO concerning natural sites, the iSimangaliso Authority adopts IUCN 
categories to inform their image of what protected area delineation would look like in 
its context (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016; DEA1, 2017).  
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The IUCN categories (Appendix 2) have informed the delineation of protected 
terrestrial and marine environments within the iSimangaliso site (iSimangaliso 
Authority, 2016). The dominant discourses, values and worldviews that inform 
conservation within the iSimangaliso site do not primarily stem from national or local 
levels, but are informed by the images of international actors such as UNESCO and 
the IUCN. One of the main concerns with the interpretation of IUCN categories in the 
governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site by the iSimangaliso Authority is 
the fact that the site exists in an area of deep poverty, marginalization and 
underdevelopment. Moreover, the restrictions on the access and use of resources 
within the site that come with world heritage status have seemingly undermined the 
long history of natural-resource use in the area. This creates confusion about who the 
resources are being conserved for, and whose values are being upheld in the 
conservation of  “outstanding universal value” within the site.  
 
For instance, in the delineation of restricted terrestrial and marine environments, 
under “permissible uses and activities”, the iSimangaliso Authority states that they 
control traditional resource use as well as human settlement by local people within the 
World Heritage Site (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). Moreover, the iSimangaliso 
Authority prohibits commercial agricultural activities by local people within the park, 
and limits food gardening to only subsistence use, even though these activities were 
historical livelihood activities of local people. Activities such as 4x4 driving, the use 
of motorized vessels and recreational fishing, to name but a few, which are largely 
conducted by tourists, dominate the list of activities allowed in the Park. What is also 
an issue of note is the fact that the iSimangaliso Authority defines the inherent 
attributes of the restricted marine environments within the iSimangaliso World 
Heritage Site to be those that include the following:  
 
no existing human settlement…nor consumptive use of 
marine resources…no adjacent land/sea which has human 
settlement or infrastructure development, and no access 
roads/ramps…The adjacent land and seascape bear negligible 
visual evidence (even to the “educated eye”) of human 
influence (settlement /infrastructure) in the recent past…an 
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inherent pristine appearance and character… (iSimangaliso 
Authority, 2016: 91).  
 
These interpretations of IUCN categories by the iSimangaliso Authority that inform 
the governance of coastal resources within the site raise various questions regarding 
the rights of local people to ownership of and access to land and coastal resources 
within and adjacent to the park, the long history that the local people have in the area, 
and the future of community members within and adjacent to the park. This is because 
the iSimangaliso Authority seeks to significantly minimize human presence and 
activity, or the interaction between local people and the surrounding environment 
within the bounds of the World Heritage Site in order to “provide visitors with 
wilderness/spiritual experiences in a marine environment” (iSimangaliso Authority, 
2016: 91) (Appendix 2).   
 
In a key informant interview, a DEA official disagreed that the iSimangaliso 
Authority had any basis for prohibiting historical livelihood activities of local people 
taking place within the boundaries of the Park. The DEA official stated: 
	
It’s not as if when you declare a World Heritage Site you 
have to have strict conditions on local people. That is not the 
case. Most authorities like to use world heritage status as a 
deterrent for development because they don’t want any 
development to happen, and then they use World Heritage 
Site status as an excuse for preventing it. Some of these 
conservationists are extreme; they don’t want any 
development in conservation areas. But it’s not like people in 
communities don’t know about conservation, they have lived 
in these areas for a long time. They are the ones who used to 
protect and look after the environment and coexisted with the 
resources for many years before they were fenced off. It’s not 
that they don’t know about conservation, they know, but now 
the circumstances are such that they are removed from it 
while at the same time they need to put food on the table 
(DEA1, 2017). 
	
It is apparent that there are concerns and contradictions relating to the manner in 
which the iSimangaliso Authority has interpreted IUCN categories to promote fortress 
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conservation that excludes local people from effectively interacting with coastal 
resources, despite their long history of living in the area and using these resources.   
7.5 COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS ABOUT GOVERNANCE PROCESSES 
IN COASTAL GOVERNANCE IN KOSI BAY 
	
Local people believed that the governance practices of the the iSimangaliso Authority 
did not reflect the human rights approach promoted by the South African 
Constitution.  
 
The arrival of iSimangaliso was bad, the way they treat us is 
so bad it’s almost like we could just hang ourselves by a rope 
and die. If iSimangaliso would be elected democratically, no 
one here would ever vote for them.  We don’t even know 
who iSimangaliso is, whether it’s an animal or something 
else. If we call them, they never come. iSimangaliso 
“inkunzi” that came in and created a lot of suffering for us. 
God created the environment for us but it has been taken by 
greedy people (FFG, 2015). 
 
ISimangaliso must stop what they are doing. They need to 
work with us because they are hurting our livelihoods. The 
problem with iSimangaliso is we don’t know what their role 
is but as soon as we try to do something for ourselves, then 
they oppress, we do something there, then they 
oppress…they should stop this. They prohibit us from doing 
things in our own place. They need to enable our livelihood 
needs and support us, not the other way around – they must 
negotiate with us and not take decisions on our behalf. We 
know how to conserve the resources ourselves but they could 
play a role in assisting us do that rather than taking over. We 
know how and when to harvest marine resources or forest 
resources sustainably. They make all rules wherever they 
make them and then those rules come here and impact our 
livelihoods. How would they feel if we went to their houses 
and made rules for them? That is the same thing they are 
doing to us and it’s not acceptable – we should be the ones 
telling them what to do here…it’s our will that should work 
in this area, not theirs. When we voted, the president said 
people must have rights in the areas where they reside, but 
not so in this area (NFG, 2015) 
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Focus group findings reveal that people generally perceived the iSimangaliso 
Authority to be the most powerful governance actor influencing local livelihoods in 
fishing, forestry and tourism activities. Figure 7.5 depicts a Venn diagram that was 
constructed in a focus group discussion with people from kwaDapha.	
 
	
Figure 7.5: A Venn diagram depicting how people from kwaDapha perceived power 
relations in decision-making processes that affected their livelihoods (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
 
Figure 7.5 depicts local people’s perceptions that iSimangaliso Authority (yellow 
circle) was the most powerfulactor when it came to decision-making within the Park, 
and that they worked closely with traditional authorities (i.e. “Ubukhosi” in the blue 
circle) as well as Nature (i.e. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife in the yellow square). The 
close relationship between the three actors is depicted in the proximity of the actors in 
the Venn diagram. Nature was not perceived to have any powers in decision-making 
processes (hence it was not depicted in a circle) as local people understood that 
Nature worked for iSimangaliso Authority, and it was iSimangaliso Authority that 
dictated Nature’s activities. The orange circle in the bottom right corner depicts 
people of kwaDapha, as the focus group participants perceived that local people had 
very little power compared to the other actors when it came to decision-making about 
coastal-resource use and livelihoods. The orange dotted line highlights the perception 
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held by local people that they felt far removed from decision-making processes that 
involved the three aforementioned actors. 
	
People from Nkovukeni also stated that they have struggled for many years to travel 
to the nearest town of Manguzi to do shopping or run errands due to the remoteness of 
this village. Due to limited financial resources, some of the people in the village 
resorted to walking to Manguzi, which is an approximately two-hour walk. In a focus 
group discussion, the people of Nkovukeni mentioned that they have raised the issue 
of physical access many times with the iSimangaliso Authority, but they believed the 
iSimangaliso Authority had countered any efforts to provide them with any means of 
improved physical access, either through a) a bridge to walk across the lake, b) a boat 
to move back and forth across the lake, or c) allowing 4x4 motor vehicles to cross the 
lake at low tide. Moreover, people in the village felt that if one or more of these were 
allowed by the iSimangaliso Authority to be provided to them, their livelihoods would 
be greatly improved.  
	
Remarks were made that when outsiders and the local municipality once tried to 
intervene to assist the community gain better road access, the iSimangaliso Authority 
blocked those efforts (NFG, 2015). Nkovukeni residents expressed frustration with 
this because if, for instance, someone was deceased, people in the village would have 
to carry the coffin across the lake with their bare hands to bury the person (NM, 
2014). Furthermore, when someone was ill at night, it was even more difficult 
because there was no transport available, and the person would have to be carried by 
others so they could be taken to Manguzi hospital. In fact, in one of the field visits, a 
young couple from Nkovukeni was observed carrying a sick toddler while wading 
across shoulder-deep water in the lake at high tide. One of the prominent women in 
the village added, 
 
…When someone dies, we have to carry them in the water to 
take them to the other side. It is very difficult. We feel that 
our constitutional rights are not respected and these rights 
cannot be realized in this area because of iSimangaliso rules. 
The problem is that our voices and our views are never heard, 
it is authorities who decide on our behalf what should happen 
in our area, and this is a problem. We have not received any 
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freedom from democracy…the way they [iSimangaliso 
Authority] decide on conservation rules is very arbitrary, as 
well as how and why these rules are made and how they 
establishthemselves as experts of this area who know more 
than us (NOH1, 2015).   
 
People claimed that the iSimangaliso Authority did not understand their livelihood 
needs and was trying to make it difficult for them to continue living in the village in 
order to force them to move out of the village. However, people from Nkovukeni 
expressed that no matter how difficult it was living in such conditions, they would not 
give up because they loved their land and recognized its value.  
 
With the decline of agriculture following the declaration of the World Heritage Site, 
livelihood strategies were becoming more and more constrained. They also expressed 
no aspirations to move out, or to participate in large-scale tourism developments. 
Instead they expressed that they would like to maintain the integrity of their 
environment as they strongly expressed on various occasions that they were “one with 
nature”, and that they did not understand why conservation authorities behaved as if 
they own the environment (NM1, 2014; NFG, 2015).  
 
The Venn diagram in Figure 7.6 was constructed with people from Nkovukeni and it 
depicts how they perceived themselves as far removed from decision-making 
processes that were usually centralized with the iSimangaliso Authority, Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife (Nature), as well as the Inkosi (Chief).  
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Figure 7.6: A Venn diagram depicting how the iSimangaliso Authority (yellow circle) was 
perceived to have the most power in decision-making processes, followed by Nature (red 
circle) and Inkosi (i.e. Tembe chief in the green circle) (photo: Philile Mbatha). 
 
People from Nkovukeni perceived that iSimangaliso, Nature and Inkosi worked 
closely together to make decisions about governance of coastal resources that affected 
the livelihood strategies of local people. The red circle on the top of the image on the 
bark of the tree represents where people of Nkovukeni saw themselves in decision-
making processes. People of Nkovukeni stated that because they did not feel included 
in any way in decision-making processes, they should be placed as far from the other 
actors as possible. They asked me to place them on the bark of the tree because they 
felt that the powerful actors considered them not as people, but as things…just like 
the tree itself. 
7.6 POLICY VERSUS REALITY IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE 
ISIMANGALISO WORLD HERITAGE SITE 
	
There were clearly mismatches between the policy framework governing the 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and the implementation of governance processes at 
provincial and local level, i.e. Kosi Bay. The policy framework governing the 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site is informed by the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention, as well as the World Heritage Convention Act. Figure 7.7 depicts the 
	
177	
	
governance structure for the iSimangaliso site, and how actors at national level 
assume governance interactions or arrangements for the site operate at local level.  
	
Although the assumption made by government at national level is that there are 
strong/positive interactions between actors, the reality on the ground proved the 
contrary. For instance, although national government was under the impression that 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife and the iSimangaliso Authority worked strongly together in 
the day-to-day management of conservation activities (DEA1, 2017), this was not the 
case at local level. Although Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife are supposed to be working 
together with the iSimangaliso Auhority, the reality on the ground was that the two 
institutions did not work well together and their interactions were characterized by 
conflict. There were also conflicts between the iSimangaliso Authority and various 
other actors. Moreover, the roles of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, traditional authorities 
and municipalities with regards to the governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage 
Site at the local level were unclear, especially because of the conflictual relationship 
between the iSimangaliso Authority and these actors on the ground.  
 
The ambiguities in the relationship between the iSimangaliso Authority and Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife were noted by local people (FFG, 2015). Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife was 
regarded a puppet of iSimangaliso with minimal or no decision-making powers. 
Nature is the child of iSimangaliso – they arrest people and 
hurt us. But even people from Nature tell us they are scared 
of iSimangaliso, they say they have a problem of 
iSimangaliso (MFG, 2015). 
 
They [Ezemvelo KZN Wildife] are the messengers for 
iSimangaliso, they are like a name and surname. The name is 
iSimangaliso and surname Nature… (FFG, 2015). 
 
 
Figures 7.8 and Figure 7.9 depict the poor interactions that the iSimangaliso Authority 
had with various actors at local level, and the ambiguous roles of actors and conflicts 
that existed at the local level in the governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage 
Site.  
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Figure 7.7: Policy – Governance interactions for coastal governance in Kosi Bay as 
stipulated in policies (source: Philile Mbatha)	
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Figure 7.8: The reality of governance interactions and the ambiguous roles of actors (source: 
Philile Mbatha)	
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Figure 7.9: The reality of conflicts between actors in Kosi Bay (source: Philile Mbatha)	
	
It is apparent that the policy structure presented in Figure 7.7 has stark differences to 
the realities of implementation presented in Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9.  
 
Another emerging issue was that the iSimangaliso Board acted on behalf of the 
minister of Environmental Affairs, and was the key institution responsible for 
effecting decisions at the local level. The iSimangaliso Board that is appointed by the 
Minister is the one that regulates the iSimangaliso Authority (Republic of South 
Africa, 1999; DEA1, 2017). According to DEA, the purpose of the iSimangaliso 
Board is to ensure that activities undertaken by the iSimangaliso Authority are in line 
with the World Heritage Convention and the World Heritage Convention Act (DEA1, 
2017). In theory, the CEO of the iSimangaliso Authority is therefore upwardly 
accountable to the board, which is currently made up of ten members (DEA1, 2017; 
iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). The chairperson of the board, on behalf of the 
Minister, has final decision-making power over what the iSimangaliso Authority and 
its CEO can or cannot do. The board itself is the only entity that has the final powers 
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to displace the CEO of the iSimangaliso Authority (on behalf of the Minister), if at 
any point it sees fit (Republic of South Africa, 1999; DEA1, 2017).  
The expectation of the iSimangaliso Authority Board is that the iSimangaliso 
Authority constantly engages with its counterparts (i.e. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife as 
well as the municipalities) as well as community members, and presents issues to the 
board that reflect what is happening on the ground so that the board may have an 
accurate understanding about what is happening at local level (DEA1, 2017). 
However, the findings of this study revealed that there was no mechanism enabling 
interaction between the iSimangaliso Board and the iSimangaliso Authority with 
other local level actors in order to facilitate downward accountability at the local 
level. This resulted in various complications that created confusion at local level, 
especially among community members who generally felt far removed from decision-
making processes.  
 
In practice, people in Kosi Bay generally regarded the CEO of the iSimangaliso 
Authority as the most powerful and influential actor in terms of determining what 
activities could take place within the iSimangaliso site (Figure 7.9). However, 
according to DEA, this was not the case (Figure, 7.7).  
 
It is apparent that there is a gap between the perceptions of community members 
about the powers of the iSimangaliso Authority and its CEO (including their role in 
decision-making processes), and the image that DEA has about who has key authority 
in the governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. The reasons these gaps 
were evident when the iSimangaliso Authority was presenting its Integrated 
Management Plan (IMP) for the period between 2017-2021 in Mbazwana town near 
Kosi Bay, in June 2016. The IMP is the key document that informs the governance of 
the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site and the implementation of governance 
strategies for every five-year period. 
 
During the presentation of the IMP, two key issues were identified. The first was that 
conflicts over stakeholder engagement issues were more pronounced than what DEA 
realized. Second, stakeholder engagement was not just an issue between the 
iSimangaliso Authority and communities, but was also a major concern between the 
iSimangaliso Authority and its counterparts, i.e. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, 
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Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality and other private tourism facility owners 
within the park. Although the iSimangaliso Authority is supposed to be working 
together with these actors, in reality, the relationship between the iSimangaliso 
Authority and these actors was poor because of tensions and power struggles between 
them. It appeared that the board and DEA were not aware of this reality because of 
indirect rule by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and her department (DEA).  
This was evidenced through the lack of mechanisms for monitoring the downward 
accountability of the iSimangaliso Authority by the minister (DEA1, 2017). 
 
For these and other reasons, the iSimangaliso Authority’s IMP meeting in Mbazwana 
ended up as a catastrophe before it even commenced, as local people protested 
against the meeting and disturbed it. Protesters included community members from 
Sodwana Bay and all the way up to Kosi Bay. One of the reasons for protests was the 
fact that community members from the affected areas had not been properly invited 
to the meeting. Very few community members were inside the venue of the IMP 
meeting when it was scheduled to begin. The iSimangaliso Authority had used an 
electronic platform to invite participants to the meeting, as well as to distribute the 
draft IMP document for people to review prior to the meeting date. This was 
surprising as areas within the Park are largely rural, and located in municipalities that 
are among the poorest in the country, with limited access to the Internet. 
Furthermore, the draft document was only published in English, when the majority of 
the people that reside in the area are Zulu-speaking and not proficient in English. The 
presentation of the IMP was through various banners displayed in the venue with no 
oral presentation, containing largely scientific information presented in English, 
making it difficult for lay local people to comprehend. Those who were inside the 
venue pointed this problem out at the start of the meeting. However, within a few 
moments, the meeting was disrupted by a large number of protesters outside the 
venue (who could not enter the venue because it could only hold very few people 
compared to the combined size of the affected communities).  
 
Protesters noted that they were tired of the ambiguous roles of the iSimangaliso 
Authority and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, and the manner in which the iSimangaliso 
Authority appeared to use the ambiguity to its own advantage. Protesters stated that 
the iSimangaliso Authority sent Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife officials to monitor and 
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disrupt livelihood activities of local people (i.e. crop farming) on a daily basis, and 
when the iSimangaliso Authority officials came to the communities once in a while, 
they pretended as if there was no relationship between themselves and Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife. This came up after a conservation official in an Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife uniform had, the previous day, held some women from Sodwana Bay at 
gunpoint after finding them harvesting crops in an area that they were told had been 
fenced off as part of the iSimangaliso Park (IMP meeting, 2016). Those women had 
been served with letters stating that they would be arrested if they were found in the 
area again. 
 
During the protest, community members asked the iSimangaliso Authorities who 
were present to revoke the letter, but the iSimangaliso officials stated that they did 
not have the power to do so. That was when community members became frustrated 
because they were under the impression that Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife worked 
together with the iSimangaliso Authority, which was proving not to be the case in 
practice. The leader of the protest ordered an iSimangaliso official, 
 
You must call all your friends [i.e. Ezemvelo] and bring them 
here so we can address all of you at the same time so that you 
will stop pointing fingers at each other when the other is not 
present. You must all come here together so that you can 
each account for your roles and actions. If we talk to you 
alone, it is dangerous for us! (IMP meeting, 2016). 
 
 
By that time, there were close to 200 protesters outside the meeting venue (Figure 
7.10). The official from the iSimangaliso Authority responded by stating that he was 
not aware of what had transpired because Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife did not 
necessarily consult them about their activities on a daily basis, even though the 
iSimangaliso IMP states that this should be the case.  
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Figure 7.10: Protesters at the iSimangaliso IMP meeting held at the Mbazwana Community 
Library in June 2016.	
 
	
Figure 7.11: A community leader from the Mbila Tribal Council with the letter of notice that 
had been issued to the women who were held at gunpoint by conservation officials.	
 
Although the crowd dispersed after five hours of arguments between local people and 
iSimangaliso officials (who had been held hostage by community members until some 
sort of resolution was achieved), the Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife officials that were 
contacted refused to come to the meeting. It was clear that although on paper 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife are the day-to-day compliance and enforcement managers on 
behalf of the iSimangaliso Authority (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011; 2016), there 
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were institutional disjunctures and power struggles between the two institutions. One 
of the officials from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife confirmed in an earlier interview,  
 
As Ezemvelo, we have currently been removed from the 
governance of the area, it has been left to iSimingaliso and 
it’s so confusing to people because what iSimangaliso is 
responsible for now is what we used to do before 
iSimangaliso was established…We do all the dirty work on 
the ground for iSimangaliso because where are they? For 
instance when there was an illegal camp built at kwaDapha, 
we were instructed by iSimangaliso to bulldoze it. The worst 
thing is that we are seen to local people as iSimangaliso when 
we are not because we do the dirty work and it is difficult for 
us to do anything about that. Moreover, when iSimangaliso 
Authority was established, they instructed us not to 
communicate with community members but we were the 
ones with some sort of relationship with community 
members in the first place (EKZNW1, 2015). 
 
Local and district municipalities (who are pivotal governance actors in the area) also 
had no representatives in the IMP meeting when it started. It was clear that the 
relationship between the iSimangaliso Authority and these actors was equally 
problematic. An official from the Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality confirmed 
this assertion (LM, 2015). Various white tourism business owners in Sodwana Bay 
who were present in the protest also confirmed that their businesses have suffered 
from the way the iSimangaliso Authority operates (TFO1, 2016). The presence of the 
iSimangaliso Authority in the midst of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, local and district 
municipalities, traditional councils as well as other government departments has 
created a lot of confusion and ambiguity at the local level. For instance, World 
Heritage Site jurisdiction that operated upon fortress conservation rules overlapped 
with the jurisdiction of democratic municipal structures whose roles were to enable 
rural development. This ambiguity not only made it difficult for community members 
to comprehend the governance system, but also for other actors on the ground who 
were usually excluded from key decision-making processes facilitated by the 
iSimangaliso Authority. An official from the Umhlabuyalingana Local Municipality 
confirmed,  
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…We have no control over iSimangaliso, there are so many 
things that they do that we have no control over and that is a 
problem…iSimangaliso Authority restricts a lot of our 
activities as they govern most of the land within the 
Umhlabuyalingana Spatial Development Framework and they 
impose too many restrictions …in terms of governance. I think 
iSimangaliso holds most power in determining what 
governance looks like in this area. They don’t involve us in 
decisions and this is mostly because the law enables them a lot, 
and there is nothing we can do about that (LM, 2015). 
 
Moreover, the persisting power struggles between the iSimangaliso Authority and 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife also exacerbated asymmetries in the governance of the 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. This affected governance practices and increased 
confusion at local level. Hence an official from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife asserted, 
 
There is still confusion among people about the difference 
between Ezemvelo and iSimangaliso, it makes people 
confused. I also don’t understand how iSimangaliso and 
Ezemvelo work sometimes, it’s difficult and complex to 
understand…when iSimangaliso Authority was established, 
they instructed us not to communicate with community 
members but we were the ones with some sort of relationship 
with community members in the first place (EKZNW1, 
2015).   
 
Another reason for power imbalances in the governance of resources in Kosi Bay was 
the prevalence of legal pluralism at the local level that led to the ambiguity of roles of 
traditional authorities, customary institutions and conservation institutions. The 
existence of traditional authorities alongside the iSimangaliso Authority, 
democratically elected representatives and customary institutions proved to be 
problematic in governance processes in Kosi Bay.  
 
It became apparent that members of the traditional authority were “double-dipping” 
between traditional and statutory roles. For instance, community members were not 
aware that their traditional leader was a member of the iSimangaliso Authority Board 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2012). Although the iSimangaliso Authority 2012 Annual 
Report lists the Kosi Bay leader as a non-executive board member (i.e. now former 
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member) of the iSimangaliso Authority, the community only gained knowledge of 
this when they read of it in a front-page article of the local newspaper Maputaland 
Mirror (February, 2013). This was an article about the local men from kwaDapha 
who had partnered with an outside investor to build a tourism facility in the village 
that was later demolished by the iSimangaliso Authority. Upon hearing the news, 
community members were confused about why the traditional leader had not 
protected the community member in question. According to the article; the traditional 
leader had initially supported the construction of the facility, and later denied 
allegations that he had been on the board (Maputaland Mirror, February 2013). Local 
people expressed that they felt that the traditional leader was selling them out by 
agreeing to be a member of the board. This was seen as a conflict of interest because 
local people perceived the administrative roles of the traditional leader to be separate 
from those of the iSimangaliso Authority.  
 
Maneuvering around the ambiguities of roles and relations of traditional authorities in 
Kosi Bay was not a new experience for local people. They asserted that even in 
historical periods, the traditional authorities acted both as government actors and as 
traditional leaders of the community – supporting the community on one hand when it 
suited them, while allying with the government or conservation authorities on the 
other – depending on what was convenient for them at a given time. For instance, 
people recalled that one of the traditional leaders participated with Nature in forcibly 
moving them from their land where they conducted agricultural activities in the 1980s 
(FFG, 2015; MFG, 2015). When the local people complained to the traditional 
authority about forced removals, the traditional leader told them that those who did 
not want to move would have to fend for themselves because he could not protect 
them. People recalled that the traditional leader even wore the Nature uniform and 
went house-to-house assisting conservation officials to forcibly move people from 
their land (MFG, 2015).  
 
The establishment of nature conservation interventions in Maputaland intensified 
tensions between the two houses of traditional authorities in Kosi Bay (Mthethwa, 
2002).  This worsened when Maputaland was awarded UNESCO World Heritage Site 
status as the democratic government, together with the Tembe traditional leaders from 
the Ngwanase house, had identified the area’s potential for eco-tourism that was seen 
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as a tool for creating economic development for the area (Mthethwa, 2002; 
iSimangaliso, 2011). By the late 1990s, there were approximately 17, 000 tourists that 
visited the Kosi lake (Mthethwa, 2002). The eco-tourism boom in the area attracted 
investments from outsiders who saw economic opportunities in the tourism potential 
of the area.  
 
This increase of tourism activity in the coastal parts of Kosi Bay contributed to the 
intensified squabble between the two houses of the Tembe authorities, and the 
accounts of these conflicts were not usually debated because they were neglected in 
colonial records, South African historiography, as well as by the democratic 
government (Mthethwa, 2002). They were also a forbidden topic of discussion in 
most of the villages in Kosi Bay, as observed during the time spent in the community. 
Various people in the area mentioned that they discussed the conflict between the 
houses of the traditional authorities privately. 
 
Ironically, the leader of the Tembe traditional authority from the Ngwanase house 
denied that there was any conflict between the two houses, insisting that the two 
houses have always worked well together (TTC1, 2015). On the contrary, the current 
leader of the Makhuza house admitted that there was a conflict between the two 
houses that has existed for decades, if not centuries. The leader of the Makhuza house 
also claimed that the house of Ngwanase mostly operates secretively, and hides 
certain things from him, and that this affects the livelihoods of local people because 
they can never really know what their chief is up to (MOH6, 2015).  
 
In the 2014 Annual Report of the iSimangaliso Authority, the traditional leader from 
the Ngwanase house who used to be a member of the board was no longer listed as a 
board member of iSimangaliso (iSimangaliso Authority, 2014). The issues attached to 
traditional leader roles in conservation raised even more ambiguity when a key 
informant interview was conducted with the traditional leader from the paramount 
house, Ngwanase, who denied any allegiance to the iSimangaliso Authority and 
stated:  
 
iSimangaliso needs to do proper consultation and not dictate 
decisions to us. If we say we want a beach development, they 
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must be willing to give us what we want and not prescribe 
options for us. Conservation should be able to enable 
livelihoods of local people and consultation is important for 
this goal to be achieved (TTC1, 2015).  
 
This statement was collected after the traditional leader stated that he was no longer 
part of the iSimangaliso Board, and it was not clear how, when and why the 
relationship between him and the iSimangaliso Authority had changed (i.e. if it did). 
On the other hand, a member of the Tembe Tribal Council from the Makhuza side 
stated that he believed that members of the Tribal Council from the Ngwanase house 
still have strong ties with the iSimangaliso Authority because they usually have 
private engagements where other members of the Tribal Council are excluded (OH16, 
2015). It was beyond the scope of this study to trace the extent to which these 
allegations were true. However, what was clear was that there remains much 
ambiguity and lack of accountability about the Tribal Council’s relationship with 
conservation authorities in Kosi Bay. 
 
People from Mvutshane believed that in order for the livelihoods of people in Kosi 
Bay to improve, decision-making processes needed to change and be more bottom-up. 
They stated that they wished to get rid of all conservation authorities in the area, 
especially if they won the pending land claim (MFG, 2015). They also expressed that 
they did not feel the traditional authorities represented their interests, and that they 
would therefore prefer the governance of coastal resources to be vested in the hands 
of customary institutions, as they were considered more representative (MFG, 2015). 
Figure 7.12 depicts how people in Mvutshane perceived that governance 
arrangements would change if the pending Tembe land claim were settled. 
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Perception that the TA and iSimangaliso Authority and 
traditional authorities are intertwined and do everything 
together. People perceived that they inform government that 
everything is going well; and the government does not know 
exactly what is happening on the ground. People believe that 
the government makes the law, throws them to the TA and 
iSimangaliso; but the two do their own thing on the ground. 
They also felt that the people on the ground and their 
customary rules have no power.   
People asserted that they want to run everything themselves 
because the land and the coast is theirs. People want more 
tourism developments. They asserted that the TA and Nature 
should work under the direction of the people and the 
government should hear from the people and the TA. People 
felt that Nature should work for local people and manage the 
environment under their direction and iSimangaliso must be 
out of the picture completely, with no powers.  
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Figure 7.12: A Venn diagram depicting how people from Mvutshane perceived governance 
arrangements affecting their livelihood strategies to look like, and what their image of 
governance is for the future if the land claim were to be settled (source: Philile Mbatha). 
 
Figure 7.12 depicts that people believed that the iSimangaliso Authority, the 
traditional authorities (TA) and national government are major actors driving 
governance processes. However, local people perceived that if the land claim were to 
be settled, governance arrangements would change in order to allow for villagers to 
be the primary drivers of governance processes, and actors such as the 
iSimangalisoAuthority or Nature would have very minimal or no involvement in 
governance processes (MFG, 2015). According to people in Mvutshane, this would 
result in improved livelihoods at the local level.  
 
Clearly, there is a gap between policy and practice in the management and 
governance processes within the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. It is also apparent 
that certain actors and networks have significant power in driving decision-making 
processes. This is a critical issue given that the iSimangaliso Board, DEA and the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs relied on the iSimangaliso Authority’s IMP to 
make decisions pertaining to the governance of the World Heritage Site, whereas 
various local level actors have been excluded from decision-making processes, and 
there has been no downward accountability. This is an issue that is further discussed 
in Chapter Eight.  
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter sought to outline key processes and practices pertaining to coastal 
governance in Kosi Bay that have, over time, played a role in influencing and shifting 
livelihood strategies of community members, particularly in the fisheries, tourism and 
agriculture sectors. The manner in which policy processes and practices, as well 
institutional arrangements have impacted the livelihoods of local people since 1948 
was outlined. It is apparent from the analysis provided in this chapter that the 
dominant discourses and images driving governance processes in iSimangaliso 
communicated poorly with actors at the local level, including wider communities. The 
chapter also reveals that there is more upward accountability than downward 
accountability in terms of how the iSimangaliso Authority governs the World 
Heritage Site. Due to this, there is a gap between stated policy objectives and the lived 
realities of the people on the ground. This gap is widened by the fact that the 
institutional design that drives fortress conservation within iSimangaliso from the 
international level to the local level does not allow much room for livelihood 
considerations to be a focus of governance practices within the iSimangaliso site. 
Mechanisms to ensure effective interaction between higher-level governance actors 
and communities are not in place because of the lack of representation of 
communities in decision-making platforms. What was apparent was the general 
perception from the wider community in Kosi Bay that the iSimangaliso Authority, 
together with other actors with decision-making powers, had discretionary powers to 
impose rules that did not reflect the human rights aspirations and principles of 
democracy enshrined in Constitution of South Africa. Chapter Eight will discuss these 
key emerging themes further, as well as link them to broader debates in the literature 
related to linkages between governance and livelihoods. 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION	
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The sustainability of livelihood strategies that the rural poor have developed over the 
years largely depends on the nature of governance systems, institutions and policies 
that exist within rural communities (Agrawal and Perrin, 2008). Enhancing 
understanding of the conceptual links between livelihoods and governance debates are 
therefore needed in order to elucidate understanding about how different forms of 
natural resource governance produce different outcomes for livelihoods and wellbeing 
in rural areas (Scoones, 2009; Brockington and Wilkie, 2015). This is pertinent for 
situations of legal pluralism where the quality of relations between different legal 
systems may affect the governability of the whole system (Jentoft and Bavinck, 
2014). Hence, a legal pluralism perspective was a useful lens in this study in the 
analysis of the different ways in which incoherencies in governance processes and 
practices negatively affected and marginalised rural communities in the Kosi Bay 
study area.  
 
Looking at the Kosi Bay case from a legal pluralism perspective enables one to   
interrogate why incoherencies and conflicts emerge, and within the context of coastal 
resource governance it reveals how plural situations manifest and how different actors 
manipulate the multiple contexts that they operate in (Gupta and Bavinck, 2014). 
However, thinking to date has not had a strong focus on gaps in governance or on 
enhancing knowledge that could improve sustainability. Moreover, legal pluralism 
literature has not yet effectively contributed towards making sound governance 
recommendations, or developed diagnostic tools for analysing governance 
interactions (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). Results from this study clearly show that 
legal pluralism directly affects governance. In the case of Kosi Bay, legal pluralism 
has created more challenges than opportunities, which has had consequences for 
coastal resource governance and rural livelihoods. 
 
This discussion highlights the nature of governance in influencing livelihood 
strategies in legally pluralistic contexts. In order to guide this discussion, interactive 
governance theory’s orders of governance (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009; Jentoft and 
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Bavinck, 2014) are used as a conceptual framework to explore findings and to 
highlight key issues that have implications for livelihoods, governance and 
governability.  
 
8.2 PLURAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN KOSI BAY: THE 
NORMATIVE VIEW VS. REALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This chapter draws on interactive governance theory’s orders of governance to discuss 
issues pertaining to governability, and the manner in which governance in the context 
of legal pluralism affected the livelihoods of people in Kosi Bay. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, orders of governance may include first order, second order and third 
order or meta-governance (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009; Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). 
First order governance refers to the day-to-day affairs that actors engage in. Second 
order governance is concerned with the design of institutional arrangements such as 
rules, laws and norms that are used to address first order governing. The norms, 
values, images and principles driving governance systems and approaches arereferred 
to as meta-governance or third order governance. 
 
In terms of interactive governance theory, the normative view is that the greater the 
recognition of differences across governance systems at different orders of 
governance, as well as efforts to align and accommodate differences – the better the 
quality of governance or governability (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009; Jentoft and 
Bavinck, 2014). Drawing on this conceptual framework, Figure 8.1 depicts a 
normative view of governance (modified from Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014) for Kosi 
Bay; involving statutory, traditional and customary systems. Figure 8.1 also depicts 
the relationships or interactions across the governance systems, which may be 
characterised by symmetry or asymmetry. Symmetry can be understood as coherence 
and compatibility between governance systems, which usually reduces conflict and 
increases opportunities for harmonisation and cooperation between governance 
systems (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). Asymmetry is therefore the opposite of 
symmetry, although Jentoft and Bavinck (2014) posit that the absence of symmetry 
does not always result in asymmetry.  
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Figure 8.1:  A normative view of interactive governance in Kosi Bay (adapted from Jentoft 
and Bavinck, 2014). 
 
In the case of Kosi Bay, the statutory conservation governance system is clearly 
dominant, and there is poor recognition of the existence of parallel customary and 
traditional governance systems, especially at meta- and second orders of governance. 
Customary governance systems and institutions remain marginalised, as they operate 
at community level and are usually left out of key decision-making processes between 
the iSimangaliso Authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife and traditional authorities. 
Although these customary governance systems still continue to inform historical 
livelihoods such as fishing at the local level, they are stifled by the dominance of 
statutory systems in terms of influencing livelihood strategies. This has resulted in 
high levels of asymmetry which are exacerbated by the fact that in the democratic 
dispensation, national government has failed to clarify the roles of multiple 
governance actors in rural areas (Ntsebeza, 2002).  
 
Figure 8.2 depicts the complex and asymmetric reality of governance processes and 
practices pertaining to the Kosi Bay study site. These are largely due to the 
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dominance of statutory systems, the ambiguous roles of traditional authorities and 
poor recognition of customary systems in governance.  
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Figure 8.2:  The reality of asymmetries between governance systems in Kosi Bay (source: 
Philile Mbatha). 
 
The poor evidence for the consideration for the prevailing legal pluralist system by 
key actors involved in decision-making processes, as well as the prevailing remnants 
of colonial and apartheid histories in Kosi Bay, affected community livelihood 
strategies. The main statutory conservation structure underpinned by the iSimangaliso 
Board and iSimangaliso Authority, and associated policies and plans have had a 
significant influence on livelihood strategies and outcomes. Simultaneously, the 
powers of traditional authorities are couched within statutory and customary legal 
systems, enabling them to “double-dip” from recognition in both systems. Customary 
systems and practices founded on historical norms and knowledge have had little 
power in the current governance processes and practices in Kosi Bay (Figure 8.2). 
Thishas resulted in power imbalances, conflict, lack of participation, lack of 
representation, poor downward accountability, confusion and ambiguity; especially at 
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the local level. These factors have directly and indirectly affected people in the 
community, especially in terms of fishing, agricultural, and tourism livelihoods, and 
land tenure security.  
 
The following sections provide a discussion of these themes, based on the different 
governance orders from which they emerge. 
 
8.3 THE META-LEVEL: NORMS, VALUES, DISCOURSES, IMAGES AND 
WORLDVIEWS UNDERPINNING GOVERNANCE 
 
Meta-level governance is significant because it underpins governance institutions, 
processes and practices shape how decisions are made within them. Kooiman (2003: 
170) compares meta-level governing to “an imaginary governor” possessing 
predefined values, images and principles, “teleported to a point ‘outside’ and holding 
the whole governance experience against a normative light”. This is pertinent because 
of influences of global natural resource governance discourses and principles devised 
in the Global North, on environmental governance policies and practices developed 
and implemented in Global South. As an increasing body of literature reveals, these 
discourses are usually not suitable for use in the contexts into which they are 
parachuted (Agrawal, 2005; Benjaminsen and Overa, 2011; Balboa, 2013).  
 
In the context of natural resource protection and the creation of protected 
environments, a question that arises is of whose ideas of “value” are used to 
determine what should be protected and how. Brockington and Wilkie (2015), for 
instance, point out that some protected area managers claim to protect nature from 
human interference by “rewilding” landscapes, yet the very methods they use to 
“conserve” are very unnatural. Examples of this include suppressing fire or removing 
predators from protected areas, all of which are anthropogenic efforts that contradict 
the very essence of what “wilderness” areas are supposed to resemble (Brockington 
and Wilkie, 2015).  
 
One can argue that it is significant to question the worldviews that are used to inform 
what kind of “nature” protected areas are created to conserve, including the politics of 
conservation, land issues and well as the impacts of these interventions on 
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livelihoods. The manner through which certain images become hegemonic, and the 
reasons for that, need careful scrutiny (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). This is pertinent 
because protected areas have been often founded upon histories of forced removals 
and exclusions of indigenous people and rural communities by conservation 
authorities (Brockington and Wilkie, 2015). In the southern African context, protected 
areas have, since the colonial era, been used by influential actors and governments as 
tools for amassing political power (Spierenburg and Wels, 2006). Hence, protected 
areas tend to create winners and losers, as well as threaten the livelihoods and rights 
of rural and marginalised people residing within and adjacent to them (Brockington 
and Wilkie, 2015).  
 
As this thesis reveals, dominant discourses and worldviews that informed the 
establishment of the Isimangaliso World Heritage area did not necessarily represent 
customary worldviews and practices in Kosi Bay, as they were seemingly driven by 
international actors such as UNESCO and the IUCN. It is unclear whether UNESCO 
was aware of the socio-economic and political challenges created by establishment of 
the site, and the negative livelihood impacts that ensued. Ongoing debates in Kosi 
Bay have centred on whether the community was effectively consulted about the 
declaration of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and evidence of these 
engagements, with 95% of respondents stating that they were not consulted. 
 
Given the historical context of South Africa, one could argue whether interventions 
such as world heritage sites in rural areas are appropriate, especially with the 
country’s conservation history of forced removals, land dispossession and exclusion 
of black communities from natural resource use (Sunde and Isaacs, 2008; Nustad, 
2015). In rural areas such as Kosi Bay, history has played a significant role in terms 
of informing and entrenching governance processes that continue to exclude local 
people from natural resource use and access. Due to spatial and social engineering by 
the colonial and apartheid governments, Kosi Bay and the wider Maputaland area 
(which was once one of the wealthier places in Southern Africa in pre-colonial times 
especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth century when trading was at its peak), 
paradoxically became one of the poorest areas in the region due to policies that aimed 
to produce underdevelopment (Webster, 1991).  
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For instance, in 1972, the KwaZulu homeland government was imposed on 
Maputaland by the apartheid government, and the people of Maputaland were 
recruited into the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)23 (Webster, 1991).  In the latter half of 
the 1970s, the KwaZulu government went on to establish the KwaZulu Bureau of 
Nature Conservation (KBNC), which became the conservation enforcement agency in 
the region (Mthethwa, 2002). This agency worked with traditional authorities to 
enforce conservation in the area, and ordered the forced removals of local people 
from their homes in the 1980s (Mthethwa, 2002). This was not considered favourably 
by the local people, as it alienated them from their land and resources (Mthethwa, 
2002; MOH5; MOH7; MFG).  
The dilution of Maputaland and its people into the KwaZulu homeland also resulted 
in the overpowering and dilution of Maputa culture and customs by the Zulu influence 
(Mthethwa, 2002). This was affirmed through the research; Zulu was the dominant 
language spoken in the area, and various people indicated that they identified more 
with Zulu than Thonga culture, even though admitting they were of Thonga descent. 
Governance interventions such as the proclamation of the Kosi Bay Coastal Forest 
Reserve in 1952, as well as the establishment of the Maputaland Marine Reserve, 
have all contributed to the progressive marginalisation and alienation of local people 
from natural resources.  
The declaration of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site in 2000 could only but 
further entrench the marginalisation of local people from natural resource use (Guyot, 
2005; Hansen, 2013, Sunde, 2013). It is not clear how contextual factors linked to the 
country’s discriminatory history were considered when the South African government 
became signatory to and ratified the World Heritage Convention. What is also unclear 
is how “outstanding universal value” within iSimangaliso is defined, and by whom, 
given the uneven history of the area and mismatching images about conservation. 
Ramutsindela (2008) points out that in developing countries, conservation governance 
and the establishment of conservation institutions do not occur in a vacuum, but are 
influenced by socio-economic, historical and political conditions (Ramutsindela, 
2008). Political power has been central in shaping types of conservation interventions 
and where they occur (Igoe and Brockington, 2008; Ramutsindela, 2008; Nustad, 
																																																								
23A political party of South Africa.  
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2015). In the case of iSimangaliso, opening governance to the international 
community by ratifying the World Heritage Convention meant that organisations such 
as UNESCO that act on behalf of the “international community” gained power to 
dictate what “outstanding universal value” means for sites listed under the 
Convention, despite local context and applicability. A DEA representative confirmed, 
 
European countries still have a major influence in UNESCO 
because they have money and money talks. Sometimes they can 
even threaten to withdraw funding they are providing to African 
countries if certain standards are not being met. If you remember, 
most natural sites are in Africa and most are listed by UNESCO 
as “in danger” because we want to develop. European countries 
don’t have the same dilemma because their sites are mostly 
cultural and not threatened by activities such as tourism, plus they 
are already developed countries. Therefore, we as African 
countries are still trying to influence the discourses and 
conceptualisations of what “outstanding universal value’ actually 
means in our contexts, especially because we were not there in 
1972 when the Convention was signed (DEA1, 2017). 
Less powerful states such as South Africa have typically subscribed to internationally 
conceived environmental governance discourses and strategies promoted by powerful 
countries. These may be relevant to Global North contexts, but cannot necessarily be 
fashioned into Global South contexts, where issues like poverty and livelihood 
insecurity are usually pressing concerns (Agrawal, 2003; Agrawal, 2005; Fletcher, 
2009). For instance, the governance framework provided by the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention is based on normative values, principles, images and discourses 
about global sustainability and conservation, i.e. the conservation of “outstanding 
universal value”. The danger in developing governance regimes for national 
conservation based on global normative discourses, values, principles and images in a 
country that has a deep history of marginalisation and dispossession, is that such 
normative frameworks are abstract, which therefore means that it is difficult to 
implement them effectively. Hence, Song et al. (2013) assert that since images are not 
capable of achieving deep insights, they are considered as incomplete, biased and 
sometimes misleading (Song et al., 2013). 
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As Agrawal and Redford (2006) affirm, promotion of the “conservation through 
tourism” discourse by UNESCO is a further indication of how actors who do not 
understand livelihood realities on the ground tend to oversimplify the relationship 
between livelihoods and the environment. Wide assumptions are made that 
communities only care about conserving resources if they can yield financial benefits 
from activities such as tourism. Livelihoods analyses conducted in this study reveal 
the significance of customary livelihoods, predating statutory interventions and 
demonstrating that this notion is questionable. Indeed, natural resources contribute to 
rural livelihoods in various ways, other than through providing economic benefits. 
 
The next section highlights asymmetries in second order governance in Kosi Bay that 
emerged as a result of ambiguities and incoherence across the different governance 
systems. 
8.4 THE SECOND ORDER OF GOVERNANCE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
PLURAL AND MULTI-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS 
 
An increasing amount of literature has attempted to explain how the design of plural 
institutions governing natural resources influences the ability of resource users to 
devise livelihood strategies, as well as governance outcomes (Ostrom, 1990; Cox et 
al., 2010; Cinner et al., 2012). In Kosi Bay there were greater levels of upward 
accountability, as opposed to downward accountability of governance institutions, 
poor levels of coordination among governance institutions, and high levels of 
perceived ambiguity in terms of roles and jurisdictions of key institutions involved in 
the governance system. 
 
This institutional plurality resulted in weak and confusing interactions and relations 
between actors and legal systems at different levels. This in turn led to the exclusion 
of communities from decision-making processes.  
 
Although DEA are seemingly aware of these concerns, they still believed that the 
iSimangaliso Authority was the best world heritage management authority in the 
whole country (DEA1, 2017).  
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Despite the fact that iSimangaliso Authority has stakeholder 
engagement issues, it is still the best site in terms of management. 
They are still the only site that has programs benefiting 
communities. You might say, there are communities that are not 
benefiting and so on, but that is not a major issue because they 
give bursaries to community members and they have programs for 
skills development and Small, Medium and Micro-sized 
Enterprises (SMMEs) that benefit community members that have 
been trained by iSimangaliso (DEA1, 2017).  
 
This suggests that where livelihoods analyses are absent in the assessment of plural 
natural resource governance arrangements, it is difficult for actors operating remotely 
(i.e. DEA officials) to have an accurate understanding of the impacts on local 
livelihoods, i.e. in the Kosi Bay case within the world heritage site. This points to the 
fact that multi-level institutions tend to result in poor coordination and blurred 
accountability (Poteete, 2012).  
 
It is typical in multi-level institutions for coordination problems to arise when 
institutions involved in governing resources fail to acknowledge one another and thus 
take decisions that have conflicting outcomes. Pluralism tends to exacerbate 
uncertainty, and “in many countries, state laws are largely unknown in villages, and 
sometimes when new laws are promulgated, not only villagers but also government 
officials at the district or village levels are ignorant of the new laws”(Meinzen-Dick 
and Pradhan, 2002:13).  
 
In the governance of coastal resources in Kosi Bay, the ambiguities created by the 
plural institutions and institutional arrangements enabled the iSimangaliso Authority 
to find ways of ignoring, and sometimes shifting accountability for community 
grievances to other actors, who did not have much influence in decision-making 
processes. Lund (2006:700) asserts that the “plurality of institutions may open 
alternative avenues for some – also for poorer people – but the more affluent, the 
better connected, and the more knowledgeable tend to have the upper hand in such 
contexts”. 
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The following sub-sections provide more detail about the issues arising in second 
order governance as a result of lack of accountability, lack of participation, lack of 
representation, as well as ambiguities in governance actor roles.  
8.4.1 Asymmteries in statutory governance actor roles, as well as lack of 
accountability, participation and representation 
 
The accountability of institutions, both at central and local levels, is crucial for 
effective decentralisation and the establishment of robust local institutional 
arrangements (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ostrom, 2005). 
Johnson (2001) points out that democratic decentralisation in rural areas is essential in 
achieving enhanced accountability and empowerment of poor people. The degree to 
which decision makers involve communities in deciding how resources are used, 
accessed and governed determines the power relations between institutions and 
resource users (McDermott, 2009).  
Sowman (2015) points out that in South Africa, the nature of interactions between 
government actors (i.e. conservation authorities) and communities is usually 
characterised by conflict resulting from poor downward participation, and a lack of 
accountability and transparency by powerful actors. The findings of this study suggest 
that in the case of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, the lack of downward 
accountability is largely attributable to the fact that national government (DEA) 
persistently operated through a system of indirect rule in the iSimangaliso World 
Heritage Site, i.e. via the iSimangaliso Authority. A similar pattern of rule was used 
in colonial and apartheid times when chiefs had discretionary powers in Maputaland, 
due to indirect rule by apartheid and colonial governments. The success of both 
colonial and apartheid policies in rural areas was therefore dependent on chiefs and 
headmen, which is what made the system of indirect rule work in favour of 
governments and chiefs, and against the desires of rural communities (Mthethwa, 
2002).  
Post-colonial systems of rule are largely modeled and transferred from the 
authoritarianism of colonial states (Young, 1994). In the context of this study, it is 
argued that this notion held true as the Minister of Environmental Affairs who is 
responsible for managing world heritage sites in South Africa, does so remotely 
through structures such as the iSimangaliso Authority. This resulted in the 
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iSimangaliso Authority using indirect rule for its own ends by promoting certain 
images of governance that DEA officials were not entirely aware of. This was 
confirmed when a DEA official stated that they were not aware that the iSimangaliso 
Authority prohibited historical livelihoods such as agriculture within the world 
heritage site (DEA1, 2017). The DEA officials stated that this was not the intention of 
the World Heritage Convention Act, and asserted, 
 
It’s not as if when you declare a world heritage site you have to 
have strict conditions on local people. That is not the case. Most 
authorities like to use world heritage status as a deterrent for 
development because they don’t want any development to happen, 
and then they use world heritage site status as an excuse for 
preventing it. Some of these conservationists are extreme; they 
don’t want any development in conservation areas. But it’s not 
like people in communities don’t know about conservation, they 
have lived in these areas for a long time. They are the ones who 
used to protect and look after the environment and coexisted with 
the resources for many years before they were fenced off. It’s not 
that they don’t know about conservation, they know, but now the 
circumstances are such that they are removed from it while at the 
same time they need to put food on the table (DEA1, 2017). 
 
In scenarios where governing orders are incoherent, and where institutions are not 
nested, there is likely to be less cooperation and more conflict (Jentoft and Bavinck, 
2014). Guyot (2005), Sunde (2013), Hansen et al. (2014) and Nustad (2015) all 
highlight the existing conflicts surrounding the constructions of nature conservation 
and the local realities of communities within the iSimangaliso site. Accountability 
within multi-level institutions in the context of legal pluralism can be reduced where 
it is not clear for people on the ground which institution is responsible for what. This 
institutional plurality not only minimizes accountability, but exacerbates power 
struggles between governance actors at a local level who fail to work together 
cohesively. This was observed when communities within the iSimangaliso World 
Heritage Site protested at the integrated management plan (IMP) meeting for 2017-
2021. People were weary of the ambiguous roles between the iSimangaliso Authority 
and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, and the manner in which the iSimangaliso Authority 
appeared to use this ambiguity to its own advantage.  
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There were also ambiguitiesin decision-making powers between the iSimangaliso 
Authority and DEA officials. This had implications for accountability, exacerbated by 
the fact that DEA officials were not able to police the governance processes of the 
iSimangaliso Authority because DEA officials operate centrally, and have poor 
understanding about governance practices implemented by its counterpart at local 
level. This was a problem not just in terms of a lack of downward accountability, but 
also with a lack of procedures for communication and deliberation amongst the 
multiple relevant governance actors and institutions. 
 
The other problematic issue was the fact that community members in Maputaland 
were not represented in key decision-making structures relevant to the world heritage 
site, and there was no designated platform for community voices to be heard. 
According to the DEA official, if communities are unhappy with any aspect of 
governance, they could write directly to UNESCO about their complaints, and these 
would be taken down to DEA, who would then try to resolve those problems (DEA1, 
2017). This highlights the fact that there is no space for communities to raise their 
concerns at national and local levels. The institutional design mostly enabled upward 
accountability of powerful actors, as well as centralised decision-making. This is 
problematic because the principles of fair participation and representation are 
enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa and embedded within various 
environmental laws of the country which promote representation, participatory 
democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement in decision-making 
processes (Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
 
For instance, Section 12 of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
World Heritage Convention (UNESCO, 2015:12) requires that:  
 
State Parties to the Convention are encouraged to ensure the 
participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, including site 
managers, local and regional governments, local communities, 
non-governmental organisations and other interested parties and 
partners in the identification, nomination and protection of World 
Heritage properties. 
 
The Operational Guidelines further state that local communities and indigenous 
peoples are considered partners in the conservation and protection of world heritage 
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and they must be involved in the management and conservation of the sites 
(UNESCO, 2015).  
 
Section 13 of the World Heritage Convention Act (Republic of South Africa, 
1999:10) also states that world heritage authorities appointed by the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs have a duty to “liaise with, and be sensitive to, the needs of 
communities living in or near world heritage sites”. Section 14 of the Act goes on to 
state that the minister must make sure that board entities of world heritage sites are 
“broadly representative and multidisciplinary, with members who may make a 
contribution towards the proper functioning of the Authority, and may include, 
without limitation, representatives from…directly affected adjacent communities…” 
(Republic of South Africa, 1999:10). The Act also stipulates that the IMP of each 
world heritage authority must be developed in consultation with “surrounding 
communities on, or communities adjacent to, the World Heritage Site” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1999:13).  
 
Although these policy and legal provisions distinctly highlight that institutional 
arrangements should be in place for communities to be effectively involved in the 
governance of world heritage sites, the contrary proved true for Kosi Bay. The 
ongoing negative perceptions at community level were largely linked to the fact that 
decision-making structures, such as the iSimangaliso Board, contained little or no 
community representation or participation.  
 
The existence of the iSimangaliso Board as a key decision-making institution raises 
two critical issues that have implications for the legitimacy and accountability of the 
governance system, and for local livelihoods. The first is that, according to the World 
Heritage Convention Act (No. 49 of 1999), wider community members, land 
claimants and traditional authorities may be represented on the board of a world 
heritage site. In fact, one could assume that the iSimangaliso Board provided 
representation for communities whose livelihoods were affected. However, this is not 
the case. The board is made up of members from different organisations, including the 
DEA. Board member positions are appointed and remunerated solely by the minister 
(DEA1, 2017). The iSimangaliso Board members were appointed according to the 
experience and skills of the individuals, and could be any citizen of South Africa. A 
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DEA representative confirmed that participation within the board is not meant to 
provide affected communities with representation, as board members are selected at 
the discretion of the minister, based on their qualifications and competencies (DEA1, 
2017). “Most board members come from different areas and do not even have a clue 
about how communities work and what communities want and don’t want and so on” 
(DEA1, 2017). This raises questions about the quality of governance interactions, 
governance, as well as the nature of decision-making processes for the iSimangaliso 
site.  
 
The second issue is that iSimangaliso Board meets once per quarter, and bases its 
knowledge on the IMP, which is put together by the iSimangaliso Authority. It is 
argued here that this institutional setup is exclusive and not representative of 
community voices because the iSimangaliso Board, and therefore the DEA and the 
minister, base their knowledge about what is happening within the site on prima facie 
evidence provided by the iSimangaliso Authority. There is no mechanism in place to 
verify whether the iSimangaliso Authority effectively consults with and/or integrates 
the views of stakeholders, such as communities within and near the site, in decision 
making about what the IMP should comprise. This was discovered when a board 
member confirmed that the board receives its information about what is happening on 
the ground from the CEO of the iSimangaliso Authority only, and it is up to the CEO 
and the operational staff to ensure that they effectively engage with communities - as 
is the expectation of the board (DEA1, 2017).  
 
It is apparent that communities within Kosi Bay have poor representation and 
participation in the governance structures concerning the iSimangaliso site. 
Simultaneously, the Minister of Environmental Affairs and the iSimangaliso Board 
remotely govern the actions of the iSimangaliso Authority. These are arguably the 
loopholes in governance and the root of most issues pertaining to the lack of 
accountability and exclusion of local people in the governance of the site. This 
confirms that, just like chiefs in the colonial and apartheid eras, the iSimangaliso 
Authority continues to hold discretionary powers with regards to governance 
practices. One could argue that such loopholes enable institutions such the 
iSimangaliso Authority to ignore the need to be downwardly accountable to 
stakeholders on the ground. 
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These issues are further exacerbated by the fact that it is the iSimangaliso Board, and 
not communities or actors on the ground, which has the power to remove the 
iSimangaliso Authority if it is not performing its duties appropriately. Larson and 
Ribot (2004:11) thus argue “leaders who cannot be selected – or removed – by 
constituents have only limited downward accountability”. Agrawal and Ribot (2003) 
confirm this assertion by providing an example from the Senegalese forestry sector 
where rural councils that received powers to distribute benefits to local people from 
government, were selected by government and not elected by community members. 
As a result, villagers often felt that the rural councils did not represent community 
needs. Moreover, those councils were not accountable to the local people since there 
were no formal mechanisms put in place by government to allow for this. The same 
pattern applied in the governance of the iSimangaliso site, as members of the 
iSimangaliso Board are remotely selected at the Minister of Environmental Affairs’ 
discretion, without any form of representation or inclusion of wider community 
members in decisions pertaining to the selection of board members, or in decisions 
pertaining to the governance of iSimangaliso.  
8.4.2 The ambiguous roles of traditional authorities  
 
In colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa, customary practices were weakened by 
laws that transferred powers to traditional authorities who were seen as more militant 
and effective agents of ruling indigenous communities (Cordell, 1991). In 
communities such as Kosi Bay, customary institutions involved in governing coastal 
resources are distinct from traditional institutions and operate on a more democratic 
and downwardly accountable fashion. However, the authority of traditional 
institutions usually overrides the authority of customary institutions (Ntsebeza, 2006; 
Delius, 2008).  
 
This study has highlighted the questionability of traditional authority roles and the 
marginalization of customary institutions in Kosi Bay. For instance, in Kosi Bay, one 
of the prime members of the tribal council was also the chairperson of the 
Umhlosinga Development Agency established by the Umkhanyakude District 
Municipality, aimed at promoting agribusiness and tourism within the district 
(UMDA, 2014). It is unclear and questionable how a member of the traditional 
	
207	
	
authority (which is a hereditary institution) could also be a member of a democratic 
statutory institution; especially given that traditional and democratic institutions in 
rural South Africa operate parallel to each other and are usually in conflict, as they 
draw upon different sources of law (Ntsebeza, 2006; Delius, 2008; Mbatha, 2011; 
Buthelezi and Yeni, 2016). 
 
It is clear that members of the tribal council have “double-dipped” between traditional 
and statutory roles. For instance, most community members were not aware that their 
traditional leader was a member of the iSimangaliso Authority Board at the time this 
study commenced (iSimangaliso Authority, 2012). The “double-dipping” of 
traditional authorities can be traced back to the colonial era when chiefs found 
themselves straddling and having to meet the demands of two different administrative 
systems, (i.e. the colonial system versus the pre-colonial (customary) system that was 
more people-centered). They were able to meet demands from either side with 
differing degrees of success (Delius, 2008).  
 
Fast forwarding to the commencement of South Africa’s democracy in 1994, there 
remains much ambiguity about the role of traditional institutions in relation to 
customary, as well as statutory institutions governing land and coastal resources in 
rural areas such as Kosi Bay. This is largely attributed to the historical powers of 
colonial and apartheid governments which dismantled customary institutions by 
appointing and deposing chiefs as they wished, coupled with the impact of the 
indirect style of rule they adopted (Mthethwa, 2002; Delius, 2008). This has resulted 
in the wicked problem of resolving challenges related to “traditional” governance in 
rural South Africa, which the democratic government has failed dismally to address 
(Ntsebeza, 2004). Without understanding the role that the colonial and apartheid 
governments played in confusing the system of customary leadership in many parts of 
rural South Africa, most people will not realise that some existing traditional leaders 
in rural areas are not customary leaders, but were put in power through the discretion 
and authority of colonial and apartheid powers.  
 
Buthelezi and Yeni (2016) point out that the view that traditional leaders are the most 
accountable and effective modes of authority in the governance of rural areas is 
erroneous. This is because colonial and apartheid rule gave traditional authorities 
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discretionary powers that made them less accountable. This was also evident in Kosi 
Bay, evidenced by the poor involvement of traditional authorities in engaging or 
supporting local customary structures that were not part of the Tembe royal family. 
Traditional authorities have typically opposed representative local structures, as they 
perceive that they may potentially compete for the powers that they hold (Ntsebeza, 
2006). There were stark divisions between different houses of the Tembe royal family 
in Kosi Bay which created more confusion about the future of traditional governance. 
The ruling national political party (ANC) which has been striving to dominate the 
electorate in rural communities such as those in KwaZulu-Natal has also failed to 
clarify the roles of traditional authorities in the midst of democratic local government 
structures that were put in place in the democratic dispensation (Ntsebeza, 2004). As a 
result, there are overlapping and unclear jurisdictions between municipalities and 
traditional authorities at the local level.  
 
Mamdani (1996) argues that where the system of indirect rule prevails, actors that are 
given power tend to be despotic and upwardly accountable, instead of being 
downwardly accountable. He further argues that this despotism is as prevalent in local 
and national governance of post-colonial African societies, as it was during the 
colonial era. It is concluded that, indirect rule, upward accountability, as well as lack 
of participation and representation were key reasons for the contradiction between the 
impression that DEA and UNESCO have that the iSimangaliso Authority is 
exemplary in its governance of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site on the one hand, 
and the complaints of local communities and other stakeholders that the iSimangaliso 
Authority was making life difficult for them on the other.  
 
8.5 THE FIRST ORDER: GOVERNANCE PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 
INFLUENCING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
 
In a context where legal pluralism exists, the first order of governance is concerned 
with the day-to-day actions of governors, as well as how people respond to these 
(Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). In post-colonial states where indigenous people have 
lived for many years using natural resources and applying customary rules to manage 
them, Western legal systems of rules for conserving resources have often prevailed 
even in the post-colonial era and usually conflict with the operation of customary laws 
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and institutions on the ground (Techera, 2008). This was also the case in Kosi Bay 
where, over the years, the existence of plural governance actors (i.e. statutory, 
traditional and customary) has indeed affected the ability of community members to 
pursue livelihoods.  
 
Historically, forced removals, and subsequent livelihood restrictions imposed by 
conservation authorities on land and coastal resource use for agriculture, tourism and 
fishing have all had direct and indirect influences on local livelihood shifts over the 
years. Currently, the presence of the iSimangaliso Authority, together with Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife, local and district municipalities, traditional authorities, customary 
institutions, as well as other government departments has also created a lot of 
confusion and ambiguity. For instance, world heritage site jurisdiction that operated 
upon fortress conservation rules overlaps with the jurisdiction of democratic 
municipal structures whose roles were to facilitate rural development. This ambiguity 
not only makes it difficult for community members to comprehend the governance 
system, but also for other actors on the ground who were usually excluded from key 
decision-making processes facilitated by the iSimangaliso Authority.  
 
The poor interactions that the iSimangaliso Authority have had with various actors at 
local level (i.e. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, customary institutions and municipalities), 
and the ambiguous roles of actors and conflicts that existed at the local level have not 
only affected governability of coastal resources, but also the livelihoods of people in 
Kosi Bay.Persisting power struggles and ambiguity of roles between the iSimangaliso 
Authority and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife have also exacerbated confusion and 
asymmetries in the day-to-day governance practices in Kosi Bay. As Poteete (2012) 
points out, where there is an existence of multiple institutions that are supposed to be 
working together but experience tensions and conflicts on the ground, a joint-decision 
trap may arise. A joint-decision trap is “the production of systematically suboptimal 
outcomes that can occur when two levels of government exist and policy decisions 
require agreement at both levels” (Poteete, 2012:138). 
 
Local people believed that the day-to-day governance practices of the iSimangaliso 
Authority, enforced through Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, did not reflect the human rights 
approach promoted by the South African Constitution. They also expressed that the 
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iSimangaliso Authority did not understand their livelihood needs and was trying to 
make it difficult for them to continue living in the area in order to force them to move 
out.  
 
With a specific focus on land tenure security, and agricultural and fishing livelihoods; 
the following sub-sections discuss the manner in which day-to-day governance in the 
legal pluralist context of Kosi Bay influenced the livelihood strategies of community 
members.  
8.5.1 Influence of plural governance systems on land tenure security 
 
The imposition of international conservation and nature-based tourism models in Kosi 
Bay posed threats not only to local livelihoods, but also to future land tenure security 
and the historical land rights of local people. This was because all the land falling 
under iSimangaliso World Heritage Site is under claim by communities within and 
adjacent to the park through the Restitution of Land Rights Act (No. 22 of 1994). 
Over and above this, it was not clear at the local level how the declaration of the 
world heritage site was meant to enable local livelihoods, as most respondents stated 
that they neither understood what “world heritage” status meant, nor had they 
perceived benefits from tourism promoted by the iSimangaliso Authority.  
 
A DEA official stated that communities within and adjacent to the iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site were meant to benefit from tourism emanating from co-
management programmes that result once land claims are settled between claimant 
communities and conservation authorities (DEA1, 2017). However, the possibility of 
this happening is highly questionable. For instance, there are 14 land claims that have 
been lodged within the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site by adjacent communities 
since 1994 (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). The Tembe land claim was submitted in 
1995, but has not been settled. Four other land claims within iSimangaliso remain 
unsettled due to challenges and back-logs that are slowing down land claim processes. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed discussion about 
the Tembe land claim, people in villages such as Mvutshane had high expectations 
that the settling of the land claim would restore land ownership back to the 
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community, which would enable them to dictate what livelihood activities could 
occur within their area (MFG, 2015). 
 
When the land restitution process was introduced in South Africa in the democratic 
dispensation, there was a belief that it would bring about livelihood improvements 
and empowerment for people. This was a sentiment that was widely expressed in this 
research. However, for a long time the democratic government did not develop a 
policy framework for regulating the overlap between land reform and environmental 
protection in protected areas such as iSimangaliso (Paterson, 2011). Legal instruments 
such as the Communal Property Associations Act (No. 28 of 1996) and the National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (No. 57 of 2003) provide that when 
communities are successful in their land restitution claims, they might be co-
management partners with conservation authorities in order to ensure that, as land 
owners, they benefit from conservation. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
communities would be able to negotiate a land use change from conservation to the 
desired activities of local people (Kepe, 2008; Paterson, 2011).  
 
This raises questions about what land restitution processes mean for livelihoods where 
land is used for conservation, since regaining land ownership would not necessarily 
translate to changes in conservation land use. Walker (2005) argues that in South 
Africa, there is a persistent mismatch between local expectations pertaining to land 
reform and the political discourse surrounding the land question. In fact, when the 
iSimamgaliso site was nominated as a world heritage site, the government was aware 
that there were ongoing land claim processes within the park. However, land claims 
were not viewed by the government actors that nominated the site as a threat to world 
heritage status when the application was put forward to UNESCO (DEA1, 2017). The 
motivation given was that that if land claims were to be settled, the conservation land 
use would never change, and communities would work with conservation authorities 
through co-management structures to manage the parts of the site where claims had 
been made and settled (DEA1, 2017). The process of settling land claims within the 
iSimangaliso site has thus been a challenge, even for communities whose land claims 
have been settled.  
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The view of conservation as a land use was however contested, with many feeling 
excluded in decision-making processes by the iSimangaliso Authority and national 
government. A substantial body of research (e.g. Kepe, 2008; Paterson, 2011; Blore et 
al., 2013) reveals how community benefits from co-management arrangements and 
land reform in protected areas in South Africa have been limited. In the case of 
Mkambati Nature Reserve in the Eastern Cape province, the co-management model 
that was used after the land claim was settled was inappropriate for meeting 
restitution and conservation objectives because there was a distinct focus on 
conservation rather than on the rights of the claimants (Kepe, 2008). This was largely 
because conservation authorities were the institutions responsible for negotiating with 
communities about the settling of land claims in protected areas. However, 
conservation authorities do not have the capacity to fulfill this task or to understand 
community needs; the problem persists because the South African government has not 
developed an appropriate institutional arrangement that would ensure equitable power 
sharing in land restitution processes that involve conservation authorities and 
communities in protected areas (Kepe, 2008).  
 
The increased prevalence of ambiguities in land restitution processes affecting 
protected areas in South Africa could suggest that they are left there because they 
possibly serve a certain purpose. Kepe (2008:319) argues: 
 
Another way of looking at how this ambiguity may serve the state 
is to relate what is happening in these geographical areas to the 
apparent disjuncture in the country’s constitution, where both land 
rights and biodiversity conservation are enshrined, but without 
any clarity on which of the two has priority over the other.  
 
It was not clear how co-management would benefit people inside the world heritage 
site, i.e. Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages, who would not necessarily partake in 
land claim processes. In villages such as Nkovukeni that are remote and where 
tourism activities are not viable, it was not clear how people could benefit from the 
existence of the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, given that the iSimangaliso 
Authority’s and DEA’s discourses on community benefits from this type of 
conservation revolve mainly around tourism from co-management. This only pertains 
to communities that are eligible for land claim processes under the restitution process. 
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Such scenarios therefore paralyze governance at the local level and diminish future 
livelihood hopes for people in rural communities. When governance images at the top 
do not reflect people’s values and expectations on the ground, governability becomes 
difficult (Song et al., 2013).  
8.5.2 Influence of governance on tourism development at local level 
 
In many developing countries, protected areas have exacerbated poverty due to the 
restrictions that they place on livelihoods (West, 2006; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; 
2008). Protected areas in these countries are often a source of conflict because they 
are regarded as important for conserving resources and for generating income, while 
the costs borne from conservation are usually skewed towards the poor and the 
marginalized (Brockington and Wilkie, 2015).  
 
The projection of nature-based tourism as a panacea for conflicts between 
conservation and economic development, as well as poverty reduction in rural areas 
of developing countries, has been comprehensively critiqued (Büscher et al., 2012; 
Duffy, 2015). Nature-based tourism discourses tend to present tourism as a “clean 
industry” in comparison to heavy industries, such as mining (Duffy, 2015). This shifts 
attention away from wider environmental, social and political impacts that tourism 
has on local communities. Critiques of nature-based tourism stem from the fact that 
its use in conservation, motivated by discourses of “benefits for indigenous 
communities”, rests on the idea that communities are separate from nature (Igoe and 
Brockington, 2007; Fletcher, 2009). This means that the image held by 
conservationists about indigenous communities is that of beneficiaries of nature based 
in conservation, rather than key actors in decision-making processes about 
conservation. Evidence of this is observed in various cases within South Africa where 
protected area conservation continues to lead to the exclusion and marginalisation of 
local communities, even in post-colonial and post-apartheid society (Emdon, 2013; 
Sunde, 2014; Hansen, 2015). 
 
Techera (2008) points out that in the South Pacific region, the “national park 
conservation model” has failed due to the fact that it is usually in conflict with local 
governance structures. In the case of world heritage sites, UNESCO requires that 
management authorities promote tourism in their conservation plans. As a result, the 
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iSimangaliso Authority has developed a conservation strategy that seeks to “rewild” 
the iSimangaliso site (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016). The iSimangaliso Authority 
(2016) states that the “rewilding” strategy would provide a strong basis for linking 
conservation to the development and empowerment of local communities through 
revenue generation, job creation and the promotion of tourism developments that 
would benefit communities adjacent to the park (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016).  
 
Neoliberalism plays a significant role in contemporary representations of biodiversity 
protection and the creation of protected areas (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Certain 
environmentalisms (including environmental protection) are usually not solely 
undertaken purely for the purpose of protecting the environment for its own good. 
Rather, these emerge as part and parcel of certain social and economic agendas by 
those in power; either to improve their power in controlling resources, to increase 
profits from environmental protection ventures (i.e. ecotourism), to win political 
votes, or to increase their popularity/sovereignty. Using ecotourism as an example, 
Brockington asserts,  
 
Often the growth of protected areas is associated with new 
strategies of accumulation based on ecotourism. It is an important 
business, particularly in poorer countries, worth between $30 
billion and $1.2 trillion a year (West and Carrier, 2004). The 
growth of ecotourism proceeds hand in hand with protected areas 
(Duffy, 2002; West and Carrier, 2004; West et al., 2006), which 
provide clients the authentic unspoilt nature they wish to consume 
on their holidays (2008:555).  
 
It is apparent and arguably not a coincidence that there is a positive correlation 
between the increase of protected areas through strategies such as “re-wilding” and 
the growth of ecotourism in many developing countries in marginalised areas (Igoe 
and Brockington, 2007). The prosperity of local livelihoods is not usually part of this 
agenda, and could in fact be an inconvenience by those in power who control the 
benefits not only from profits generated through this, but also through securing 
control over the resources. 
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For example, Büscher (2014) points out that in the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfontier 
Project (MDTP) between Lesotho and South Africa, the use of tourism to stimulate 
the link between conservation and rural development resulted in a focus on enriching 
the experiences of tourists that came to the area, rather than on improving interactions 
between local people and the environment.  
 
Tourism, operationalized as branding in the project, used natural 
scenery and poverty (i.e. primitiveness) as the “underlying assets” 
to generate value in the contemporary neoliberal political 
economy…Tourism in the project, after all, “catered to perceptions, 
not reality”. Crucially, this catering to perceptions should be seen 
against the observation that tourism, or the project in general, had 
not benefited local people in the MDTP region much or made a big 
impact on the environment (Büscher, 2014:207). 
 
Büscher (2014) also notes that in the MDTP, images and discourses that were 
propelled by powerful actors were most influential in determining what took place in 
terms of conservation and development in the region. He points out that in the MDTP, 
there was inequitable access to decision-making spaces and processes between actors, 
as certain actors were more central, and therefore had more power in decision-making 
processes because of their positions within key institutional arrangements, as well as 
their networks and resources (Büscher, 2014).  
 
The analysis of the governance system in Kosi Bay reveals that although community 
members perceived that they should have a voice in decision-making processes, this 
was not necessarily the case; or one could argue it was not the intention of those 
driving the governance processes. The image of “re-wilding” that key governance 
actors promoted was that of community involvement in the governance of the 
iSimangaliso World Heritage Site through benefiting from conservation through 
tourism (iSimangaliso Authority, 2011; 2016; DEA1, 2017). However, the 
iSimangaliso Authority had a strong hold on tourism activities within its jurisdiction, 
and various tourism operators felt that their efforts were stifled by the iSimangaliso 
Authority. This control that the iSimangaliso Authority had on tourism activities in 
the park appeared to be stronger in villages that were inside the park boundaries, such 
as kwaDapha. For instance, in 2013, local men from kwaDapha acquired assistance 
from a private investor to construct a tourism accommodation facility. However, it 
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was not long before bulldozers demolished this facility upon instruction from the 
iSimangaliso Authority. A representative from the iSimangaliso Authority 
commented that the demolition was done because they could not allow 
“unsustainable” tourism developments that would allow for benefits accruing only to 
a few businessmen in the community (Louw, 2010). However, people from 
kwaDapha believed that the iSimangaliso Authority sought to stifle any sort of 
“community-based” tourism development that was not directly administered by the 
iSimangaliso Authority. Various private tourism business owners in Sodwana Bay 
who were present in the protest against the iSimangaliso IMP meeting confirmed that 
their businesses have suffered from the way the iSimangaliso Authority operates 
(SM2, 2016). 
 
Therefore, the idea of “selling nature to save it” is increasingly dominating 
conservation discourse, revealing underlying motivations behind conservation that are 
driven by the need to create and control capital gains from the protection of nature; 
hence the exclusion of local communities (Büscher, 2014). Duffy (2015:531) concurs 
by stating “nature-based tourism allows neoliberalism to turn the very crises it has 
created into new sources of accumulation”. 
8.5.3 Influence of plural governance systems on agriculture and fishery 
livelihoods 
 
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) point out that in situations where multiple legal 
orders exist and are in conflict, people tend to choose one or the other, depending on 
which one enables them access to the resources they need at a given time. This is 
when forum shopping occurs as “the way in which people call upon different legal 
orders, and the negotiation between them, provides some of this dynamism” 
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002: 7). In Kosi Bay, kinship ties became pivotal for 
people in Mvutshane, allowing them to “maintain” claim over agricultural livelihoods 
by drawing on customary relations with people in the south of Mozambique, who 
gave them land to use to continue agriculture livelihoods. On the other side of the 
border this was prohibited by the iSimangaliso Authority. Historically, the people in 
the south of Mozambique and in Kosi Bay used to belong to one community (under 
the same traditional authority) and therefore shared the same customs and practices, 
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until the border was drawn between South Africa and Mozambique on the eastern part 
of the country in the late 1800s (Mthethwa, 2002).  
 
Agriculture had been the key livelihood strategy of many people in Kosi Bay over the 
past seven decades, especially before the conservation interventions in the area 
intensified, and before wild animals began to pose serious problems for local farmers. 
However, increasing conservation regulations in the latter part of the 20th century led 
to decreasing levels of agricultural activity. The introduction of the iSimangaliso 
World Heritage Site, which enclosed Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages, made it 
even more difficult for local people to continue with their agriculture livelihood. 
People in Nkovukeni and kwaDapha emphasised that had it not been for the 
restrictions on agriculture within the boundaries of the park, they would still 
participate in agriculture activities to a greater extent than they currently do. In 
Mvutshane, people “illegally” continued this livelihood in the south of Mozambique. 
This is because the swampy land that the people from Mvutshane relied on for 
conducting agriculture activities was enclosed within the world heritage site, adjacent 
to the Kosi Bay system. However, across the border in the south of Mozambique, the 
same ecosystem exists with no world heritage site rules.  
 
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) confirm that when social or political change 
occurs, and when statutory law is introduced and does not recognise local customary 
rights, resource users’ livelihoods become faced with uncertainty. This was indeed the 
case in Nkovukeni and kwaDapha villages where people were enclosed within the 
boundaries of the world heritage site with conservation rules imposed on their 
livelihoods. For these villages, there were no alternative avenues for pursuing 
agriculture livelihoods. This resulted in dwindling agricultural activities within the 
two villages, exacerbated by the increased numbers of hippopotamuses within the 
lakes, as well as rainfall variability over time that make it difficult to plant crops.  
 
During the time spent with people from Nkovukeni village, they expressed that they 
were under the impression that the iSimangaliso Authority was aware that livelihood 
options for the people in the village are becoming more and more limited due to 
conservation restrictions, and that they felt that the conservation authorities are not 
assisting them. They would thus get frustrated and move out of the village. An official 
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from the iSimangaliso Authority commented by stating “The park management is 
looking for conservation that will work for UNESCO, but that will benefit local 
people” (WHA, 2015). He went on to state that they could not assist people of 
Nkovukeni with mobility issues they were experiencing and that if the people 
perceived that their livelihoods were becoming difficult because of that, they should 
consider relocating to the nearest town (WHA, 2015).  
 
Where customary institutions for governing local livelihood activities did not exist 
before statutory rules were imposed, statutory rules tended to dominate, and 
ultimately managed to shift livelihood strategies. However, where customary rules 
were in place before statutory rules were imposed for governing resources, it was 
more difficult for statutory rules to dominate or shift customary practices upon which 
rural livelihoods were embedded. Agriculture livelihoods (which did not historically 
have strongly defined customary rules or boundaries), for example, were influenced 
by rules imposed by conservation authorities over time. On the contrary, fisheries 
activities had robust customary rules and arrangements that had existed over a long 
period of time. As a result, even with the increasing efforts of conservation authorities 
to impose new rules and laws to govern fisheries resources, local people managed to 
resist this dominance. Customary institutions governing fishing activities in the Kosi 
Bay system have seemingly remained a strong superstructure governing fishery 
livelihoods.  
 
In a study conducted in Haiti, Smucker et al. (2000) reveal how property rights to land 
that are locally defined enable local people to challenge imposed statutory laws over 
resource access. This resonates with the findings of this study that reveal how the 
existence of established customary rights, rules and institutions in the trap fishery 
enabled fishers to effectively defend this system against the imposition of 
conservation rules. This finding is striking, given the fact that the iSimangaliso 
Authority has, since its establishment, managed to alter most aspects of local 
livelihoods that take place within the world heritage site.  
 
However, there is still an ongoing struggle between customary fisheries institutions in 
Kosi Bay and conservation authorities who argue that the fish trap system has become 
unsustainable because it is not managed by statutory laws that draw on scientific 
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evidence (Kyle, 2013). Moreover, customary institutions remain marginalised in Kosi 
Bay, as they operate at village level and are usually left out of key decision-making 
processes between the iSimangaliso Authority and traditional authorities. Cinner et al. 
(2012) concur that in developing countries such as Mexico, Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea, customary institutions are also stifled by conflicts between themselves and 
organisations operating at more influential governance scales, that exclude them from 
key decision-making processes. Sunde (2014) points out a similar case in Dwese-
Cwebe villages in the Eastern Cape where traditional leaders, who are assumed to 
represent the interests of wider communities, did not support customary institutions. 
This was also the case in Kosi Bay, along with increasing evidence of traditional 
authorities, especially in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, not being supportive of any 
democratic or locally representative institutions in rural areas, as they believe that this 
will threaten their powers (Ntsebeza, 2002; Logan, 2008). Traditional authorities have 
also been criticised for being both anti-democracy, and for promoting individual 
interests ahead of community interests, thus impeding the development of a 
democratic and just society (Logan, 2008).   
 
8.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORY AND LEGAL PLURALISM 
CONTEXTS IN INFLUENCING GOVERNANCE AND LIVELIHOODS 
 
In contexts where history plays a pivotal role in determining the manner in which 
governance processes and practices take place in existing legal pluralist systems of 
governance, asymmetries usually manifest by way of uneven power distribution, as 
well as mismatching values, images, discourses, worldviews and practices within 
governance systems. In such cases, conflicting worldviews may be remedied through 
constructive interaction and dialogue, as well as through the empowerment of weaker 
actors (Jentoft and Bavinck, 2014). However, based on the findings of this study, it 
appeared that governance asymmetries in Kosi Bay were unlikely to be easily 
remedied, due to a lack of opportunities for interaction between different orders of 
governance across the different governance systems (Figure 8.2).  
 
The poor governance interactions were seemingly entrenched by the way institutional 
arrangements were set up that did not allow for participation and representation of 
local actors in key decision-making structures. This meant that constructive dialogue 
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could not occur because there was poor downward accountability to local 
communities by powerful actors involved in key decision-making processes. This also 
meant that there was no space for communities to communicate their livelihood 
priorities to actors involved in second and third order governance. This is particularly 
highlighted by the fact that the iSimangaliso Authority’s “rewilding” strategy that is 
stipulated on its website, and the IMP states that they intend promote a “conservation 
vision of restoring all historically occurring game back into the world heritage site” 
(iSimangaliso Authority, 2014: 1). On the other hand, the people living within the 
park that formed part of this study strongly asserted, “People must understand that 
this is not a jungle or wilderness, this is an area with people, where we have lived for 
many years…” (Kosi Bay community, 2016). This highlights the divergent 
worldviews between key actors involved in governance and wider communities in 
Kosi Bay.  
 
In any setting, governance practices of complex systems in a multi-level world are not 
likely to be politically or socially neutral because “inequities are intrinsic to shifting 
relations of status, power and knowledge, culture and history” (Armitage, 2008:11). 
Therefore, theroles of politics and power, as well as lack of acknowledgement of 
history and the existence of plural governance systems has implications 
forgovernance and for how people in rural areas can conduct their livelihoods 
strategies. Poor interactions between plural governance systems create conflict and 
pose serious threats to the governability of natural resource systems. The challenge, 
therefore, that is usually posed when it comes to the governance of complex and 
multi-level systems such as coastal resources that are managed at multiple levels is 
the issue of “for whom?” resources are governed and “whose values?” are taken into 
account when resources are protected through conservation (Blomquist, 2009). 
 
Moreover, the Kosi Bay case clearly demonstrates that in the conceptualisation of 
rural livelihoods, recognising the roles of history and legal pluralism contexts upon 
which governance systems are embedded is critical, as these influence the livelihood 
strategies of rural people. This is mostly relevant because history, as well as 
governance in the context of legal pluralism, do not currently feature in the 
sustainable livelihoods framework.  
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8.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the key issues arising from different levels of governance 
orders that have influenced governance processes and practices and livelihood 
strategies of rural communities at the local level. It has underlined how in situations 
where plural governance systems exist to govern protected natural resources and land, 
the adoption of global norms and principles tends to pose problems if they ignore 
historical and current country contexts. What is also raised in the discussion is the 
significance of interrogating the manner in which governance institutions involved in 
key decision-making processes interpret global discourses, values, images, principles 
and norms in ways that create winners and losers at the local level. Therefore, in rural 
contexts, poor governance interactions coupled with poor downward accountability 
and broader participation and representation of communities in key decision-making 
processes result in conflicts and decreased opportunities for improved governability 
of human-environment systems. Livelihoods analyses at community level are thus 
useful for assessing the impacts and effectiveness of plural governance processes and 
practices, especially where plural governance systems result in poor 
representativeness and downward accountability. Studying governance systems, what 
they are meant to do, as well as why and how they are created, is a significant step 
towards resolving societal problems (Song et al., 2013). This also requires 
understanding of behaviours, actions and decisions of different governance actors at 
different levels.  
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 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
This study has sought to enhance understanding about the conceptual linkages 
between livelihoods and plural governance systems, using the case study of Kosi Bay, 
a coastal region in northern KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. This is done with the view 
to strengthen the conceptualization of relationships between livelihoods and 
governance, in order to highlight ways in which governance processes and practices 
influence rural livelihoods. Using a case study methodology, empirical research was 
conducted in Kosi Bay, with qualitative and quantitative data collected to: a) describe 
livelihood strategies; b) identify and document statutory, traditional and customary 
governance structures linked to coastal resource governance; c) explore the norms, 
discourses, images, values and worldviews that have informed coastal resource 
governance in this area; d) review and analyse the influences of plural coastal 
governance systems on livelihood strategies; e) contribute towards conceptual 
frameworks that link livelihoods and governance and; f) make recommendations for 
improved livelihoods and governance in rural areas in the South African context and 
beyond.  
 
The study demonstrates that rural livelihood strategies are diverse and dynamic, and 
can be profoundly affected by political processes and different governance 
approaches. In forefronting the role of power, politics and governance, it helps to 
address the historical lack of attention paid to these dimensions in other livelihood 
studies (Scoones, 2009). It also highlights the manner in which legal pluralism and 
historical context affect and influence governance processes. Through this analysis it 
concludes that livelihoods evaluations cannot be reduced to apolitical descriptions.  
 
Within the sustainable livelihoods literature, institutions are often depicted as merely 
playing a role of mediating and governing people’s power and access to different 
types of capitals, as well as to opportunities and livelihood decisions (Morse and 
McNamara, 2013). Findings of this study reveal a far more profound influence of 
governance, demonstrating how it determines, shapes and influences how people 
access resources, formulate livelihood strategies and derive benefits. More 
specifically, the way governance influences livelihoods in contexts of legal pluralism, 
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and the role of history in shaping current governance processes, are important 
considerations in attempts to understand rural livelihood strategies. This is especially 
the case in countries such as South Africa, characterised by traumatic displacements 
and forced removals from land and resources. This study shows that understandings 
about natural resources in plural legal and institutional contexts can benefit from 
nuanced livelihoods analyses; these can reveal the impacts, influences and 
shortcomings of governance processes and practices and how these are distributed at 
different scales.  
 
The significance of understanding how history plays a role in informing what 
governance looks like today is underscored. Findings reveal how current governance 
systems for natural resources in Kosi Bay are failing rural communities because they 
are still largely informed by colonial and apartheid modes of regulation that depend 
on centralised, remote and indirect rule, through the use of authoritarian actors that 
are usually not downwardly accountable. Centralised management of natural 
resources by the State, paralleled by indirect rule, has proved to be a failure in many 
countries around the world (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
The existence of parallel statutory, traditional and customary systems of governance 
in areas such as Kosi Bay, within a context of deep colonial and apartheid histories, is 
an indication of how complex and dynamic governance can be. However, such 
complexity and the way it influences meta-level, second order and first order 
governance has not been adequately considered by key actors. In Kosi Bay, this has 
resulted in mismatches between normative governance and the realities of governance 
processes and practices on the ground. This is because statutory conservation 
governance systems dominate processes and practices, while parallel customary 
systems of governance are often ignored in key decision-making processes. This is 
exacerbated by the ambiguous roles of traditional authorities in rural areas who 
“double-dip” between statutory and “customary” roles. The post-apartheid 
government is largely to blame for these asymmetries since it has failed to clarify the 
roles of traditional authorities in relation to other democratic or representative 
structures in rural areas. Moreover, national government has failed to justify 
promoting fortress conservation in areas such as the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site 
where communities have been persistently marginalised and dispossessed of land and 
resources since colonial times.  
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Over the years, economics-driven and apolitical analyses have been advocated to 
explain the relationship between livelihood strategies and governance institutions that 
regulate resources use and access. This overly monetised view has been fueled by 
assumptions made by Chambers (1987; 1995) and other conceptual livelihood 
pioneers that rural people in the Global South are “poor”. The data informing 
livelihoods work in the 1990s was largely quantitative and made use of 
monetary/economic analyses to the exclusion of using social, cultural or political 
perspectives to define or understand “poverty”. Kosi Bay, for instance, is an 
extremely rich area in terms of biodiversity, coastal resources and culture. The 
tendency to homogenise rural people in the Global South is considered to be 
questionable, given that the reasons for poverty and inequality tend to be context 
specific. The nuances of life in the coastal villages of Kosi Bay have highlighted that 
the livelihoods and backgrounds of people within rural communities are not as 
homogenous as is often assumed in livelihoods literature.  
 
The study has revealed that a variety of State institutions hold and promote norms, 
values, images, discourses and worldviews about coastal governance that are derived 
from global or Western ideas; in the case of Kosi Bay, these usually do not match 
those of communities. These asymmetries exacerbate the erosion of customary 
livelihoods, and exacerbate feelings of marginalisation among rural dwellers in South 
Africa. Discourses such as Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the commons still play a 
powerful role in shaping images that inform natural resource management and 
governance in different parts of the world. Such discourses promote a romantic view 
of nature as “wilderness” and “pristine” and in need of being protected from humans, 
who act to degrade the environment (Guha, 1989; Cronon, 1996; Fletcher, 2009). The 
main problem with governance images inspired by this thinking is that many 
indigenous people and customary communities who have a long history of direct 
interaction with the environment and resources do not see themselves as separate 
from “nature”, but rather as one with it. This is affirmed in the case of Kosi Bay.  
 
It is apparent that where plural governance systems exist in areas where the State 
governs remotely, governability becomes difficult; under such circumstances it  
becomes even more difficult for local communities to hold governance actors to 
account for negative livelihood impacts (Schmelzle, 2007). As this study reveals, 
	
225	
	
effective governance interactions cannot always be assumed to be innate 
characteristics of governance practices. The stated policy objectives of promoting 
interactions between actors at different scales of governance in Kosi Bay, for 
example, did not match the institutional design established for implementation. 
Mismatches between laws, policies and institutional design can influence the nature 
of governance interactions, as well as governance practices. This may also increase 
wider community perceptions of exclusion, and may inhibit equity and justice in 
governance processes. This argument resonates with that of Ostrom (2005) who 
asserts that robust institutional arrangements for resource use and management are 
those that promote fairness and the participation of affected individuals in decision-
making processes. It is pivotal for international organisations such as UNESCO to 
understand and constantly assess the applicability, relevance and interpretations of 
global environmental governance tools that they promote within the Global South; in 
such contexts the role played by history and legal pluralism in influencing governance 
is paramount.  
 
The first recommendation of this study is for international organisations such as 
UNESCO to evaluate the performance of world heritage authorities for natural sites 
based on a wide range of considerations. The assessment of natural world heritage 
sites (Hockings et al., 2007; Osipova et al., 2014) typically focuses on plant and 
animal species, climate change and tourism rather than the impacts on local 
livelihoods and historical contexts of community marginalisation in post-colonial 
states. This is a pertinent issue for countries like South Africa where protected areas 
are often introduced within or adjacent to rural areas with histories of deep exclusion 
and where black populations and indigenous people have been marginalised. If such 
considerations are not taken into account, world heritage sites will lend themselves as 
systems that serve to continue the legacies of colonialism and apartheid that benefit 
the powerful few, while suppressing the lives of the majority.  
 
Second, in situations where plural governance systems exist, it is important for 
national government to clarify their own roles and those of different governance 
actors, so that people in rural communities may be able to harness their rights. 
Clarifying the mandates, powers and jurisdictions of statutory governance actors and 
traditional authorities in rural areas could improve the governability of land and 
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resources, as well as provide more haste towards land reform processes that are 
currently pending in areas such as within the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site. In 
addition, the role of traditional authorities at the local level needs to be clearly defined 
and a platform provided to allow democratically elected structures to represent local 
people, without undue interference. The failure to resolve this not only has 
implications for the governability of land and resources, but also for the ability of 
actors such as municipalities to implement rural development strategies that do not 
compete with powers of traditional authorities and the strict restrictions imposed by 
conservation authorities.  
 
Third, national government needs to recognise and act upon the reality that 
conservation authorities are not necessarily equipped to resolve intricate land claim 
processes in former homeland areas (Kepe, 2008; Paterson, 2011; Blore et al., 2013). 
A resolution needs to be reached in this regard to restore the integrity, security, tenure 
and rights of rural people to their historical land and livelihood practices that they 
seek to revive or maintain.  
 
Lastly, the study shows that because of legal pluralism and the role that history has 
played in informing governance in rural South Africa, livelihoods analyses conducted 
in areas such as Kosi Bay should be re-conceptualised in order to be relevant and to 
contribute towards improved rural livelihood sustainability. Strengthening equity and 
representation in rural areas through the establishment and support of representative 
institutional structures is also fundamental, and can help to promote human rights, 
rural development and the empowerment of people in rural communities. This 
conclusion was echoed by the people of Kosi Bay when they stated, 
 
It would be better if governing institutions humble themselves and work 
with us and include us in their planning activities and formally introduce 
themselves to us…We could live better lives if there was recognition that 
we can conduct our livelihoods on our own…Governing actors need to 
enable our livelihood needs and support us, not the other way around. 
They must negotiate with us and not take decisions on our behalf. We 
know how to conserve the resources ourselves but they could play a role 
in assisting us do that better, rather than taking over and overpowering us 
(FFG, 2015). 
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 APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 – Household Survey 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PLURAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS ON 
COASTAL LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Household Questionnaire Number---------- 
 
 
Date: ___________________________________________________________ 
Interviewer’s Name: _______________________________________________ 
Respondent’s Name: _______________________________________________ 
(Optional) 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Study Site Location 
1. Region/Province 
________________________________________________________ 
2. District 
_______________________________________________________________ 
3. Village/Community 
/Locality______________________________________________ 
4. Name of Ward /Sub-
Location______________________________________________ 
 
1.2 Respondent’s Information 
5. Gender  [1] Male  [2] Female 
 
6. Age ____________  
 
7. Marital status of the respondent: [1] Single [2] Married [3] Divorced [4] 
Widow [5] Separated [6] Widower 
 
8. Level of education of respondent.  
[1] No formal Education  
[2] Incomplete primary education [between Gr.1 and Gr.4] 
[3] Complete Primary education [finished Gr.5] 
[4] Incomplete High School Education [between Gr. 6 and Gr.11]  
[5] Complete High school Education [finished Gr. 12] 
[6] Technical/ College Education  
[7] University Education 
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9. Occupation of Respondent 
[1] Employed 
[1b] If employed (please state) 
__________________________________________ 
[2] Self-employed 
[2b] If self-employed (please state - e.g. Farmer, livestock keeper, agro-
pastoral, fisher, taxi driver, shop owner, trader 
etc)_________________________ 
[3] Unemployed 
[4] Pensioner  
[4b] If a Pensioner, please state former occupation 
________________________ 
[5] School-going learner 
[6] Other (please state) ______________________________ 
 
10.Where does your family come from/born? 
1. In this village  
2. In different village within the district 
3. Outside the District but within the Region/Province 
4. Outside the Region/Province 
5. Outside the Country  
 
11.  For how long have you lived in this village _______________ (Mention years) 
 
12. If you migrated to this village/community/locality, mention where you migrated 
from and the reason(s) for migrating 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
13. How many HOUSES are there in your homestead/Compound? 
_____________________ 
 
14. How many HOUSEHOLDS live in your homestead/Compound? 
_____________________ 
 
15. What is the total number of rooms in the MAIN 
dwelling?_________________________ 
 
16. What is the MAIN material used for the walls and roof of the MAIN dwelling? 
Observe and tick only one for each. 
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17.  How many people live in your household/homestead?  ________________ 
 
 
18. How many adults, older than 18, live in your household/homestead? 
________________ 
 
 
19. Are you the household/homestead head? [1] Yes or [2] No _______________ 
 
 
20. If No, what is your relation to the Head of Household? 
___________________________ 
 
 
21. What is the occupation of the head of your household/homestead? 
[1] Employed 
[1b] If employed (please state) 
__________________________________________ 
[2] Self-employed 
[2b] If self-employed (please state - e.g. Farmer, livestock keeper, agro-
pastoral, fisher, taxi driver, shop owner, trader etc) 
________________________ 
[3] Unemployed 
[4] Pensioner __________________________________ 
[4b] If a Pensioner, please state former occupation 
________________________ 
[5] School-going learner 
[6] Other (please state) 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
22. What is the range of your household monthly income (pensions, grants, other 
sources of income included?) [Ask range and not specific amount]  
 
[1] Less than R1000 
[2] R1001-R1700 
[3] R1701-R3000 
[4] R3001-R7500 
[5] R7501 or more 
 
 
23. What present activities contribute towards supporting your livelihoods? Circle 
ALL that are applicable and go through each. 
 
 [1] Fisheries 
 [2] Crop farming (fruit, vegetables) 
 [3] Livestock farming (poultry etc) 
 [4] Sale of wood 
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 [5] Involvement in tourism industry (state type of work) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 [6] Involvement in forestry industry (state type of work) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 [7] Involvement in agriculture (state type of work) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 [8 Involvement in fishing industry  (state type of work) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 [9] Land ownership outside village 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 [10] Employment in other activities (please state) 
_____________________________________________________________________
____ 
 [11] Pension 
 [12] Grants (please specify: ie: disability, child) 
_____________________________________________________________________
______ 
  
24. What three activities contribute most towards your monthly income? 
 [1]  
 [2]  
 [3]  
 
25. Is your household connected to an electricity supply? 
      [1] Yes              [2] No 
 
 
26. What is the source of energy for cooking in your household? [Tick all that apply] 
a. Electricity 
b. Solar power 
c. Charcoal 
d. Kerosene  
e. LPG gas 
f. Biogas 
g. Firewood 
h. Other sources 
(specify)_______________________________________________________
____________________ 
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27. What is the most often used source of DRINKING water in your household? 
[Tick all that apply] 
[1] Piped/tap water inside household/homestead  
[2] Piped – Single tap in yard 
[3] Piped – public stand post 
[4] Hand pump well (Borehole with hand pump, shallow well fitted with 
pump) 
[5] Rainwater tank 
[6] Collect water from flowing river/stream 
[7] A constructed Dam with outlet for fetching water 
[8] Stagnant water (ponding water, natural/traditional pool, swamp, dug out 
pits/holes) 
[9]Open unprotected well (traditional well) 
[10]Open but lined well with a container for lifting water  
[11]Others sources (specify): 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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2. RESOURCE USE AND ACCESS 
 
28. What are the natural 
resources that you use? 
 
Please State 
29. Tick the 
THREE 
most 
important 
resources for 
you and your 
family 
30. For how 
long have 
you been 
harvesting 
this resource 
(in years)? 
31. Where do 
you access 
this resource?  
32. What is the 
resource used for? 
(Please state) 
Natural 
resources 
that you use 
State 
name of 
resource 
used  
    
Marine 
Resources 
     
   
   
   
   
Forest 
Products 
     
   
   
   
   
Agriculture 
     
   
   
 
 
33. Are there key issues within these sectors that impact on your livelihood?  
Sector Yes No Explain 
Marine resource harvesting 
 
 
   
Forest products harvesting 
 
   
Agriculture 
 
   
Tourism  
 
   
Conservation    
Other (specify) 
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34. Who do you think is most powerful in making decisions in the following sectors?  
 
Sector 
Coastal fisheries 
 
 
Trap fisheries 
 
Agriculture 
 
Forestry 
 
Tourism 
 
 
 
3. LOCAL RULES 
 
Specify the 
livelihood sector 
35. Are there 
customary 
rules in place 
that outline 
how people 
should use 
resources? 
36. Do you think these rules 
are fair or enable you to 
pursue your daily livelihood 
strategies? 
37. Do you keep to (comply 
with) these rules? 
38. Do you think local people 
easily understand the content 
of these rules? 
 Yes No Don’t know 
Yes 
always 
Yes, 
Sometimes 
No Don’t 
know 
Yes 
Always 
Yes 
Sometimes 
No Don’t 
know 
Yes 
Always 
Yes, 
Sometimes 
No Don’t 
know 
Marine    
             
Forestry    
             
Tourism    
             
Agriculture    
             
Land    
             
Please elaborate on the above where relevant (e.g. mentioning the rules). 
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4. GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
 
Case study specific 
governance system 
39. Are you aware 
of these activities in 
your area? 
1.YES 2. NO 
40. Are you 
involved in these 
activities?  
1. YES 2. NO. 
41.  If you are 
involved in these 
activities, indicate 
how? 
42. Were you informed 
about the establishment 
of these activities in 
this area? 
 
iSimangaliso World Heritage 
Site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Maputaland Marine Protected 
Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Coastal Forest Reserve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Tembe Land Claim  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Small-scale fisheries policy 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Restricted terrestial environments in iSimangaliso informed by IUCN categories for 
protected areas (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016) 
Inherent Attributes/  
Characteristics  
An area in which the landscape and ecological processes may 
have been noticeably transformed by past or present 
development (e.g. human settlement, silviculture, agriculture, 
alien plant invasion and soil erosion) but in which restoration is 
possible to:  
i A natural setting that appears largely unmodified.  
ii A system in which the ecological processes function naturally 
in many if not all respects.  
iii A situation in which, as a result of achieving the above, the 
area could be regarded as partly modified and, hence, could be 
upgraded to a Restricted Zone. Proactive and responsive 
interventions may be required indefinitely for the maintenance 
of the above.  
Focal Purpose of Zone  i The restoration and maintenance of natural landscapes and 
ecological processes.  
ii Provide nature-based recreational experiences for the full 
spectrum of potential user groups and market segments.  
Permissible Uses & Activities  Hiking.  
ii Horse riding.  
iii Cycling.  
iv Motorised vessels (concession and self-drive).  
v Non-motorised water craft.  
vi 2x4 and 4x4 driving (concession and self-drive).  
vii Recreational fishing.  
viii Freshwater diving.  
ix Swimming (in secured areas).  
x Motorised and non-motorised special interest/educational 
trails, tours and activities within the parameters of other 
permissible and non-permissible uses and activities.  
xi Overnighting in all types of Park Development Nodes and 
houseboats.  
xii Lake ferry shuttle service.  
xiii Controlled traditional subsistence resource harvesting and 
use.  
xiv Human settlement in Special Residential Nodes in the 
Coastal Forest Reserve section of the Park and as defined in 
Local Area Plans, with limited non-commercial food gardens 
(for subsistence purposes and using low technology).  
xv The quarrying of material from approved borrow pits for road 
maintenance in the Park.  
xvi Scientific research and monitoring.  
xvii Law enforcement patrols and reaction.  
xviii General management activities and intervention to 
restore/maintain ecological processes and the unspoilt 
appearance of the landscape.  
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Non-Permissible Uses & 
Activities  
i Quad bikes and motor cycles except for management purposes.  
ii Jet skis and private sail boats.  
iii Invertebrate harvesting.  
iv Commercial fishing.  
v Mining (except for borrow pits used for road maintenance in 
the Park), silviculture, hunting, commercial agriculture, and 
aquaculture.  
vi Human settlement, except for Special Residential Nodes and 
management staff and tourist accommodation facilities, as 
described above under ‘permissible uses and activities’.  
vii Supply of water to consumers outside the Park.  
viii Recreational and leisure activities that are not associated 
with an outdoor nature-based experience.  
Use Intensity/  
Frequency  
Full range of controlled use – very low to high intensities and 
frequencies but relative to World Heritage status. Distinguished 
from previous zones by entry/access control mainly through the 
issue of permits (tickets) at entry gates, as opposed to advance 
application for individual or concession permits. Also 
distinguished by the potential to allow a significant level of self-
drive game viewing experiences, as opposed to the need to 
confine activities to guided experiences (as in the previous three 
zones).  
Development Nodes  All Development Nodes are permitted, including Medium and 
High Intensity Tourism Overnight Nodes, Tourism Day Visitor 
Nodes, Park Management Nodes and Special Residential Nodes.  
Development Restrictions  Despite falling within a Controlled Zone, development must be 
sensitive, maintain a ‘sense of place’ and be in keeping with the 
Park’s World Heritage values and status. Development must also 
adhere to all other environmental specifications and guidelines, 
including avoidance of sensitive sites.  
Outside of the Medium and High Intensity Development Nodes, 
the following development is permitted:  
i Small, low impact management facilities, bush lodges, hides, 
permanent campsites, viewpoints, canopy walkways, picnic sites 
and interpretation displays.  
ii Comprehensive but environmentally harmonious 
informative/directional signage.  
iii Upgraded management and tourist roads (i.e. gravel and hard 
top).  
iv Regional supply of utility services but overhead/above ground 
infrastructure in exceptional cases only (e.g. occurs historically, 
provides an essential service and is too costly to relocate, bury or 
substitute with alternative technology).  
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Restricted marine environments in iSimangaliso informed by IUCN categories for 
protected areas (iSimangaliso Authority, 2016) 
 
Inherent Attributes/  
Characteristics  
A marine area having no existing human settlement, 
infrastructure within it (e.g. buoys, piers, outflow pipes), nor 
consumptive use of marine resources (e.g. invertebrate 
harvesting, fishing, etc.), nor activities that cause disturbance to 
wildlife (e.g. dolphins, birds, crabs) occurring within it, having 
no adjacent land/sea which has human settlement or 
infrastructure development, and no access roads/ramps, no 
parking, no view sites and no picnic areas in the dune cordon 
alongside it. The adjacent land and seascape bear negligible 
visual evidence (even to the ‘educated eye’) of human influence 
(settlement/infrastructure) in the recent past. Thus, to even the 
‘educated eye’, the area has an inherent pristine appearance and 
character, or at least the potential of being restored accordingly 
in the short to medium term with an absolute minimum of 
intervention. It must also be sufficiently unspoilt and of a large 
enough size to:  
i Maintain ecological processes with an absolute minimum of 
management intervention.  
ii Provide a high quality wilderness experience by being 
physically, visually and audibly buffered from adjacent areas of 
human settlement (heightened ‘sense of place’ and of World 
Heritage values).  
Focal Purpose of Zone  i Maintain an undisturbed pristine benchmark area of 
biodiversity and ecosystem processes.  
ii Provide visitors with wilderness/spiritual experiences in a 
marine environment (heightened ‘sense of place’ and of World 
Heritage values).  
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Permissible Uses & Activities 
NOTE 1  
Inshore:  
i Walking on beaches and rocks.  
ii Swimming and snorkelling.  
iii Guided wilderness, special interest/educational trails and 
activities (non-motorised, including on foot, horseback and 
cycling) within the parameters of other permissible and non-
permissible uses and activities.  
iv Highly regulated scientific research and monitoring that 
cannot be carried out elsewhere in the Park.  
v Essential management activities and intervention, including 
law enforcement operations (scheduled patrols and reaction) 
applying the ‘minimum tool’ principle and in line with national 
and international principles of wilderness management.  
vi Special access, assessed on a case by case basis, and requiring 
permits.  
 
Offshore:  
i Guided wilderness, special interest/educational activities (non-
motorised vessels only) within the parameters of other 
permissible and non-permissible uses and activities.  
ii Highly-regulated scientific research, monitoring and World 
Heritage presentation that cannot be carried out elsewhere in the 
Park.  
iii Essential management activities, including law-enforcement 
operations (scheduled patrol and reaction) applying the 
‘minimum tool’ principle.  
iv Special access, assessed on a case by case basis, and requiring 
permits.  
 
Estuarine Lakes:  
i Walking on estuary margins.  
ii Guided wilderness, special interest/educational trails and 
activities (non-motorised, including on foot, horseback and 
canoe) within the parameters of other permissible and non-
permissible uses and activities.  
iii Highly regulated scientific research and monitoring that 
cannot be carried out elsewhere in the Park.  
 
iv Essential management activities and intervention, including 
law enforcement operations (scheduled patrols and reaction) 
applying the ‘minimum tool’ principle and in line with national 
and international principles of wilderness management.  
v Special access, assessed on a case by case basis, and requiring 
permits.  
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Non-Permissible Uses & 
Activities  
Inshore:  
i. All forms of extractive use, including rock and surf angling, 
harvesting of intertidal or shallow subtidal organisms, and 
collection of biota and marine products (e.g. shells, driftwood, 
rocks, sand).  
ii. Fossicking NOTE 4.  
iii. Beach driving, including management vehicles (except in 
emergencies).  
iv. Launching of motorised vessels except for management 
purposes.  
 
Offshore:  
i Scuba diving except for highly regulated research, monitoring 
and World Heritage presentation.  
ii Kite and wind-surfing.  
iii Parasailing from boats or use of jet skis.  
ivAll forms of extractive use, including all types of fishing, and 
collection of biota and marine products (e.g. shells, rocks, sand 
etc.).  
v Use of motorised vessels except for essential management and 
research/monitoring and vessels at sea within the 3 nautical mile 
limit offshore which have the right of passage, but may not be in 
possession of any marine life or parts thereof, and may not stop 
for any reason, other than a declaredNOTE 5 emergency (e.g. 
sinking).  
 
Estuarine Lakes  
iAll forms of extractive use, including angling, harvesting of 
intertidal or shallow subtidal organisms, and collection of biota 
and marine products (e.g. shells, driftwood, rocks and sand).  
ii Fossicking NOTE 4.  
iii Beach driving, including management vehicles (except in 
emergencies).  
iv Launching of motorised vessels except for essential 
management and research/monitoring  
Use Intensity/  
Frequency  
Law enforcement, management activities and visitor use strictly 
limited to:  
i The principles of ‘minimum tool’ and ‘leave no trace’ apply.  
ii Very low intensity.  
iii Very low frequency, the emphasis being on transient use only.  
iv Very small group sizes.  
v Very strict regulation and control over entry.  
Development Nodes  No development or infrastructural facilities (e.g. buoys, beacons) 
permitted.  
Development Restrictions  All types and forms of development prohibited, regardless of 
circumstances and needs.  
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APPENDIX 3 – KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Key informant interview questions – provincial and local level 
 
1. Describe the roles and mandates of your organization. 
2. How are communities within the boundaries of the World Heritage Site 
represented within iSimangaliso Authority Board?  
3. How do the customary, as well as traditional institutions, interact with 
statutory institutions (i.e. iSimangaliso Authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife) to 
govern areas within iSimangaliso World Heritage Site boundaries? Are the 
different roles and mandates clearly outlined? 
4. What is the role and extent of involvement of UNESCO in driving or 
facilitating the activities and priorities of iSimangaliso Authority with regards 
to the World Heritage Site? 
5. What is your understanding of preserving natural heritage and how do you 
think it is pertinent for the Maputaland area? 
6. What are the motivations for the current governance arrangements of coastal 
resources in Maputaland. Why do you believe that this area deserves WHS 
status? 
7. Who is benefiting from the iSimangaliso World Heritage Site, and how are 
these benefits attained? 
8. How does your organization include community members in decision-making 
processes? 
9. Are you aware of any positive examples where the World Heritage Site 
interventions improved community livelihoods? Explain. 
10. List all the organisations/actors that are relevant for governance processes in 
Kosi Bay that you are aware of. In ascending order, rank the 
actors/organisations according to who you consider to have the most influence 
in decision-making processes.  
	
 
Key informant interview questions – national level 
 
1. ISimangaliso has been protected as a World Heritage Site since 1999/2000 for 
its “outstanding universal value”. Can you comment on what you understand 
by this and the reasons why you think such high level conservation is 
significant for this area? Why was protection under “protected area” status at 
national level considered not adequate for this area? 
2. Can you comment on why, historically, the site was identified for conservation 
and motivated for as a natural World Heritage site, instead of a cultural or 
mixed site under the WHC? Who was involved in these processes?  
3. Describe your role in the iSimangaliso Board. 
4. Describe the duties of the iSimangaliso Board. 
5. How are members of the Board nominated/appointed? Do you find these 
processes democratic and representative of key stakeholders? Explain. 
6. Can you explain the line of communication between iSimangaliso Board and 
UNESCO? 
7. How does national government (via the DEA Minister) regulate the activities 
of iSimangaliso Authority? 
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8. Can you describe the interactions between and roles of the following 
institutions with regards to the governance and day-to-day management of the 
World Heritage Site: a) iSimangaliso Authority and UNESCO b) ISimangaliso 
Authority and DEA c) iSimangaliso Authority and EKZN Wildlife d) 
iSimangaliso Authority and the local municipalities adjacent to the Park e) 
iSimangaliso Authority and traditional institutions within and adjacent to the 
Park. 
9. How does the iSimangaliso IMP integrate and uphold national statutes guiding 
marine and coastal resource use and management in South Africa (i.e. NEMA, 
MLRA, NEMPAA) 
10. What do you understand about ‘re-wilding’ within iSimangaliso? Can you 
explain what this means given that the area is already a protected area? What 
implications will this have on local livelihoods? 
11. Given that iSimangaliso is protected at the international scale all the way 
down to the local level, while coastal environments adjacent to the Park such 
as in the south of Mozambique are weakly regulated; do you think that this 
may pose implications on the sustainability of the resources given the porous 
nature of the border? Explain. 
12. The UNESCO Operational Guidelines for the WHC state that indigenous 
communities should be party in the management and policy processes of 
World Heritage sites. How are wider communities within and adjacent to 
iSimangaliso included and represented in decision-making processes 
(historically and in the present), especially given that they are not represented 
in the Board? 
13. Are you aware of any positive examples where communities in the Park have 
benefited from the World Heritage Site? If yes, please provide any.  
14. Are you aware of how communities perceive iSimangaliso Authority and the 
existence of the World Heritage site as a whole? Explain. 
15. How does the iSimangaliso Board monitor whether or not the stated policy 
objectives of the Park match management practice and that communities can 
yield benefits from the Park, as stated on the IMP? 
16. Can you comment on the pending land claims within the Park, as well as on 
the blockages that prevent some of them from being settled? 
17. Who do you consider the most powerful actor(s) in decision-making processes 
about aspects of the governance of the Park that impact on local livelihoods? 
Why? 
18. Do you think local communities are well placed to equitably benefit from the 
existence of the World Heritage Site and decision-making processes involved? 
Explain. 
19. Do you think that the existence of plural governance systems operating in 
iSimangaliso is conducive for good governance? Explain.  
20. Do you think it is possible for iSimangaliso Authority to deliver on UNESCO 
requirements while at the same time ensuring that the livelihoods of 
communities benefit from the Park? Explain.  
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APPENDIX 4 – FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION PROTOCOL 
 
Applying Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques in focus groups – 
developed by Philile Mbatha 
 
PRA introduction 
PRA is a method that can be used by researchers, particularly in the social sciences, to 
understand specific communities in a participatory manner as it encourages the 
participants from the community to actively participate in raising the views about the 
issue in question (Driyamedia, 1996; LBDS, 1996). Conducting research using PRA 
techniques therefore requires that the researchers fully engage in listening and 
understanding people’s opinions, life experiences and traditional knowledge. This is 
pertinent as the community is the primary source of information on the conditions, 
livelihoods, needs and attitudes of the community. 
Eight basic principles we should remember when conducting PRA: 
• Learning from the community – PRA is from, by and for the community and 
therefore researchers must recognise beliefs, norms, knowledge and traditions 
of the community in order to realise the community’s ability to solve their 
own problems 
• Researchers are facilitators, NOT actors – researchers should not see 
themselves as teachers but only as facilitators, demonstrating the will to learn 
from the community and positioning the community members as the main 
source of knowledge in understanding the conditions of the community. 
Therefore, the community dominates the activities in PRA 
• Inter-sharing of experiences – although PRA highly recognises traditional 
knowledge, researchers also need to contribute their scientific knowledge to 
provide the community people with some perspective in understanding certain 
issues. This is because, essentially, neither the community nor the researchers 
are always right, which means that knowledge contributed by either parties is 
equally valuable 
• Researchers should create a relaxed and flexible atmosphere -  an open, 
friendly and informal  atmosphere is conducive for PRA activities 
• Involvement of all the community groups – in order to prevent bias and to 
gain support from the whole community, PRA activity must involve 
community men and women from every class so that the results obtained from 
the discussions do not only favour a certain group within the community 
• Respect differences – the people from the community are different and hold 
different opinions about different issues. Facilitators should therefore promote 
respect between participants 
• Triangulation – using more than one PRA technique to address different issues 
and identifying various types of sources of information is important 
• Learning from mistakes – it is difficult to achieve perfection with PRA 
techniques and mistakes in implementing it are likely to occur. Therefore, the 
important thing is to learn from the mistakes made so as to improve on them in 
future implementation of PRA (Driyamedia, 1996; LBDS, 1996). 
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PRA techniques 
PRA techniques are visual illustrations used as a media for community discussion on 
the conditions of themselves and their environment (Driyamedia, 1996; LBDS, 1996). 
The different techniques are named and explained below: 
1. Mapping 
Mapping involves utilising maps of the community that depict the condition of 
the area. The participating community members collectively make a map of 
their area and this assists them to recognize community conditions, area 
boundaries, land uses, and so on 
• Objectives of conducting a mapping exercise include getting the 
community actively involved in identifying and recognizing the 
conditions of the community collectively. It also gives the community 
participants the chance to identify distribution patterns of natural 
resource use and various relationships that exist with regards to the 
land uses in their area 
• Other sources such as secondary data (i.e. aerial photos or maps) are 
useful in assisting the community in making their own maps 
Figure 1: Examples of community mapping 
 
The participants of a focus group in Mankosi highlighted on the map where they were 
harvest fisheries resources 
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Sketch map of areas of resource use and access for the traditional healers 
 
2. Time lines and ranking  
Timelines may be used to reveal important community events that occurred in 
the past, e.g. droughts, floods, forest felling, etc. This helps researchers 
understand the present condition and behaviour of the community by 
acknowledging the past. Timelines may be used to collect information on 
trends of natural resource use by the community as well as changes in land 
ownership. Old community members are usually crucial for providing 
historical information in timelines. Figure 2 below depicts an example of a 
timeline 
 
Figure 2: Example of a time lines  
Sokhulu community Mbonambi community 
• 1933: commercial 
forestry first came 
(eucalyptus) 
• 1980s: Mondi came 
• 1984: Maphelane 
Reserve established 
• 2003: mining came – 
casuarinas planted 
• 2005-2006: Mondi 
stopped engagement 
• 1933: commercial 
forestry first came 
(eucalyptus) 
• 1976: mining came – 
casuarinas planted 
• 1980s: Mondi came 
• 1984: Maphelane 
Reserve established 
• 2005-2006: Mondi 
stopped engagement 
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with community and 
facilitating permits 
for planting trees 
• After 2006: 
introduction of 
middlemen (new 
wood buyers from 
community) - 
Siyaqhubeka  
 
 
with community and 
facilitating permits for 
planting trees 
• After 2006: 
introduction of 
middlemen (new wood 
buyers from 
community) - 
Siyaqhubeka  
 
 
FACILITATOR NEEDS: 
-        newsprint paper 
-        prestik/adhesive spray 
-        markers 
-       stickers with different  
-     REMEMBER TO TAKE NOTES!!! 
 
 
3. Ranking 
Ranking is helpful in analyzing a number of key issues that were already 
identified by the community while using the other PRA techniques. 
Perceptions, assessments and criteria are believed to be important by the 
community. This process indicates the order of importance among the key 
issues brought up. A score is determined by the PRA team and use by the 
community to indicate level of significance. In both ranking and scoring. It is 
important that all the participants have a similar understanding of the criteria 
by which the participants are developing their preferences for a given issue. 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of ranking of impacts of interventions that were mentioned 
in the timelines 
• Permits from co-management JJ 
• EKZNW has built a parking lot at Nhlabane beach for safety of 
fishermen’s cars – plan is to have a boom gate where people with cars 
will pay and the money will go to the community – committee did this 
with EKZNW but no benefits to committee J 
• Loss of free access to mussels as a source of protein LLL 
• RBM bridge at lake Nhlabane decreased fish stock at the lake LLL 
• We can no longer make crafts because indigenous forests were 
destroyed by mining LLL 
 
 
4. Venn diagrams 
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Venn diagrams consist of overlapping circles drawn to indicate/identify 
different user groups. These are used to identify leaders or organizations 
within the larger circles and to study the relationship between the community 
and institutions or certain parties that influence the life of that community or 
resource use. The result of this exercise show how big or small is the influence 
and closeness of a certain institution with the community and the influence 
and roles of various organizations in the local community, based on the 
judgement of the community itself. 
• Objectives of this exercise include learning more about the benefit and 
role of various organizations in the community and to study the 
interaction between those organizations. Venn diagrams can help 
identify conflicts over resources 
 
Figure 4: An example of a Venn diagram  
 
 
 
PROCEDURE (An example of how to conduct a Venn diagram) 
The aim of this exercise is for understanding who are the stakeholders and 
beneficiaries of the resources in question (e.g. fisheries, forestry, tourism, etc.), the 
different levels of decision making power among stakeholders and the interaction of 
stakeholders in the sharing of benefits. 
1. The facilitator explains that circle shapes are used to understand 
interactions between stakeholders (i.e. government, private sector, NGOs, 
community and other beneficiaries) involved in using or managing the 
resource 
2. The names of stakeholders or beneficiaries are drawn from the ones 
already mentioned in the timeline exercise. The facilitator should name the 
list of stakeholders and ask the group if there are any they would like to 
add before proceeding.  
3. The group is then asked to rank the stakeholders, in ascending order, 
according to who has the most decision making power 
4. Write down the number of the ranking of each stakeholder by the group 
next to their name 
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5. Present the circle shapes to the group and explain largest circle = highest 
decision-making power, medium circle = satisfactory decision making 
power, and the smallest circle = little decision making power 
6. Ask the group to assign a circle size shape to each stakeholder according 
to they perception of decision making power 
7. After all the stakeholders listed are assigned rankings, write the name of 
the stakeholder with the highest ranking in the biggest circle, and then the 
rest in descending order using smaller circles. Then place the biggest in the 
centre of the board, then for the following one, ask whether or not it 
interacts with the first stakeholder in terms of decision-making. Depending 
on the extent to which the group says the two groups influence each other 
in terms of decision-making, place the following circles close, far or in 
overlap with every subsequent circle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5 – ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW & TRANSECT  
 WALK PROTOCOL 
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PLURAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS ON 
COASTAL LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
 
 
Date: ___________________________________________________________ 
Interviewer’s Name: _______________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Name …….. 
2. Where born …… 
3. Age….. 
4. Number of years in village/community…… 
5. In your own words, describe the history of the village by describing how life 
was in the area from when you were a child, up until now. Explain key 
changes in terms of livelihoods and the reasons for those changes.  
